How does nuclear weaponization affect the conventional warfighting patterns of the countries? Such a question becomes more relevant given the fact that following the detonation of two nuclear bombs by the United States (US) in August 1945 and conduction of tests by other first nuclear proliferation wave countries, few more countries which belong to the second nuclear proliferation wave acquired their nuclear weapon in the process of secret nuclear weaponization proliferation. The nuclear weaponization influenced the relations among the countries. The ultimate goal of this book is to examine the impact of nuclear weaponization on the warfighting patterns in respect of conventional conflicts openly waged by one state over another by regular armies.1 In order to address the aforementioned question, we examine the case studies of three countries, attributable to the second nuclear proliferation wave , which are not parties to NPTāPakistan, India, and Israel.2 Our analysis appears to defer from the existing studies, inter alia, in view of the fact, that in contrast to other existing studies regarding the effects of nuclear weapons on conventional war possibility, we focus on conventional warfighting patterns in practice and argue that the nuclear weaponization influence is variable and after crossing the nuclear weaponization threshold various countries have adopted different approaches regarding the conventional warfighting patterns under the nuclear umbrella.
It should be noted that beyond the bookās further contribution to scholarly literature on nuclear weapons, the importance of examining the impact of nuclear weaponization on warfighting patterns is particularly high even nowadays given the Iranian or, in the future, other countriesā attempts to develop nuclear arsenal secretly and thus undermine NPT regime. Would it change their warfighting preferences? Would they adopt escalation and aggressive warfighting pattern at the battlefield or would they adopt restraint and defensive pattern?
Notwithstanding the fact that the literature on the NPTās five nuclear weapons states is abundant, mainly in respect of the so-called ābalance of terror ā in the Cold War era,3 the experience of such countries, doesnāt appear to be applicable for the purposes of examination of the nuclear weaponization influence on the warfighting patterns of the countries in the aforementioned three case studies.
As noted, compared to the first nuclear proliferation wave countries, which should be deemed to be nuclear pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),4 the main characteristic of the second nuclear proliferation wave countries is that they secretly crossed the nuclear weaponization threshold even prior to performance of public nuclear tests and the process was incompatible with the NPT regime rules. The weaponization can be defined as follows:
ā¦assembling nuclear weapons, i.e., fashioning weapon-grade fissile materials (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) into a bomb, by using a workable bomb design.5
Thus, the first wave countries demonstrate a different model regarding the process of nuclear weapon acquisition and the challenges that they had to face. In contrast to such countries, which obtained the nuclear weapon in course of the public tests, Pakistan and India secretly crossed the nuclear weaponization threshold even prior to performance of the public nuclear tests in 1998. In the Israeli case, no public test has been conducted up until the date hereof. Moreover, there has been no explicit acknowledgment by officials of the existence of a nuclear arsenal. As John Weltman argued, at the time, due to the technical progress, a country could possess a usable nuclear weapon without a need first to test it.6
It seems that a model of public introduction of nuclear weapon into a conflict, mainly, by two rival superpowers during the Cold War, Soviet Union and the United States, couldnāt constitute a solid basis for examination of the impact of secret nuclear weaponization on countriesā warfighting patterns.
Upon commencement of the nuclear weapon possession, the size and disposition of nuclear arsenal are vague from the other sideās perspective.7 Since acquiring nuclear capability could affect both belligerentsā perceptions of relative power, public and acknowledged military nuclear capability is not associated with the same degree of uncertainty regarding adversaryās actual nuclear status.
This nuclear condition is characterized by a high degree of confidentiality and is referred to in the academic literature as āOpacityā:
ā¦ a situation in which a stateās nuclear capability has not been acknowledged, but is recognized in a way that influences other nationsā perceptions and actions.8
At a later stage, such a term was further developed. Thus, David Hagerty defined the concept as follows:
Opaque proliferation is a governmentās covert development of nuclear weapon capabilities combined with its public denial of any intention to deploy nuclear weapons.9
Furthermore, as aforementioned, while previous studies focused mainly on the impact of nuclear weapons on deterrence, strategic stability,10 namely, the subject of weaponization influence on warfighting at the conventional level, seems to be relatively neglected by scholars.
Moreover, nuclear deterrenceās logic appears to be different. The aim of deterrence is to prevent a war. Nevertheless, by examining weaponization influence on warfighting, one is not interested to explore whether and how weaponization encourages deterrence but whether and to what extent it affects the traditional patterns of warfighting. Therefore, these theories cannot answer questions such as: Why does crossing a weaponization threshold affect differently warfighting patterns of Pakistan , India , and Israel ? What is the causal mechanism of such influence? How do countries prefer one warfighting pattern over another? How do such choices affect conflicts?
Since the existing studies do not provide comprehensive answers to such important questions and rather focus on nuclear weapons influence on deterrence and conflicts stability than on its influence on conventional warfighting patterns, this book contributes to the research by broadening the scholarly discussion beyond and shift the focus from the study of nuclear weapons influence on deterrence to the examination of nuclear weaponization influence on countriesā practical behavior in wars.
Accordingly, as will be discussed in detail below, we will examine the presumed variable influence of nuclear weaponization through the implementation of an alternative model, which is inspired by the neoclassical realism and consists of two concepts: the concept of a strategic threat and the concept of strategic culture. Such combined approach, focusing on external and internal variables, allows to examine differences in warfighting patterns the countries adopt as a result of nuclear weaponization and thus avoiding determinism that characterizes theories examining the effect of nuclear weapons on strategic stability.
Since there is no āone-size-fits-allā model to examine warfighting patterns under the nuclear umbrella, we identify and classify three models of nuclear weaponization influence:
- Restraint Impositionāreferring to the situation in which a country, given a nuclear aggressive foe, is restrained and...