Introduction
According to one observer, the People’s Republic of China (PRC/China)’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), one of two components of its larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is “All about Africa.”1 Another analyst asserts, more ominously, that the MSRI in Africa is an integral part of a Chinese attempt to build a new Sinocentric system and consolidate China’s position as a global superpower.2 Looking northward, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which is the “physical heart of the BRI” will “play a decisive role in the building of” China’s ambitious venture.3 Similar to the case of Africa, China’s aims to exploit its initiative in MENA to “expand its reach and influence” and reshape the “economic balance.”4 Aside from the issues raised above about China’s true motivations, the relevance of Africa and MENA to the MSRI and its cousin the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), and the geopolitical impact of China’s scheme, two other critical empirical questions are what is the actual progress of the MSRI and what are the net benefits of MSRI projects. After all, it is hard to envision the MSRI transforming country behaviors and regional orders (much less the global one), if projects are not completed and/or fail to deliver the desired outcomes.
The existing literature has a limited ability to shed light on these issues partly because it is relatively scant.5 This defect, however, is not the biggest one. One noteworthy issue is the tendency to analyze the entire BRI, rather than to research just the MSRI or the SREB.6 A second is the failure to delve into a specific region or country, problematic given the experiences of individual countries can be quite heterogeneous.7 A third is that analyses of the MSRI and SREB in Africa and MENA that stress an individual country often deliver a review of the relevant country’s overall ties with China instead of a genuine MSRI study. A fourth is the tendency to equate headlines, official communiqués, or Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with concrete action or outcomes. A fifth is the dearth of systematic studies of the net benefits of MSRI projects. A sixth is the failure to unpack carefully the factors driving host country domestic and foreign policy decisions, which too often are associated exclusively with the economic stimuli flowing from the MSRI or a participant country’s broader economic ties with China. To address some of these issues, this book concentrates solely on the MSRI and, beyond this, select countries within the Africa and MENA regions. In addition, contributors emphasize analysis of the MSRI. Furthermore, chapter writers evaluating the drivers of particular country’s policies contemplate multiple factors, not just economic ones.8
Some question the payoff of exploring the MSRI in Africa and MENA. One set of scholars asserted, “Africa’s inclusion in the Belt and Road Initiative is minute.”9 A MENA specialist wondered about the wisdom of academics “dancing to the Chinese tune,” devoting so much time studying something so vague.”10 While these points are well taken, Africa deserves attention because of China’s significant presence there, the prominence given to the MSRI and SREB in Africa-Chinese institutions such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and the existence of major MSRI projects in many African countries. MENA warrants attention because it is central in global energy affairs, strategically located, and becoming China’s “most important region” outside the Asia-Pacific Region (APR).11 Aside from this, individual MENA MSRI countries such as Iran significantly influence regional and global political and security dynamics. From a conceptual standpoint, study of the MSRI in Africa and MENA can enhance our knowledge of how politics and economics interact to shape participant country attitudes towards the MSRI, its implementation, and its political and economic effects. The business case for studying the MSRI in Africa and MENA is to develop a richer understanding of the non-market environment as well as the business opportunities (or not) flowing from MSRI as well as SREB projects.
This book offers several findings. First, the MSRI appears to have advanced more in Africa than MENA and major land projects (e.g., railways) seem to have progressed more than maritime ones. Second, the MSRI is far from being realized, with some projects canceled (e.g., in Tanzania), nonexistent (e.g., Iraq), and many in-progress (e.g., Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Gulf Cooperation Council/GCC states, and Iran). Third, as shown by case studies of Egypt, Iraq, and Tanzania, history, good relations, and/or economic need do not ensure MSRI project implementation. Fourth, the MSRI is promoting connectivity, but this connectivity may not be “win-win,” but asymmetric or negative. Fifth, the economic attractions of the MSRI and broader economic links with China do not suffice to explain the stance countries such as Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, GCC states, Iran, and Tanzania have taken toward the MSRI, China, or China-favored positions such as the “One China policy.” Also relevant are the domestic political needs and national interest perceptions of leaders, internal security imperatives, development ideologies, external security threats, China’s interests and situation, and the availability (or not) of appealing alternatives such as international financial institutions (IFIs) or the United States (US).12
The next (second) section of this chapter supplies background on the MSRI in its entirety. The third gives an overview of Africa-China and MENA-China ties and their drivers from 1949 through the present, focusing on the period prior to the birth of the MSRI in 2013. The fourth turns to examining the MSRI in Africa before providing an in-depth treatment of the MSRI in MENA. Among other themes, the fourth section reflects on China’s objectives as well as the goals of MSRI participants in Africa and MENA. It also identifies some of the issues—e.g., neocolonialism—that have come up in connection with discussions of the MSRI. The fifth consists of focused summaries of the contributions in this volume. The sixth and final part offers summary remarks, details some implications of the introduction and book chapters, and identifies several areas for future research.
The MSRI
This part of the chapter provides a primer on the MSRI broadly speaking (the MSRI in Africa and MENA receives extensive coverage below), though it is abbreviated since the MSRI has been covered extensively elsewhere. This section initially offers a basic overview of the MSRI. Following this, it identifies some of the purposes of the MSRI. Next, it notes a number of the features of the MSRI, focusing on hard infrastructure.13 The financing of the MSRI is tackled in the sub-section entitled “Issues associated with the MSRI in Africa and MENA” later in this chapter. The fourth component of this section is a review of some of the issues frequently raised in connection with the MSRI. The fifth piece delivers some thoughts about the prospects for the MSRI which, for some of the more pessimistic writers, are encountering endless potholes, have been derailed, or are on life support.14
The route of the MSRI is illustrated in numerous maps. While they lack official imprimatur and often are vague, it remains clear that the MSRI aims to link China with the Europe through a, primarily but not exclusively, maritime route. In its general form, the MSRI originates from China’s east coast, runs southward through the South China Sea, and then transverses through the Indian Ocean. After this, it branches westward to the east coast of Africa and northwestward through the Arabian Sea before connecting to the Mediterranean and ulti...