The Politics of Recall Elections

Yanina Welp, Laurence Whitehead, Yanina Welp, Laurence Whitehead

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9783030376093
• eBook ISBN:
  9783030376109
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This edited volume presents the first comprehensive analysis of recall processes which have spread globally since the end of the Cold War, and which are now re-configuring the political dynamics of electoral democracy. Drawing on the expertise of country experts, the book provides a coherent and theoretically informed framework for mapping and evaluating this fast-evolving phenomenon. While the existing literature on the subject has so far focused on isolated single-country studies, the collection brings recall experiments to centre stage as it relates them to current crises in the traditional variants of representative democracy. It explains why the spread of recall innovations is set to continue, and to pass a threshold from inattention to urgent engagement. The authors further provide original insights into the rationale for recall, as well as guidance on minimising the accompanying risks.

© The Author(s) 2020

Y. Welp, L. Whitehead (eds.)The Politics of Recall Electionshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37610-9_1

Begin Abstract

1. The Politics of Recall Elections

Yanina Welp¹ and Laurence Whitehead²

(1)

Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland

(2)

Nuffield College, Oxford, UK

Yanina Welp (Corresponding author)

Laurence Whitehead

Email: [email protected]

End Abstract

Traditionally positions of political authority were subject to no fixed time limits. They might be accessed through inheritance, conquest or by virtue of some exceptional power or merit (prophets and sages). In all these cases, leadership tenure would extend indefinitely at the will of the incumbent, subject only to defeat by a rival challenger, permanent incapacity or death. In principle such rulers might voluntarily abdicate or nominate a successor, but these were risky and infrequent alternatives, since the survival of a former ruler would inevitably cast a shadow of the authority of the newcomer.

Representative government provides the standard modern and time limited alternative to this situation. Officeholders gain access to defined parcels of authority for fixed periods of time, subject to procedures and constraints that are not (at least directly) under their control. Challengers with a wider range of attributes can put themselves forward under more predictable and safer conditions, and may try again at a later time if initially unsuccessful. The advantage for incumbents is that they exchange the uncertain benefits of life tenure for the greater security of a defined term followed by an orderly handover. The people they “represent” also gain the prospect of a peaceful and regular rotation of incumbency, with more scope for the recruitment of “new blood”, the correction of arbitrary policy decisions, and some ethic of accountability (under which rulers heed the concerns of their subjects, and may even start viewing them as citizens). As these principles of representation spread through the society, it becomes easier to extend the parcellization of political authority, both within the executive offices of the state, and through a separate legislature and local forms of government. In its full modern form this involves a constitution (rules specifying the relationships between the various parcels of authority) and a rule of law (specialized judicial arrangements for the impersonal arbitration of disagreements between these elected authorities).

The idea of “recall” elections is not a last minute “add on” to these principles of representative government, but rather a logical strand of thought interwoven into this foundational reasoning. Once political authority is no longer grounded on divine right, conquest, hereditary entitlement or prophetic visions, it must find some more performative justification. Officeholders can serve to the extent that they are duly elected, and that they “represent” those over whom they exercise temporary authority. This provides some protection against the arbitrary excesses and insecurities of the traditional formulae, but these defences can only be partial. The very notion of a “time limit” discloses the inherent cross-pressures. Ex ante it cannot be known whether a short or a long term of office will be more performative. Too little time renders the officeholder impotent; too much risks despotism. The right balance will partly depend upon the challenges that arise during the incumbency, but will also be affected by the parcellization of power between the various positions to be filled, the rules concerning re-election, the scope of the constitutional provisions concerning accountability and so on.

In view of these complexities (which help explain why despite centuries of experience no single template for best practice representation has ever won general assent), all systems of office-holding must contend with the hypothesis that under certain circumstances an elected representative might need to be recalled before time. The easiest cases to envisage are the most extreme—treason, insanity, blatant criminality and so on. But once the possibility of in extremis recall is acknowledged then the possibility arises that a broader set of more conventional political failings might be added. At one end of the spectrum lies a view of political office that resembles the “bourgeois” model of private property—a set of entitlements, social obligations and revenue streams that should not be prematurely confiscated, except in cases of clear and serious legal violations and under due process of law. A clear example of this variant is the UK’s 2014 “Recall of MPs Act”, which confines the procedure to cases where an offence has been committed, and at least 10% of the electorate can start a petition for a recall. Constitutional provisions concerning the “impeachment” of sitting presidents mostly operate more or less along these lines (despite the inescapably “political” elements of judgement involved). At the other pole of this debate lies the “imperative mandate” argument (for the most part, although not exclusively, a “left-wing” or even “socialist” alternative to the bourgeois ideal.). This views the officeholder as agent of the electors, charged with transmitting their instructions to the assembly or governing authority to which they are delegated. According to this position, any failure to discharge the mandate as instructed would be cause for instant recall. (Again some “political” elements of judgement are inescapable here—mandated instructions cannot cover all details of a decision, unexpected contingencies may intervene, “instant” recall is an unattainable ideal).

Some chapters included in this volume trace these lines of thought back through the long record of Western debates over political representation (see also Whitehead 2018), but our central concerns are to identify the current conditions that are encouraging widespread new experiments in “recall”, and to draw from both historical and contemporary evidence a clear balance sheet mapping the pitfalls—as well as the potential benefits—of recourse to this long subterranean strand in the representative government tradition of thought.

This is the first volume dealing with recall referendums with a global approach (Zimmerman (1997) and Cronin (1989) published on the US experience). The cases have been selected to offer a general overview and to cover still understudied cases such as Japan or Moldova, Mexico and France. Latin American cases are better covered by previous works, and accordingly we opted for a regional approach in place of presenting case studies. In the case of Switzerland the work of Serdült (2015) is up to date.¹

1.1 Structure of the Volume

In a stage setting chapter, “Recall: Democratic Advance, Safety Valve, or Risky Adventure?” (Chap. 2), the editors propose that in principle the recall referendum is expected to provide a “safety valve” that could help to re-legitimize democratic politics in an era of dissatisfaction. Then, they explore the available empirical evidence to highlight substantial differences in institutional designs both between and within countries as well as evolving episodes of reform over time which affect the performance of the institution.

In “The Political Theory of the Recall. A Study in the History of the Ideas” (Chap. 3), Matt Qvortrup traces the development of the recall in the history of political philosophy from the Roman Republic to present-day republican thought. The chapter outlines how the institution was discussed by Karl Marx before it became an integral part of the political doctrines of respectively Vladimir Lenin and Antonio Gramsci, how the recall was championed by American Centre-left progressives, and how the institution was paradoxically utilized by Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger.

“The Debate on the Recall in France: Imperative Mandate or Political Irresponsibility Under the Fifth Republic?” (Chap. 4) by Clara Egger and Raul Magni-Berton focuses on a case understudied to describe the French experience of recall mechanisms considering the historical diffusion of the idea of recall, its introduction during the French Revolution, as imperative mandate and the most recent developments, especially focusing on the demand which has emerged out of the yellow vests movement, including a discussion of the possible design a recall process could take in France.

“Recall Elections in the US: Its Long Past and Uncertain Future” (Chap. 5), by Joshua Spivak, looks back at US history to show that the recall has been popular before, only to crash back to disuse. But right now, the recall is currently in a boom phase, as jurisdictions in the US have adopted the recall over the last decade and the recall may be growing in use throughout the country. The author analyses the reasons behind this grow as well as the practical hurdles that will prevent the recall from becoming a major player in US politics.

The following chapter moves to the east. “Recall in Japan as a Measure of Vertical Accountability” (Chap. 6) by Mitsuhiko Okamoto and Uwe Serdült showed that between 1947 and 2014 there were at least 1527 signature collections aiming to trigger a recall and 485 binding recall votes. The study shed some light on the less known history, practice, functions and consequences of recall referendum procedures in Japan offering a general overview followed by three case studies examined in more detail (Maki 1996, Akune 2010 and Nagoya 2011).

Then, in “Explaining Institutional Change Towards Recall in Germany” (Chap. 7), Brigitte Geißel and Stefan Jung develop a comprehensive framework based on different institutionalist views (historical, sociological, rational choice) and insights from theories of democratic innovations to explain the adoption and diversity of local recall in Germany.

“Recall Practices in Central and Eastern Europe: From Citizen Accountability to Partisan Account Settling” (Chap. 8) by Sergiu Mișcoiu explores the experience of the post-communist Eastern European countries with recall referendums by bringing e...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. The Politics of Recall Elections
• 2. Recall: Democratic Advance, Safety Valve or Risky Adventure?
• 3. The Political Theory of the Recall. A Study in the History of the Ideas
• 4. The Recall in France: A long standing and unresolved debate
• 5. Recall Elections in the US: Its Long Past and Uncertain Future
• 6. Recall in Japan as a Measure of Vertical Accountability
• 7. Explaining Institutional Change Towards Recall in Germany
• 8. Recall Practices in Central and Eastern Europe: From Citizen Accountability to Partisan Account Settling
• 9. The Recall Revival and Its Mixed Implications for Democracy: Evidence from Latin America
• 10. Reselection and Deselection in the Political Party
• 11. Narratives of Executive Downfall: Recall, Impeachment, or Coup?
• 12. On Reconciling Recall with Representation
• Back Matter