1.1 Problematizing the Concept of Racism
1.1.1 Racism and the Concept of Racism
This book is not about racism, but about the concept of racism. Racism is an empirical reality, a lived experience. The concept of racism is the nature of this reality, the nature of this lived experience. This distinction requires elaboration.
All of us are familiar with discussions like these: Does racism still exist? Is racism worsening? Is so and so a racist? Activists participate in discussions about what to do about racism; how to live with and survive racism; how to combat, subvert, and resist racism. Some examples will drive the point home: What are some of the ways in which well-intentioned individuals unwittingly participate in racism? How do whites, as a group, benefit from racism? What policies, laws, and social practices are racist? What is being done to reduce or mitigate racism? What recourse is available to victims of racist discrimination (in the workplace, in the classroom, etc.)?
Scholars interested in racismās history, causes, and expressions participate in theoretical conversations: What are the causes of racial inequality? What are the psychological mechanisms of racist cognition? How has racism corrupted this or that institution? What are the short- and long-term effects of racism, for this or that racial group? Where did racism come fromāhow did it evolve, and from what? And so on.
These are all worthwhile and important questions. Many of them can be described as conceptual in some sense of the term. For instance, a respectable sense of āconceptualā applies to the historianās interest in mapping the development of the idea of racism; it similarly applies to the historianās interest in parsing the conceptual differences between Medieval manifestations of religious antisemitism and twentieth-century manifestations of race-based antisemitism. As I use the term āconceptualā neither of these inquiries into racism count as conceptual investigations, for they take a particular understanding of racism for granted. Indeed, all of the aforementioned questions presuppose a conception of racism. By āpresupposeā I mean that a prior understanding of racism is required in order for the above questions to be intelligible. Empirical theories that inquire about racismās origins, development, and history only make sense because the term āracismā has been assigned a meaning in the context of these inquiries; it is this meaning which makes observations, recommendations, and predictions about racist phenomena possible.
As I use the term, a conceptual investigation into racism is one that investigates the question āWhat is racism?ā How might such an investigation proceed, and why is it important to theorize the concept of racism? We can get a grip on these and related questions by reflecting on two things: the object of racist ascriptions and the phenomenon of conceptual disagreement. Let us start with the former.
What is the proper object of a racist ascription? That is, what do we single out for condemnation when we call something āracismā or āracistā? As it turns out, there are many such things. For the terms āracismā and āracistā are applied to various categories of entity: persons, institutions, behaviors, speech, policies, societies, and much more is called racist. But do āracismā and āracistā mean the same across all categories; for example, when applied to persons and institutions? Interesting issues arise in thinking about the relationship of individual racism to institutional racism. If āracistā applies to persons, can members of subjugated racial groups be racist or is it only members of dominant racial groups that can be racist? If institutions can be racist, do they become racist only when they are corrupted by the individuals running them, or are there structural causes of institutional racism? A conception of racism provides answers to these and related questions; it resolves puzzlement concerning the meaning of āracism.ā
The second thing that motivates the distinction between philosophical theories (which investigate the concept of racism) and empirical theories of racist phenomena is the formerās interest in resolving conceptual disagreement. It is not difficult to imagine oneās beliefs about racism being challenged. When this occurs, one is forced to ask: How are we (how am I) to decide which conception of racism is correct? Some examples will quickly illustrate the point:
- Example 1: Suppose I assert: implicit racial bias is racist. I suspect that many would reject this proposition, even while many others would accept it. How do we decide which position is correct? The answer largely depends on just what precisely racism is.
- Example 2: What if when I recommend a race-conscious policy to mitigate racism, it is immediately shot down or criticized on the grounds that it is racist? The dismissal of race-conscious policies is commonly reported by supporters of affirmative action and proponents of reparations for Native Americans and American Descendants of Slaves (ADOS). A common argument holds that, because affirmative action wrongfully discriminates on the basis of race, it cannot be implemented, not even to correct for historical injustices that were committed at the behest of white supremacy. Is affirmative action, then, racist? If it is, that is partly because we have adopted a certain definition of āracism.ā (Perhaps this is the definition that racism is the differential treatment of people, based on race.)
- Example 3: Is the criminal justice system racist? Many have argued that it is, yet many others disagree.
- Example 4: If a teacher, with no ill intent, calls on a black Haitian student to āprovide the black perspective to the class,ā some would call this racist; others wouldnāt.
- Example 5: If a store manager monitors his Latino customers more closely than his white customers, some would call his practice racist; others wouldnāt.
A concept of racism should provide resources to address such controversies. Let us consider how a concept of racism might help us settle the question in our last example: whether the managerās racial profiling practice is racist. This will afford me the opportunity to introduce some competing conceptions of racism.
1.1.2 Competing Conceptions of Racism
Some defenders of the managerās racial profiling practice might argue that it is justified if it is motivated by āgood business,ā that is, if the managerās desire to protect his profits requires him to monitor those groups that are most likely to shoplift from his store. On this perspective, if he sincerely believes that Latino customers are predisposed to shoplifting, and if he has a ārationalā basis for believing this (perhaps he appeals to statistical data), then his practice is not racist (even if his belief about Latinos proves to be false). What are we to make of this argument? What information is pertinent to assessing this case? Addressing these hard questions is precisely the kind of thing a concept of racism can be good for.
Most people, I suspect, would want to know the store managerās intentions. The manager appeals to evidence, yet his profiling practice might not be motivated by good business alone. He may have other (more nefarious) motivations at work, which he conceals. Or perhaps, he is selective about the evidence he is willing to consider. Perhaps his selection bias is an unconscious one, a function of his aversion to, his fear of, or his contempt for Latinos. If his belief about them is improperly motivated, Jorge Garcia and others argue, then and only then should we call it racist; otherwise we shouldnāt.1 This argument presupposes what philosophers call a volitional account of racism, one that defines racism in terms of the agentās will, including her intentions, motives, and emotions. In other words, volitional accounts focus on the internal mental states of individuals, the noncognitive ones that are thought to drive action.
Others might argue that information about peopleās intentions and feelings is not always pertinent or useful in deciding whether a case involves racism. For instance, some, like J. Angelo Corlett, might argue that the managerās profiling practice is racist if it involves racially discriminatory conduct, which is objectionable in virtue of harming Latinos and treating them unfairly.2 Let us call this a behavioral approach to racism, because it defines racism in terms of action and its consequences.
Others would identify the managerās belief as the source of the problem. Beliefs matter because they enter into cognition; that is, they inform how an agent thinks, reasons and acts. They guide behavior even when they happen to be false, for example. Because false beliefs may have undesirable effects, such as harming others, one might think that it is wrong to form beliefs irresponsibly (in an irrational manner). So, racism might be defined in cognitive terms, as harboring certain kinds of ungrounded and false beliefs, fallacious forms of reasoning, and the like. Anthony Appiah and Michael Dummett adopt hybrid approaches which incorporate behavioral and cognitive components.3
Focusing on the social consequences of faulty cognition some scholars take the cognitive approach a step further. A socially sophisticated version of the cognitive approach is called the ideological approach to racism. It asserts that practices like racial profiling are racist because they perpetuate invidious racial stereotypes about racially oppressed groups, attitudes that contribute to a condition of group vulnerability to certain harms. Tommie Shelby argues that when invidious racial stereotypes are widely distributed throughout society, it is not just the specific individuals targeted that are harmed, but the entire racial group to which they belong. A widely distributed racial ideology about Latinos can function to stigmatize them, that is, brand them as criminals before they have had a chance to do anything wrong (or not!). Many have observed that this experience is not particularly uncommon in the Latino community, for they, along with other racial minorities, have histories of stigmatization as thugs, gangbangers, illegals, and so on (recall Donald Trumpās āMexicans are rapistsā). The manager in our example contributes (unwittingly, perhaps) to a social structure wherein Latinos do not have full access to the rights and privileges afforded to more privileged racial groups.
Consider some of the privileges people generally take for granted (or should be able to take for granted) in our society. Everyone supposedly has the right to feel comfortable in their day-to-day lives (doing normal, everyday things). Yet, some Latinos think twice about entering certain spaces. If I go to such and such restaurant, are people going to stare at me while I eat? If I enter this neighborhood, am I likely to be followed, harassed, and viewed with suspicion? If I go to this college or if I take this job, will people view me as the ādiversity hireā (code for: āHe didnāt earn his place hereā)? And how does this affect my conduct: when I enter that restaurant; walk through that neighborhood; interact with my academic colleagues? The above examples illustrate vulnerabilities to certain types of discomfort and insult. We can easily imagine more troubling scenarios (think of how the stereotype āMexicans are rapistsā impacts peopleās lives under the Trump administration). Is it racist for a business or institution to implement practices that, though arguably useful for some legitimate purposes, exacerbate the burdens imposed on historically disadvantaged racial groups? Aside from ideological/stigmatization accounts of racism, there are institutional/structural accounts. These theories are variously defined. One popular definition holds that racism is āa practice that is itself free of racial bias but in its implementation has a disproportionately negative effect on subordinate racial groups.ā4 By this definition, the store managerās profiling of Latinos may be thought to be racist because it harms Latinos disproportionately, quite irrespective of whether the manager harbors racial bias or not.
Some people might be more sympathetic to an account of racism that appeals to the notions of autonomy and respect. Hence some argue that treating Latinos as potential thugs in the way the manager does is disrespectful to the targeted individuals. One way to flesh out this idea is to elucidate the concept of a person. Persons are rational, autonomous agents....