The aftermath of African independence in the early 1960s was marked by the emergence of imperial presidencies across the continent and the total disregard for any notion of power alternation in the constitutional and political order of most countries. Adept at playing Cold War politics and manipulating the masses, many African leaders succeeded in being crowned de facto or de jure life presidents. They came to symbolize the āBig Manā syndrome, a landmark of African political landscape that spoke to the centrality of personal rule and various systems of patronage orchestrated by the leader to ensure his longevity in office. In such a system , there was no ontological separation between the leader and the state. The leader was the state. Congoās Mobutu Sese Seko, Ivory Coastās Felix Houphouet Boigny, Egyptās Hosni Mubarak or Gabonās Omar Bongo were some of the archetypal Big Men, a breed of life presidents or ādinosaursā of African politics that would hold a firm grip on power and dominate their societies for decades.
The crisis of the African state in the 1980s, combined with the geo-politics of the post-Cold War era, opened up the political and social space needed to challenge big menās hold on power and advocate for presidential term limits, which would become a key feature of post-Cold War constitutional orders engineered across the continent in the 1990s. It is important to note that the embrace of presidential term limits as a new democratic norm in the early years of the post-Cold War era was not the subject of much discussion on the continent. No major political or social forces openly stood against it. It was easily included in the package of reforms that countries were quick to adopt to assert their democratic credentials and chart a new political path. In some instances, it was even supported by the same big men who had ruled their countries for decades, only to challenge it in years to come.
Since its adoption by the majority of African presidential regimes in the years following the end of the Cold War , the institution of presidential term limits has come under successive waves of assault in many countries whose leaders have contemplated or sought its removal or alteration in order to extend their time in office. The first wave, which began in the early 2000s, was led by incumbents such as Namibiaās Sam Nujoma, Zambiaās Frederick Chiluba , Guineaās Lansana Conte, Ugandaās Yoweri Museveni , Nigeriaās Olusegum Obasanjo , Gabonās Omar Bongo and Tunisiaās Ben Ali, some of who succeeded whereas others failed to achieve their goal of removing or altering term limits. The most recent wave (2015ā2017) has put the institution of term limits at the forefront of political debate and maneuvering in countries such as Rwanda , Burundi, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo , and the Republic of the Congo. It has resulted in various outcomes that are dissected in the case studies included in this volume.
Overall, a numerical overview of the institution shows that in the early 1990s, 33 out of 48 constitutions had enabled presidential term limits, thus raising the hope of a new constitutional era in Africa and āreflecting a new logic of power alternation , a novelty at the time.ā1 However, between 1990 and 2009, 26 incumbents representing 72% of the total number of countries with term limits considered altering them to prolong their tenure. Of this group of leaders, only 15 would actually attempt a constitutional amendment with an alarmingly high rate of success. Bids to remove term limits succeeded in 12 countries and were rejected only in 3, representing a success rate of 80% relative to the number of attempts.2 This situation raises serious concerns over the long-term viability of the institution of term limits and its impact on Africaās democratic trajectory even though, as of 2017, 32 countries still had the principle of power alternation through presidential term limits enshrined in their constitutions.
It is important to note that assaults on the institution of presidential term limits in Africa over the past two decades have been part of a global and long trend that has seen incumbent presidents from Latin America to post-Soviet Eurasia questioning its legitimacy. It has been reported that, between 1960 and 2010, more than a quarter of 200 term-bounded presidents that had exhausted their term in office succeeded, in various forms and manners, in extending their stay beyond constitutionally mandated terms .3 This number does not include incumbents whose attempts failed as well as those who contemplated the idea of extending their stay but did not, in the end, table a constitutional amendment to that effect or engage in extra constitutional actions to stay in office. This global context must be kept in mind when discussing the institution of term limits in Africa. Even though there are certain dynamics that are particular to African societies, the latter does not need to be exoticized as is often the case in social sciences debates. The questioning of term limits by incumbents or attempts to remove them are not some kind of African āpathologyā that leaders and societies elsewhere would be immune against.
Onslaughts on presidential term limits in Africa and globally over the two past decades, and the ensuing political debates, have generated a great deal of scholarly interest and empirical studies shedding new insights on the classical institution of term limits through the examination of a number of variables influencing incumbentsā propensity to seek term alteration as well as those impacting the success or failure of such attempts at term elongation . To place the discussion of the politics of presidential terms limits in Africa in its proper context, the following sections will successively offer some historical and global perspectives on presidential term limits, revisit the core political and philosophical arguments in the debate over presidential term limits, review key theoretical contentions and empirical insights on presidential term limits, and outline the present bookās added value and structure.
Historical and Global Perspectives on Term Limits
The democratic institution of presidential term limits, which stipulates a presidentās maximum length of tenure in office, has deep historical roots that can be traced back to ancient Greece and the Roman republic. It has survived the vicissitudes and convulsions of history and has spread across the globe to become a landmark of modern democratic presidential regimes, often contested by rulers imbued with their own sense of indispensability and seeking political immortality, but reaffirmed through trials and tribulations that speak to its universality and enduring relevance across times and cultures .
History teaches that the institution of term limits was first practiced by ancient Greeks who sought to dilute the dangers of power usurpation on the part of elected officials by mandating they served, with very limited exceptions, only a single or two terms in office. Underlining this mandate was the view that by limiting the number of terms one could serve in a particular office, all citizens are given the opportunity to seek that office if they so desire, thus reinforcing the idea of equality among the citizens. Frequent office rotation was thought to contribute to the good of the city by compelling moderation on the part of elected officials.
Following ancient Greece, the Roman republic (509ā27 B.C.) would also enact term limits for the majority of its magistrates.4 Expanding on the rationale put forward earlier in Greece, republican Rome emphasized the need, through mandated office rotation, to prevent personal rule and moderate political competition, thus ensuring the stability of its aristocratic political system. In broad strokes, it is worth observing that, with a few exceptions pertaining to specific emergency situations and a few successful second consulships, term limits were generally enforcedāalongside other checks and balancesāduring the Roman republic until Julius Caesar decided to deviate from this republican norm by having himself declared Father of the Country and dictator perpetus in 44 B.C. It is worth noting that Caesarās assassins would justify his killing on the imperative of returning the republic to its proper course by delivering it from the claws of a de facto, if not the jure, king.5 The practice of term limits lasted until the demise of the republic in 27 B.C., which led to a long era of perpetual and personal rule. Following the demise of the Roman Republic, the practice of term limits would later resurface, in various forms and contours, in a number of medieval and early modern European cities and republics such as Novgorod, Pskov, Genoa, and Florence. In the latter, for example, members of the executive council, in which power was vested, enjoyed only a two-month term of office.6 By all historical accounts, there is little evidence to suggest that tenure limitation was practiced, at that time, outside of the European theater.
Fast-forwarding to the emergence of modern democratic constitutions, it is important to note that the notion of term limits was not initially part of the constitutional engineering that took place in the late 1700s. Neither the US Constitution of 1788 nor the French Constitution of 1793 made any reference to term limits. In the case of the USA , even though term limits for officeholders, especially in regard to the office of the president, was discussed during the Constitutional Convention, it would not, in fine, figure in the constitution that was adopted by the delegates. Presidential term limits would however quickly become an informal institution of American politics following President George Washingtonās decision to voluntarily step down after his second term in 1796. As for France, following the silence of the initial constitution of 1793, term limitation would be mandated, two years later, for the five-man executive directory established by the new constitution of 1795.7
George Washingtonās decision would prove to be of great historical and political significance. It revived the debate about term limitation in presidential regimes, and influenced presidential constitutions engineering that took place in subsequent decades in a number of newly independent countries in Latin America (Bolivia , Venezuela , and Argentina ).8 Even though not formally embedded in the US Constitution, the tradition started by George Washington would be scrupulously followed by all his successors with the exception of President Franklin D. Roosevelt who went on to seek and win four terms in office. The precedent set by President Roosevelt generated the necessary impe...