Is Euroscepticism still adequate to describe the variegated opposition flank that has developed over the last decade or so around Europe? This is the core theoretical question of this book. As the history of the European Union (EU) and of European integration teaches us, standing challenges are facing the old continent. Such challenges have become more pronounced during the last fifteen years or so. The economic crisis, the more recent immigration crisis and a general âpolitical crisisâ epitomized by the results of the Brexit referendum shake the stability, unity and shape of the European integration project. These factors are connected to a broader âdemocratic malaiseâ (Brack 2018) that contributes to consolidate and stabilize a polymorphic and heterogeneous opposition flank addressing the shape, the competencies and even the very nature of the EU.
This opposition differs in several characteristics (e.g. their origin and role at the national level) and ranges from the extreme right to the extreme left of the ideological spectrum. In spite of this, the literature still labels it under a single âumbrellaâ concept: Euroscepticism. It is enough to mention a couple of parties that has obtained a remarkable success in both national and European Parliament (EP) elections to understand this heterogeneity. Letâs think about the cases of Hungary and Poland where the FIDESZ and Law and JusticeâPISâcover major governing positions. Spain, where the left-wing Unidas Podemos (UP) won 35 seats in the national parliament after the 2019 being overtaken by Vox, a right-wing emergent party that managed to score 15.09% of the national vote share obtaining 52 seats in the national chamber in 2019. France, where the National FrontâFNâled by Marine Le Pen challenged Emmanuel Macron and his newly created centrist party âEn Marcheâ during the second round of the French presidential elections in May 2017 and got 8 seats in the French National Assembly in the June 2017 legislative elections. Germany, where the right-wing party Alternative for GermanyâAFDâgot represented in the Bundestag after the 2017 national elections becoming the main opposition party in Germany (Lees 2018). Austria where the Freedom Party of AustriaâFPĂâwas the junior coalition party of the Kurz government since December 2017 beside losing its position in the subsequent elections in favour of the Austrian Greens. Italy, where the re-branded Leagueâformer Northern League, LNâand the Five Stars MovementâFSMâscored unprecedented electoral results at the expenses of their mainstream governing counterparts1 and formed the so-called âyellow-greenâ governing alliance, an alliance that lasted approximately one year beside falling apart due to disagreements between the two parties.
Having said that, this chapter stresses the origin and limits of Euroscepticism, guiding the reader through its potential reconceptualization through the lenses of political opposition focusing on how EU-opposition has a higher heuristic validity to explain political partiesâ criticism of the EU in connection to the current European crises. The chapter then presents the methods and the cases used throughout the work, detailing bookâs structure, while a conclusive section stresses the core reasons to focus on EU-opposition as central concept for research.
1.1 Euroscepticism, Origin and Limits of a Contested Concept: Studying EU-opposition in the EP
Initially, Euroscepticism was treated as a phenomenon belonging to the âmarginsâ of the national political competition (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008) and it was thus studied in connection with the national government vs. opposition dynamics (Taggart 1998; Sitter 2001, 2003). The parties not belonging to governing coalitions at the national level take up the EU issue to challenge the mainstream governing majority and attract electoral consensus (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2017).
If it was legitimate to consider Euroscepticism as a âmarginalâ concept, this consideration now clashes with more recent developments in Europe: parties critical of the EU has gained ground both at the national at the European level. Consequently, âEuroscepticismâ should not anymore be relegated to the margins of the national political competition. On the contrary, it should be studied at the various levels of the EU multilevel governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Usherwood 2017) or at least at the two major levels of the EU governance: national and supranational (Helms 2008).
However, instances of âEuroscepticismâ in the EP have been widely neglected, due to two main reasons. First, the political competition in the EP is hindered by the fact that mainstream governing parties operate in the so-called âgrand coalitionâ de facto excluding their challengers from the political competition. This is why the EP is widely regarded as a consensual institution, a âbastionâ of pro-European integration sentiments. Second, the EP has been considered as an âunrewarding locationâ for forces critical of the EU, since its activity is mainly concerned with legislation rather than issues of more or less Europe (Benedetto 2008). In fact, apart from some eminent exceptions (Katz 2008; Brack 2012, 2018; Brack and Costa 2012; Lynch et al. 2012; Whitaker and Lynch 2014), studies concerning Euroscepticism within the supranational EP arena are still rare.
This book partially fills this gap. It firstly questions the adequacy of Euroscepticism to understand the variegated nature of criticism towards the EU. It then assumes that the EU is to be conceived as a political system (Kassim 2003; Hix 2005; Hix and Høyland 1999, 2011; Kreppel 2012; Mair 2013) where political parties take stances on its various components (the authorities, the institutions, the political community and the output of the system, the policies, see Easton 1975) and, finally, proposes a reconceptualization of Euroscepticism in terms of political opposition. Parties working within the EU system oppose or support the âcomponentâ of that system configuring a broad range of stances towards the system. Using EU-opposition this book focuses on the EP and analyses which aspects of the EU do national parties oppose from within the arena of the EP?
1.2 The European Crises and the Consolidation of a Political âPhenomenonâ
The process of constitutionalization2 of the EU is widely regarded as an âelite-led processâ originating from the mainstream governing elite that decided to pool part of the national sovereignty for the development of a supranational community (Mair 2007, 2013). This elite-led process gave origin to a peculiar polity with a peculiar multilevel system of governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001), where political actors share decision-making competencies at different and increasingly interconnected levels of governance (sub-national, national and supranational) rather than monopolize them at the national level. To put it more simply, the EU is âa construct, a system designed and built by constitutional architectsâ (Mair 2013, 216) who were government and partiesâ leaders at both the national (national governments) and the supranational levels (Council of Ministers and European CommissionâEC) and built the EU without any substantial room for either politics or parties. This âconsensualâ decision-making was, initially, âlargely unexplained and certainly under-advocated to the average citizensâ (Bellamy and Warleight 2001, 9) and the EU issue was almost absent from the national political competition. Europe was framed positivelyâas a common goodâby those mainstream parties inhabiting the decision-making arenas at the national and, consequently, at the supranational level. In other words, initially, the European integration process could progress smoothly thanks to a diffused âpermissive consensusâ among the elite and the public at large (Mair 2007).
Signs of contestation of the EU integration process were, however, present since its inception and became more apparent in the 90s with the first referendum on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (held in France and Denmark where it was repeated twice). In other words, we assist to the passage from âpermissive consensusâ to the âconstrained dissensusâ: thanks to the action of âEuroscepticsâ capitalizing on the EU issue, people become more aware of the European integration ...