Ideological Seduction and Intellectuals in Putin's Russia

Dmitry Shlapentokh

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9783030498313
• eBook ISBN: 9783030498320
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the interplay between key rulers and intellectuals in creating and sustaining popular discourses that often help keep rulers in power. By focusing in particular on the relationship between Putin and Dugin during the early Putin regime, the author zooms in on the questionable honesty in Putin's interest in Dugin's philosophy, and the instrumentality of that philosophy for strategic regime building. Arguing that ideology is largely supported by political philosophies that gain popular traction, the book questions the extent to which rulers are likely to stay faithful to their stated ideologies. Providing on-the-ground insight into Putin's rule, this book appeals to researchers and policymakers studying Post-Soviet Politics.

© The Author(s) 2021

D. ShlapentokhIdeological Seduction and Intellectuals in Putin's Russiahttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49832-0_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Dmitry Shlapentokh¹

(1)

Department of History, Indiana University South Bend, South Bend, IN, USA

Dmitry Shlapentokh

Email: [email protected]

End Abstract

What is the purpose of this book? As soon as the reader glances at the title, he would, most likely, place it in the context of the prevailing view of Russia. After 2014, or possibly earlier, Fukuyamian “end of history,” i.e., the inevitable triumph of Western democratic capitalism, made it increasingly irrelevant. At this time, Russia with Putin at the helm has emerged as a threat to the West, especially the USA. The image of the enemy has been recast and it is quite different now from what has been prevailing in the West for a long time. It was believed in the past that the Russian elite and, in a way, Russians as a people, had been obsessed with messianic dreams and ready for the Armageddon of global conquest. This image has mostly disappeared. In the present-day narrative, the Russian elite became conniving manipulators and have engaged in this with almost superhuman ability: it was they who put President Trump in the White House, created serious problems for NATO and the EU and are ready to foment disorder in the USA among law-abiding citizens. This possible perception of the book is wrong. My book is not about Russia as a “bad boy” who spoils the lives of benign Westerners. Consequently, it is not about Russian power. It is about any power in its modus operandi. Putin’s Russia is just the particular case for study. Russian power is basically identical to many other modern powers, the USA included. The focus of this manuscript is on the relationship between power and intellectuals and, in broader terms, ideology. There are several prevailing views on the role of ideology in society. One of the most popular theories is the assumption that ideology and, consequently, ideologists shape the political narrative. There are several reasons for interest in the cases in which ideology indeed plays an important role in shaping historic events. One of them is the view of intellectuals. It is much more pleasing for them to be seen as the driving force behind the historical process. The goal of the proposed monograph is not the study of cases in which ideologists/intellectuals shape the views of the people in power, but when they are used/manipulated by power. Several models exist here.

One, widely explored during the Cold War and beyond, is the relationship between intellectuals and power in totalitarian states. Libraries of books have been published on this subject in the West. In this narrative, brutish and all-embracing states use rough power in dealing with intellectuals, who have few choices: either bend and follow the desires of the all-powerful state, or perish in camps or be shot. This narrative implicitly juxtaposes totalitarian restrictions on unfettered creativity to freedom of creativity in the democratic, capitalist West. It implies that those intellectuals who were able to escape the clutches of the totalitarian beast became truly creative in the West, where they enjoy not only the freedom to write what they want, but also recognition. This is also basically an illusion. Here we deal with the other model of interaction between intellectuals and power, the elite in general. In this case, the intellectual is not compelled to follow the dictums of the elite or, to be precise, the all-powerful ruler because of the fear of repression, but because he is either directly or indirectly bought: following the dictums of the market entails prestigious publications, jobs and other perks. Those who part with or, even more so, contradict the prevailing shibboleths—whether in the Left, liberal, or conservative interpretations—would definitely not be sent to the Gulag or shot. Moreover, he could publish his work at his own expense or place it on the Internet. In most cases, no one would prevent him from doing this. Still, his chances of being published by a respected press or find an academic job would be minimal. As a matter of fact, he could well earn his living or, to be precise, his semi-starving existence, by flipping burgers or driving a taxi and, until very recently, he would have no health insurance. He would be a “loser.” In the context of the prevailing model of totalitarian societies, he could be regarded as a “noble loser,” the noble person who suffers because of his convictions and unwillingness to bend to the will of totalitarian power. Still, in the context of the prevailing American Social Darwinism-cum-Calvinism, he would be a “loser” in Donald Trump’s term: simple and plainly a man without talent, energy or aptitude for work and the ability to be attentive to the “needs of the market.” Consequently, most intellectuals, especially those in the USA, try to avoid the ideological pitfalls and internalize the maxims of what is permissible. As a result, the intellectual landscape of the modern West, especially the USA, often looks as if it is shaped by the quite visible hand of the Central Committee of totalitarian USSR or Red China. Some examples could be sufficient.

In 1989, Francis Fukuyama published his essay “The End of History,” in which he prophesized that American capitalist democracy was the inevitable end result of human history. The essay made him famous overnight and launched his spectacular academic career. But does it mean that everyone shared his vision? This was hardly the case. Quite a few have different views, especially those from outside the USA. Still, the majority of American intellectuals were eager to take their “share of the market” and follow in Fukuyama’s career footsteps. Consequently, countless books and articles confirmed that yes, “all roads lead to Rome,” i.e., the market and democracy, and those who were unable to understand this were doomed in the long run. Red China was chosen as a prime example. It was assumed here that economic development, trade, and the rise of the middle class would inevitably lead to full-fledged capitalism and political liberty. The opposite scenario would led to China’s “hard landing,” stagnation and finally economic collapse. At that point, outraged Chinese would sweep away their totalitarian masters and embrace “liberty.” As a matter of fact, China’s continuous rise led to rapid increase of books, often published by the most prestigious academic presses, which testified that “China is poised to fail.”¹ Stephen S. Roach, whose review article I quote, noted with surprise that “today, the profusion of negative books on China is more like a tidal wave, certainly more than I have ever seen. Three recent additions to the genre are particularly noteworthy. Each is the work of a seasoned and thoughtful China watcher, and tells its tale of China from a slightly different perspective.”² Still, these works prophesize China’s doom. This uniformity in a way perplexed Roach, for they failed to explain why China, with the country’s almost inborn totalitarian rule, reached such economic heights and why the USA, the society with democracy and market, owed totalitarian China trillions of dollars. “Each book makes a solid case that stands on its own. Taken together, they tell an even more compelling – and seemingly timeless – story of Western doubts about China. It’s enough to make one wonder how the Chinese ever got to where they are today.”³

There is no doubt that the opposite view exists. Still, those who promote this could hardly expect to be published in the top presses, interviewed on major TV networks or secure cushy jobs in government, think tanks, or major universities. Therefore, the vast majority, if not all, of Sinologists travel the same road: China should be either democratic and end “market distortion” or collapse. One might add that the people in Beijing wisely pretend that they accept this model, following Deng Xiaoping’s dictum to “hide its strength and bide its time.” By the time, it became clear that leading Sinologists were absolutely wrong, China had become an unstoppable economic and geopolitical juggernaut. As a result, various “recommendations” on how to stop China became the basis of talks for pundits. Most of these “recommendations” are absolutely meaningless, for the pundits fail to provide a concrete mechanism for how their recommendations could be implemented. For example, many of them would agree that high economic growth would help the USA in dealing with China’s challenge. Still, they fail to define the difference between “economic growth” in the USA and China. In China—as was the case in the former USSR—“economic growth” implied actual production, i.e., tons of steel, number of cars, etc. In the USA, “economy” is defined in a different way. It is increasingly the economy of “service” in which everything—banking speculation, insurance fraud, etc.—could be defined as economy. This definition of economy made statistical gimmicks possible: the statistics recorded economic “growth” which paralleled closed factories. The pundits and Sinologists implied that the USA would reverse this trend and engage in new industrialization. Still, how to do this in the context of the prevailing socioeconomic system is not elaborated upon. Some people might have noted that the USA could regain its industrial and technological base by the state’s massive engagement in the country’s economic life. In short, the USA should imitate China to compete with China, i.e., to be a harsh authoritarian/totalitarian state.

One could easily imagine that such a manuscript could hardly pass “peer review” of the major presses and ensure the author’s smooth academic career. For this reason, these views either do not exist or have become extremely marginal in academic discourse. Intellectuals in the West, especially in the USA, are restrained not just in how to approach certain subjects, but in the choice of subject.

Some subjects are excluded from research almost completely, for they cannot be contextualized in safe, “politically correct” ways. A good example is the New Orleans riots, which transformed an entire, large American city into criminalized mayhem. Mostly blacks and Latinos engaged in the outrage. The event was quite recent. Still, not a single scholarly monograph exists on the subject, at least to my knowledge, as if the events were either too marginal in importance to be recorded or took place in some distant land or in the distant past, and no reliable information exists. One of the major reasons for this avoidance is that the riots were “politically incorrect.” It could not be explained by police brutality or simple social injustice, but could be clearly seen as the direct result of criminalization of the entire minority population. The restraints on the intellectual activities created a situation in which the USA’s elite became a victim of its own brainwashing and lost the ability to understand the events and trends not only in distant lands, but in their own country. Trump’s election could serve here as an example.

As time progressed, the Fukuyamian model became increasingly unworkable. Still, the idea that authoritarian or even totalitarian regimes could emerge in the USA, not as a system imposed by totalitarian conquerors—in the 1980s, American movies dealt with the hypothetical conquest of the USA by the mighty USSR or plot by some rogue military people, Mafia, etc.—but as a result of grassroots support was absolutely taboo. Any scholar who would explore the possibility of such a regime in the USA could hardly expect publication by a major press and would not just risk a great academic career, but any academic career at all. Thus, when Trump was elected—and his failure was predicted by almost 100% of pundits—the political science establishment was in shock. The attempt to find even a single monograph which clearly dealt with such a scenario was unsuccessful. As a matter of fact, pundits were able to find only one book of fiction: Sinclair Lewis’ novel It Can’t Happen Here, written in the 1930s. It is clear that Western, especially American, intellectuals are hardly free and they often subconsciously internalize the restraints and incentives of the “market,” whatever that means. One shall also remember that while fear/force is the major way of bending intellectuals’ will and creative impulses in totalitarian societies of the “Oriental” type, e.g., those in the USSR, China and North Korea, force is not the only way to deal with intellectuals. The totalitarian state also broadly uses a purely “American” way of controlling intellectuals. Those who follow the “party line” are not only physically safe but are also rewarded by fat salaries, perks, and a variety of privileges. While I have noted these two models of dealing with intellectuals, they are not the focus of our proposed study. They are mentioned plainly because the focus shall be placed in broad context. The proposed study deals with the special and comparatively rare type of interaction between intellectuals and elite, which we define as “intellectual seduction.”

To understand it better, one could compare it with seduction as a way of gaining sexual access. In the case of rape, sexual access is achieved through force or threat of using force. In the case of prostitution/semi-prostitution, access is achieved through economic incentives. The girl’s “love” for the client depends on the amount of cash or other benefits. In the case of “seduction,” neither force nor economic incentives play a role—or at least play a limited role—in achieving sexual access. Women provide sexual access absolutely willingly if convinced that the male is really in love with them. Still, his love is a sham. He convinces the girl that he has strong feelings plainly to get sexual access and abandons the girl after some time. In social context, seduction implies that the intellectual serves the ruler/elite not only because of fear or promise of material benefits, but also because he truly believes that the ruler indeed has fallen in love with his philosophy and he, the intellectual, can shape the ruler’s behavior and provide him with meta-plans for his rule. At the same time, the ruler needs the intellectual for quite pragmatic reasons which have nothing to do with the grand and lofty ideas of the intellectual. The ruler needs this intellectual and his lofty meta-plans because he needs a “true believer,” who will take the designed tasks to heart. The assurance in “love” is quite an important ingredient in seduction, but it is not the only one. While being foreign to direct economic/social incentives, the intellectual should not be above human follies and out-and-out pettiness. This is what makes his seduction possible. Indeed, one could assume that often, albeit not always, those who are seduced want to be seduced. Truly this was the case with Putin and his regime’s relationship with Alexander Dugin, a talented, educated, and ambitious intellectual in the first few years of Putin’s rule—approximately from 2000 to 2003/2004. The reason for Putin’s tactic at that time shall be placed in context. There is a popular and “politically correct” view that Putin represents a break with Yeltsin’s tradition, which, with all its shortcomings, brought democracy to Russia. Another assumption, which became quite popular after Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and dramatic worsening of Russia’s relationship with the West, especially the USA, is that Putin’s regime is absolutely different from the regime in the USA. Neither of these assumptions are true, if one were to look at both these regimes from a Marxist perspective, i.e., looking at the socioeconomic foundation of society as its defining characteristic. Yeltsin’s regime had “privatized” the state property and created immensely rich tycoons, “oligarchs,” who continued to dominate Russia’s economic and political landscape during the Putin era. From this perspective, Putin’s regime is not dramatically different, either from the Yeltsin era or from the USA. There are, however, differences; at least this was the case in the beginning of Putin’s rule. The point here is that Americans, even those who are deeply disenchanted with the prevailing socio-political system, have no interest in true socioeconomic alternatives. Even supporters of “socialism” relate it to socialized medicine and education, bu...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Putin Regime as Example of “Synthetic” Model
• 3. Putin as Dictator Savior
• 4. The Popularity of Duginism: Duginism as Dream Come True
• 5. Dugin as a Putin Rescuer
• 6. Flirtation with Seleznev
• 7. Conclusion
• Back Matter