This book presents an opportunity to contribute to the intellectual exposition on land and to reconceptualize land and land policy in the ânewâ South Africa (i.e. a democratic country after the end of apartheid). This becomes pertinent due to the failure of existing policy, which accounts for South Africaâs efforts to âre-packageâ land reform, under the populistâs tag, land expropriation without compensation (LEWC). Pessimists still struggle to grasp why it took the government about 25 years to accept the failure of the market-driven reform programmes, particularly its incapacity to redress historical land dispossession and the attendant structural violence that characterized post-apartheid South Africa. Furthermore, land policy has faced the challenge of outlining long-term planning scenarios or effective implementation strategies because of the complicity of the issue and governmentâs lacklustre attitude towards land reform. The pressures of democratization and globalization impede effective policy in the land sector, which is founded on land restitution, redistribution and a tenure system.
As stipulated in the 1997 White Paper on Land Reform, land restitution targets the return of the land (or otherwise compensating victims of land seizures) lost since the June 1913 Land Act due to racially discriminatory laws. Land redistribution makes provision for previously disadvantaged, poor and underprivileged people to buy land with the help of a Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant, and land tenure reform âaims to bring all people occupying land under a unitary, legally validated system of landholdingâ (Department of Land Affairs, 1997: 7). Building on the 1997 White Paper on Land Reform, the government in 2014 formed the current land policy on four pillars: restitution of land rights; redistribution of land; land tenure reform; and development of the land (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 2014). However, it has been accepted unanimously that the governmentâs performance in these four elements remains very low and certainly fell short of public expectation.
At the advent of majority rule in 1994, black South Africans were restricted to only 13% of the national land, which constituted the former Bantustan land (Ciskei, Gazankulu, Kangwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, Qwaqwa, Transkei, Venda and Bophuthatswana) (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 2013: 8). Decades after majority rule, this skewed land arrangement still holds sway. In 2018, the land audit reveals that,
Whites own 26 663 144 ha or 72% of the total 37 031 283 ha farms and agricultural holdings by individual landowners; followed by Coloured at 5 371 383 ha or 15%, Indians at 2 031 790 ha or 5%, Africans at 1 314 873 ha or 4%, other at 1 271 562 ha or 3%, and co-owners at 425 537 ha or 1%. (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 2018: 2)
Indeed, rethinking the existing land policy is a matter of necessity and not of choice. However, land reform must represent a radical and rapid break from the past without significantly disrupting agricultural production and food security. The state must mobilize resources to reverse both the human and material conditions of those displaced by previous land policies (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 2014: 1).
As enshrined in the 2011 Green Paper on Land Reform, ânational sovereignty is defined in terms of land. Even without it being enshrined in the countryâs supreme law, the Constitution, land is a national assetâ (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 2011: 1). The policy document conceives social cohesion as a direct function of land use, access and ownership.
While the struggle against apartheid was not rooted in land issues, Kariuki (2009) maintains that the land issue was a major instrument of mass mobilization against foreign domination and support for the attainment of democracy in 1994. Failure of many African states, like South Africa, to address the land and development nexus accounts for the national struggles for access to land that have been experienced on the continent in the mid-2000s (Moyo, 2007). More than a decade after Moyoâs presentation, the South African states have been unable to resolve the land question by redressing land inequality, occasioned by the history of dispossession during colonialism and apartheid.
While South Africa adopted a liberal democratic constitution after apartheid, the seeming radicalization of its constitutional provisions has failed to significantly address unequal access to land and disempowerment of black people. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (2014: 2) reiterates the fact that,
Colonialism and Apartheid brutalized African people, turning them hostage to perennial hunger and want, and related diseases and social strives and disorders. Thus, rural development, agrarian change and land reform must be a catalyst in the ANC-led governmentâs mission to reverse this situation.
This has not been the case, but instead, land conflict continues, illegal occupation and land/farm evictions persist, while the majority of blacks remain very poor and vulnerable.
Furthermore, the land reform, funded on a neoliberal policy framework, tagged âwilling buyer, willing sellerâ approach, marginalizes both the rural and urban poor (Moyo, 2007). The willing buyer, willing seller approach has faced budget restraints, which has manifold manifestations: internal allocation of budget for competing priorities in the land and agricultural sector; involvement of different professional players (land valuers, lawyers or land practitioners, officials of several government agencies, private service providers); and rising cost of land, since the policy was launched (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 41).
South Africa is becoming cognizance of the place of small-scale farming as opposed to the general privilege accorded large commercial farmers, before, during and after apartheid. The âover-emphasizedâ commercial farmers have enjoyed âhistorical privileges (in terms of credit, services, electricity, irrigation and marketing infrastructure)â (Moyo, 2007: 6), whereas the small-scale farming sector has been characterized by underdevelopment and farm struggles. This contradiction engenders farm conflicts and attacks, leading to loss of lives and property. There is a growing advocacy that âfarm attacks and farm murders should be treated as a separate crime category; be regarded as a priority crime; and need a particular solutionâ (Burger, 2018: 2). While there is generally an upward trend in violent crimes in the country, the recurring brutality against white farmers and resultant racialization of farm murders require an urgent solution (Burger, 2018).
In many African countries, large parcels of lands are controlled by the government, but the large hectares of land controlled by white South Africans, amidst prevailing land hunger by black people, is of great concern. One of the land audits of the South African government reveals that 14% of the entire land is state owned, 79% privately owned and 7% unaccounted for (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 2013: 9). Many farms that are also managed by the government are becoming nonviable. The reluctance of the state to cede part of its land and farms for redistribution, which has been received with mixed feelings, constituted one of the strongest arguments employed by the antagonists of the proposed LEWC under the South African President Cyril Ramaphosaâs administration. The opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), categorized the current land reform struggles as âa lost opportunity to empower a growing pool of South Africans for economic participationâ (DA, 2013). While there is a genuine need to revisit the existing land reform, the proposed LEWC may not be the most appropriate policy option required to achieve an effective land reform programme.
Structure of Book
This book draws from the standpoint of critical epistemology to interrogate the existing land reform programmes and engage the proposed policy choice of LEWC. The book adopts divergent research methodology (qualitative and quantitative founded on survey, focus group study and unstructured interviews) to properly locate the unresolved land question in scholarship exposition. The book, subjected to peer-reviews, is divided into fourteen chapters.
In this Chapter, Expropriation and Discontent of Land Reform in South Africa: An Introduction, the authors, Adeoye O. Akinola, Irrshad Kaseeram and Nokukhanya N. Jili, draw from the chapter synopses and provide the background to the book. It locates the book in context and explores the decisive factors responsible for the contradictions inherent in a post-apartheid land reform scheme. The chapter connects with the history of land dispossession in the apartheid regime to locate the choice of LEWC.
Chapter 2, Expropriation as an Effective Tool for Land Reform, by Desan Iyer and Lizelle Ramaccio Calvino, provides a brief overview of the pre-democracy policies that may have contributed towards the injustice of land dispossession in South Africa, as well as assesses whether, and to what extent, the post-democracy land reform policies have redressed historical inequality. The chapter analyses the current legislative framework and possible land expropriation, and the probable inconsistencies of the Constitution and the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 and considers whether Section 25 of the Constitution requires amendment or whether land can be expropriated without compensation within the current South African legislative framework.
In Chapter 3, Globalization of South African Land Reform Scheme: An Interrogation, Adeoye O. Akinola and Irrshad Kaseeram relate land policy to the history of foreign domination and dependency. The authors hold that land issues shape the interaction between the Global North and South, through the history of imperialism, colonialism and apartheid. Through historical conversations, the chapter examines the trajectories of land reforms and evaluates the nationâs performance in the land reform scheme. The chapter finds that the reality of land reform in Africa has not achieved equity to redress historical injustices, but rather it has been driven by a neoliberal order ...