Understanding Protest Diffusion

The Case of the Egyptian Uprising of 2011

Arne F. Wackenhut

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9783030393496
• eBook ISBN:
  9783030393502
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: African Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book traces the mobilization process leading up to the January 25 Uprising, and furthers our understanding of the largely unexpected diffusion of protest during this Egyptian Revolution. Focusing on the role of the so-called "Cairo-based political opposition," this study strongly suggests a need to pay closer attention to the complexity and contingent nature of such large-scale protest episodes. Building on interviews with activists, employees of NGOs in the human rights advocacy sector, and journalists, this in-depth single case study reveals how different movement organizations in the Egyptian prodemocracy movement had long, and largely unsuccessfully, tried to mobilize support for socio-political change in the country. Against this backdrop, the book illustrates how a coalition of activists sought to organize a protest event against police brutality in early 2011. The resulting protests on January 25 surprised not only the regime of Hosni Mubarak, but also the organizers.

© The Author(s) 2020

A. F. WackenhutUnderstanding Protest Diffusionhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39350-2_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Arne F. Wackenhut¹

(1)

School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

Arne F. Wackenhut

Email: [email protected]

Abstract

This chapter introduces the January 25 Uprising and lays out the book’s central aim, research problem and argument. Taking its point of departure in the consistent and repeated failures of the Egyptian prodemocracy movement to mobilize significant popular support for their struggle against the regime of President Hosni Mubarak during the first decade of the new Millennium, it is argued that, to understand the rapid and large-scale diffusion of protest during the Egyptian Uprising of 2011, one not only needs to account for the underlying objective structure of political opportunities, but also for the ways in which different actors at different times perceived, navigated and affected these structures.

Keywords

January 25 UprisingEgyptian prodemocracy movementPresident Hosni MubarakEgyptian Uprising of 2011Political opportunities

End Abstract

On January 25, 2011 thousands of Egyptians took to the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, Ismaïlia, and other cities throughout the country. However, rather than commemorating the deaths of fifty policemen by the hands of the British Armed Forces in 1952 on this National Police Day, the protesters soon demanded ‘the fall of the regime.’

These protests were organized by a coalition of social movement organizations and other groups within the broader Cairo-based political opposition,¹ and marked the visible beginning of a large-scale protest episode. Within a period of eighteen days, they resulted in the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak who had, at the time, been in power for nearly thirty years.

Not unlike the uprising in Tunisia, which had led to the removal of President Ben Ali from power only eleven days before the first protests in Egypt, the scale and outcome of this episode of contention came as a surprise to many observers. In fact, the size and scope of the Egyptian protests surprised even most of the very activists who were responsible for the initial planning and coordination of the event. For instance, a member of the Revolutionary Socialists, a relatively small Trotskyist movement belonging to the broader prodemocracy movement, put these protests on January 25 into historical perspective. He recalled that:

It was unbelievable. It was really a surprise. We were not expecting it. I mean, we expected it to be one big demonstration, but according to our standards, that would have been, maybe a few thousand; that would have been the maximum. (Ahmed H., interview, Cairo, November 1, 2014)

Here, Ahmed H. echoed one of the constant dilemmas of the Cairo-based political opposition, which is best described as an ideologically diverse conglomerate of different social and protest movement organizations with a—at the time—predominantly educated and (upper) middle-class membership. These groups had, for more than a decade, tried to rally popular support for the purpose of effecting socio-political change. However, they had largely failed to mobilize other societal actors and sectors. Even relatively successful campaigns, like the so-called Kefaya (enough) protest episode that started in late 2004, rarely attracted more than a few hundred protesters (El-Mahdi, 2009).²

While the January 25 uprising—now with the benefit of hindsight—did not result in the somewhat cautiously anticipated democratic transition in the country that we have seen, for instance, in the case of Tunisia, the case remains highly relevant and instructive. It remains relevant and instructive insofar as it allows us to garner important new insights into the ways in which visible grassroots resistance in less- and non-democratic settings materializes. Thereby, it not only contributes to a rapidly growing body of literature on this ‘Egyptian Revolution of 2011’ (see e.g. Abdelrahman, 2011, 2015; Beinin, 2012; Clarke, 2014; Jumet, 2018) and the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ more generally, but it also helps us to better understand the complexities of mobilization and large-scale protest diffusion processes more generally.

The Puzzle and Central Argument

Bearing in mind the aforementioned stark differences in terms of protest participation rates between, on the one hand, the 18 days-long uprising that commenced in the wake of the initial protests on January 25, 2011, and previous protest episodes on the other, this book contextualizes and traces the mobilization process leading up to the large-scale diffusion of protest during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011.³ Drawing on social movement theory and the broader contentious politics framework (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007), this book endeavors to more fully understand the complexities of mobilization and protest diffusion processes during this protest episode.

Here, it is argued that it is essential to not only account for the underlying objective structure of political opportunities, but also for the ways in which different actors at different times navigated, affected and perceived these structures. The combination and interaction of these factors allows for a more complete understanding of the subsequent rapid and large-scale diffusion of collective protest during this episode.

Scholars studying mobilization and protest diffusion processes have long asserted that grievances alone are insufficient to understand the occurrence or non-occurrence of large-scale contention (see e.g. Guerney & Tierney, 1982; Snyder & Tilly, 1972). It is now widely accepted that the context in which aggrieved actors operate does, in fact, matter. This context—described in terms of a political opportunity structure—can either facilitate or inhibit the emergence of collective protest for social or political change. McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson (1991) noted, for example, that the complex social, political, and economic environment ultimately shapes the ways in which people formulate their goals and how they work toward achieving them. Relatedly, David Meyer (2004) argued that it is largely this set of structures that determines

the grievances around which activists mobilize, advantaging some claims and disadvantaging others. Further, the organization of the polity and the positioning of various actors within it makes some strategies of influence more attractive, and potentially efficacious, than others. (Meyer, 2004, p. 128)

These structures are, generally, considered to be relatively stable, but might change or be changed over time. This implies that they might be conducive to collective challenges at certain points in time, whilst being less so at other times (Tarrow, 1996).

However, while scholars like Charles Kurzman (1996, 2009) have long argued that political opportunities are one of several key variables affecting forms and extent of such contentious collective action, the precise nature and effects of these structures have on mobilization and protest diffusion are still less than fully understood. There can be little doubt about the fact that the historical, economic, social and political context affects the opportunities non-state challengers have to advance their claims vis-à-vis an incumbent. If, for instance, potential protesters are confronted with a very real risk of imprisonment or even torture will they dare to take to the streets? Traditionally, one would expect such a hostile environment to have a quite chilling effect on protest participation rates. Conversely, one would—assuming that individuals are rational decision makers—expect higher protest participation rates if the inherent risks are comparatively low.

This linear conceptualization of opportunities has, more recently, been enriched by the notion of threats, which can have a similar mobilizing or deterring effect. Goldstone and Tilly (2001, p. 183) elaborate that

[t]he way that “threat” and “opportunity” combine, rather than shifts in the chances of success or the costs of action alone, will shape decisions regarding action. A group may decide to bear very high costs for protest if it believes the chances of achieving success are high; but the same group may decide to avoid even modest costs of protest if it believes the chances of succeeding are low. (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001, p. 183)

Hence, it is not only a broadening opportunity structure that might instigate protest and trigger con...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. It Did Not Start on National Police Day
• 3. Planning and Coordinating a Protest, Not a Revolution
• 4. From Protest to Revolution
• 5. The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same
• Back Matter