This book is concerned with metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and politics. That is a very large area of study for a relatively short book. The aim is plainly not to provide comprehensive coverage. It is instead to connect those different areas of study by solving related problems in each using the concepts of freedom, indeterminism and fallibilism. To put the point another way, the aim is to obtain an understanding of freedom in the round, in its metaphysical, epistemological, ethical and political aspects. The metaphysics of free will (Chap. 2) depends upon the idea of indeterminism; epistemology and rationality (Chap. 3) depend upon creativity and criticism, which cannot be understood without the ideas of indeterminism and fallibility; the distinction between persons and other animals (Chap. 4) depends upon the ideas of critical rationality and moral agency, and thus on the ideas of freedom, indeterminism and fallibility; morality (Chap. 5) demands both freedom and constraint, so it is also tied to the ideas of indeterminism and fallibility; and the purpose of the state (Chap. 6) is to safeguard freedom, as far as our fallibility permits. Each Chap. of the book gives pointers for the further study of its topic. That further study may, given our fallibility, require some revisions to what is said in this book. The goal here is to provide a unified and coherent account of the different facets of freedom at a high level of generality. The account is novel in its emphasis on indeterminism and fallibilism. It is a curious irony that defences of freedom are often deterministic and dogmatic. That irony is not investigated directly in what follows.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the metaphysical problem of free will. There is a general, though not universal, consensus in contemporary philosophy that indeterministic accounts of free will are incoherent. Some philosophers simply deny that persons have free will, but most seek to show how free will or, rather, some anaemic substitute for it, is compatible with a deterministic account of human behaviour. I show how that consensus is mistaken and how the mistake arises from a simple failure to distinguish acts from other events. I criticise and reject the famous infinite regress arguments of H. A. Prichard and Gilbert Ryle against acts of will; and I expose some confusions or errors about free will to be found in Roderick Chisholm, Donald Davidson, Laura Ekstrom, John Martin Fischer, Harry Frankfurt, Robert Kane, Hugh McCann, Alfred Mele, Robert Nozick, Helen Steward, Richard Taylor and many others.
The topics of Chap. 3 are epistemology and rationality. On the traditional and still current view, rationality is deterministic, either because it compels us, so far as we are rational, to think or act in a particular way, or because it has an authority over us to which we submit, so far as we are rational. As a consequence, on that view, the beliefs and actions of a rational agent are justified. I reject that approach as inconsistent with our fallibility and I criticise the views of Aristotle, Bill Brewer, John Broome, RenĂ© Descartes, and Christine Korsgaard. Following the lead of Karl Popper, I explain how rationality is critical and I offer an account of deductive reasoning as a process of guessing, testing and freely deciding. I discuss Lewis Carrollâs puzzle about deduction and criticise Ryleâs solution. I summarise Popperâs epistemology to give an account of theoretical reasoning that contrasts with the mainstream. I offer a new account of practical reasoning as guessing and testing and I excoriate contemporary decision theory , particularly its treatment of risk (indeterminism) and uncertainty (fallibilism). I criticise some recent work of Peter Graham, Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane, and Helen Steward.
In Chap. 4 I discuss the metaphysics and epistemology of personhood. What I say on the metaphysics is broadly in line with traditional philosophers, particularly Immanuel Kant, though updated with insights from Popper and evolutionary biology. Unusually for a discussion of freedom, I give prominence to an organismâs absolute needs. Against Philippa Foot I argue that an organismâs absolute needs depend upon its individual nature, not some hypothesised nature of its species. I show how a personâs possession of critical rationality entails that persons have to discover their individual natures for themselves and that, given their fallibility, they have to proceed by guessing, testing and deciding. To find fulfilment, persons need freedom and thus an open society. I criticise philosophical theories of authenticity, specifically those expounded by Michael Lynch and Charles Taylor.
Chapter 5 deals with ethics. The aims of one person often conflict with the aims of other persons. Moral rules mediate that conflict by permitting individual freedom but setting limits to it. The objective, or factual, set of moral rules is that which sets constraints that allow for persons in general the widest experimentation in quest of personal fulfilment. However, I reject rule consequentialism because fallibility and indeterminism (including free will) mean that consequences cannot be known in advance and that conditions for the widest experimentation in quest of personal fulfilment cannot ensure the best outcome. I consider the different scopes of freedom appropriate to different categories of person and restrictions on personsâ freedom for their own sakes and for the sakes of animals that are not persons, and I discuss deriving âoughtâ propositions from âisâ propositions. I employ Wesley Hohfeldâs scheme to articulate personsâ entitlements to freedom into a set of rights and obligations, thereby showing how freedom requires that resources be, as far as practical, exchangeable private property. I pan James and Stuart Rachelsâs denial of moral disagreement.
I venture into political philosophy in Chap. 6, which concerns the obligations owed by the state to persons and vice versa. Collectivist and individualist views of the state are criticised and a third way is proposed. I argue that potential conflicts between personsâ aims and their obligations imply that morality demands a state with the rights and obligations to enforce personsâ obligations to each other, and to impose new obligations on persons for the sake of freedom. I explain briefly how the state evolves rather than being created. An account of personsâ obligations to the state is related to...