1.1 Administrative Reforms, Types of Public Policy and the Empirical Science of Public Administration
The adoption and implementation of administrative reforms could be thought of as being relatively smooth. Neither they imply the huge financial costs of social policies, nor do they focus on identitarian and ideologically divisive issues. Rather, they are based on the commonsensical idea that red tape is excessive and public bureaucracies are rigid, tardy and inefficient. In principle, therefore, they could easily attract some consensus among both citizens and members of the political elite. At the same time, for the above reasons the decision making processes leading to their approval could be expected not to be ridden with controversies and conflicts. According to the seminal taxonomy of public policies proposed by Lowi (1970, 1972), administrative reforms seem to belong to âconstituent policiesâ, which are in fact characterized by remoteness of coercion and low levels of conflict.1
Gustavsson (1980) combined Wilsonâs (1980) and Lowiâs taxonomies: administrative reforms can be seen as measures with diffused costs and diffused benefits, being to some extent able to âdetermineâ (in Lowiâs vein), like any type of public policy, the way political interactions (i.e. politics) develop. This would be consistent with their supposed relative âeasinessâ. One might guess that all that is actually needed is the availability of certain technical policy instruments (which could be creatively devised or, more frequently, imitated), whose application can be credibly expected to reduce or solve certain problems plaguing existing public bureaucracies. Imitation and learning would therefore be the main factors in order to explain why certain historical phases apparently exhibit âwavesâ of administrative reforms, which expand themselves across many countries. This is what is supposed to have happened at first with the diffusion of the neo-liberal version of new public management (NPM ), which stressed the need to cut costs and import efficient tools from the private sector, and then with other more progressive approaches, which rather emphasized service quality, involvement of citizens/users, openness of governance and participation (the so-called âpost-NPMâ models). Such a picture, however, would be overly simplistic, and anyway is contradicted by several hard facts. When they are really impactful, administrative reforms often modify, reduce or eliminate existing advantages and opportunities for rent-seeking. Therefore, in such cases they would rather imply concentrated costs and diffused benefits, hence a much more adversarial and difficult decision path. Apart from the more or less overt opposition of bureaucrats or other actors whose material interests would be directly damaged by a reform, also the general culture, the institutions or the policy style of each country are relevant in favouring or obstructing the adoption and implementation of administrative reforms (Lenschow et al. 2005; Stillman 2016; Gustafsson and Richardson 1980; Richardson 1982). It must also be remarked that the diffusion of the various waves of public management reforms was not in fact so widespread, homogeneous and uncontroversial (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017; Goldfinch and Wallis 2010; Massey 2018). A public intervention in this field could be merely or mostly symbolic, when it is devoid not only of the necessary minimum of financial resources, but also of sanctions or other tools that can alter bureaucratic structures and performances deeply enough. It can also happen that, even if the innovation is explicitly inspired by some foreign experience or managerial approach, it resorts to choosing inappropriate instruments (e.g. performance evaluators that are supposed to be independent, but actually are not).
Public administrations and the policies affecting them can be studied from three different cognitive points of view: that of the jurists, who interpret valid texts in order to derive from them legal obligations and consequences; the managerial one, which is focused on the practical need of performance improvement; that of empirical social scientists (who belong to the science of administration, political science, sectoral sociology and other relevant fields), who produce explanatory/predictive accounts based on factual evidence, concerning the actual operation of real public bureaucracies, as well as the genesis, formulation, drafting, legitimacy and impact (including unintended consequences) of reforms.2 The present study is to be attributed to the third point of view. We examined Italian administrative reforms against the background of the interface between external pressures, isomorphic change, path dependency and domestic politics. The framework is dynamic and reflects the balance of power relations among the relevant actors and institutions involved in the administrative policy as a subsystem. That is the way we see politics and the policy processes interact, confirming that in order to understand administrative reforms trajectories the âpureâ dichotomy between politics (politicians) and administration (bureaucrats) within the policy cycle (decision making vs. implementation) is not enough.
1.2 Continuity and Changes Within Public Administrations
There is wide convergence among scholars of public administration (PA) that âadministrative reform is a slow process of incremental small changes, with radical changes occurring only occasionallyâ (Kickert 2011: 802), often as a result of external shocks (the so-called critical junctures3). Anyway, beyond the pessimistic view that administrative reforms âare mostly piecemeal, gradual and incrementalâ and that âalmost nothing happened at allâ, particularly in Southern European states, Kickert concludes that âmany small changes could add up to a substantial changeâ (ibidem). In fact, modes of gradual, nevertheless transformative change, were also taken into consideration by historical institutionalists, traditionally more used to adopt an âall-or-nothingâ dichotomous way of thinking (the well-known âpunctuated equilibriumâ theory).
The heritage from the Napoleonic state model, dominated by formalism and legalism, explains why in Southern European administrations new public management reforms (such as privatization, contracting-out, publicâprivate partnerships, view of the citizen as a client, performance measurement, results-based budgeting and decentralization) were mainly reframed in legal terms (Capano 2003)4 and often produced limited, or even perverse, effects (Pollitt et al. 2007).
Studying the dynamics of public management reform in Italy, Ongaro (2009) asked whether there was change of âa radical kind through disruption of the old equilibrium and transition to a new equilibriumâ or whether reforms of the public sector were âpurely superficialâ, that means that âpath dependency has prevailed and there has been no or limited change, or else whether there has been change through accumulation of small changesâ (ivi: 10). He suggested a mixed interpretation, generally agreed in the scholarly debate: by reason of an unfavourable environment for paradigmatic reforms since the beginning of the 1990sâdescribed by the notion of âcontext in motionâ, i.e. a scenario characterized by continuous transformations of the political and institutional system (Ongaro 2011), hence a context of political instability (Mele and Ongaro 2014)âthere was but only limited, âpatchyâ change. On the one hand, it was âpartly in the form of punctuated change occurring through disruption driven mainly by political turmoilâ in the 1990s (after the Tangentopoli corruption scandals); on the other hand, it was âpartly through accumulationâ in the way of specific mechanisms, like layering and conversion (ivi: 30). A process of ânegotiated changeâ (Bull and Rhodes 1997; 2007) is strongly characterized by path-dependent evolution.
This is also why, descr...