This book presents an analysis of the emerging EUâChina relationship with a focus on the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Significant change is underway in the international system, not only in terms of changes in the distribution of power in the world, but also in terms of the underpinning political and economic models which have shaped the post-1945 period. The liberal world order is under threat (Luce 2018). Bruno Maçães suggests that âThe Belt and Road is the Chinese plan to build a new world order replacing the US-led international systemâ (Maçães 2019: 5). Whilst this may be Chinaâs long-term objective, there is no global alternative to the current system. President Donald Trump has called into question existing institutional arrangements such as NATO and the United Nations and taken an increasingly hawkish position on trade, particularly in the escalating USâChina trade war. At the same time, the EU has limped from crisis to crisis since 2008 which if these crises are enduring, threatens to weaken its hitherto influential position as a global trade power. Even Germany, for decades both the key driver and beneficiary of the EUâs emerging position as a leading economic actor, faces domestic challenges at home with an increasingly polarised political party system. And as a consistent promoter and defender of the liberal world order, the EU faces an increasingly difficult task of influencing this order in light of cooling transatlantic relations, and an increasingly assertive China. Whilst the EU might cling to the liberal world order as a blueprint to navigate these changes, influential commentators such as Thomas Wright argue that wholesale rethinking of the ideas underpinning the current order are needed (Wright 2018). Examining how these emerging actors narrate the future of their bilateral relations also invokes narratives of international order and what new configuration should be privileged.
The BRI has the potential to recast economic relations between the EU and China. A recent RAND report (Mazarr et al. 2018) concluded that the continued integration of China into existing structures posed less of a threat than non-engagement with China. However, this engagement has not been straightforward for the EU. Despite the potential for economic enrichment, EUâChina relations are starting from a relatively low knowledge base with a growing sense of realism emerging on the EU side (ECFR 2017; Farnell and Crookes 2016). Similarly, on the Chinese side, the complex governance structure of the EU has not helped contribute to a sophisticated Chinese understanding of the EU (Zeng 2017), which from a Chinese perspective retains a more pronounced view of the world constructed by sovereign states. In the meanwhile, the EUâs role has become marginalised in Chinaâs strategic considerations under Xi Jinpingâs leadershipâat least before the Trump administration in 2016 (Zeng 2017). We take a narrative approach to understanding the EUâChina relationship as a means to highlight how scholars in the EU and China interpret the narrativisation of EUâChina bilateral relations and to how this bilateral relationship is refracted through relations with third parties, for instance countries in Africa and in central Asia.
The upheavals in the international system come at a time of change in the role of the EU and China in the world. China has played a largely hesitant role in international affairs. This was the position right up until the end of Hu Jintaoâs leadership. Since 2012, China under Xi Jinping has gradually emerged as a more assertive player on the world stage (Harnisch et al. 2015). Likewise, the emergence of a more global EU, stretching beyond an almost exclusively regional role, has only gathered pace this century, a development which has not been linear. In her 2020 State of the Union address, President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated that, âThe relationship between the European Union and China is simultaneously one of the most strategically important and one of the most challenging we have. From the outset I have said China is a negotiating partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rivalâ (von der Leyen 2020). This clear articulation of the realities of the relationship from the European Commissionâs perspective will shape the EUâs engagement with China for the foreseeable future. There is a recognition of competition and rivalry in von der Leyenâs understanding of the relationship, but also, of necessary, and unavoidable partnership, as both actors navigate the future international order.
The emergence of both actors has involved narrative workâdomestically in terms of elaborating a new role in international affairs, and internationally, in terms of signalling the development of more active engagement in shaping international order (Zeng 2016; Zeng and Breslin 2016; Dessein 2014; Horsburgh et al. 2014). Both actors have not, however, sought transformation in the international system. Instead, they have tried to create space for greater influence and assertiveness in shaping the rules of the game (Zeng and Breslin 2016). These emerging roles, with both polities aspiring to greater influence, raise the question: to what extent are the EU and China important partners in shaping international order (Zeng 2017)?
Up until this point, the EU has not figured highly for China in its activities, despite Chinaâs ambivalence to alternative routes to pursue influence such as exploring a G2 model with the US. Recent relations between China and the United States have gone through dramatic changes. US Vice-President Mike Penceâs 4 October 2018 speech to the Hudson Institute and President Trumpâs 2017 National Security Strategy both highlighted what they view as a new era of great power competition with China. Whilst Pence did not explicitly refer to the BRI in his 4 October 2018 speech, he did criticise what he referred to as Chinaâs âdebt diplomacyâ, using infrastructure loans to developing states to exert significant influence (Pence 2018). Reporting on the speech, the New York Times suggested that Pence was stringing together a narrative of Chinese aggression (NYT 2018). Harvard Professor Graham Allison even suggested that the speech marked the beginning of a new cold war with China (Allison 2017). The Covid-19 pandemic has allowed some actors to reinforce this antagomism. Since it connects the vulnerable human body to antagonism in international affairs, it may lead some citizens to feel this antagonism at a person, private level.
Nonetheless, European perceptions about Chinaâs rise seem to be different from those in the US. The debate on the âChina threatâ in Europe has not gone as far as it has in the US. China is perceived to be more of an economic opportunity rather than security threat to Europe. In the case of Chinaâs tech supplier Huawei, for example, whilst there have been considerable concerns within the EU, the US narrative about Huawei and Chinese intentions failed to win an upper hand in Europe (Hillman 2019). Despite the USâs repeated warning of Huaweiâs threat to national security, the EU has chosen to resist this pressure and retained its own position on Huaweiâs role in its mobile network at least for now. In Europe, Huawei represents a high-quality technology company, whose presence is critical to the EUâs construction of 5G network and its risk is manageable. In this regard, to many in Europe, the US narrative on Huaweiâs security threat seems to be exaggerated. There has been intense domestic debate within Germany and the UK concerning Huaweiâs involvement in building their 5G networks. This debate is ongoing and may trigger changes at any moment. For example, the pressure from the USA recently forced the British government to drop its original decision made in January 2020 to allow a restricted role in the UKâs 5G infrastructure, and now enforce a full ban of Huawei in the UKâs mobile network. The UKâs divergent position from the US has created added complications for the UK at a critical time for transatlantic relations. A recent study conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation found that, âEuropeans are particularly critical of China when it comes to digitalization and data protection: Only 6 percent of the respondents trust a Chinese company to handle their data responsiblyâ (Bertelsmann Foundation 2019).
Another area of potential divergence is on the area of climate change, where despite rhetorical convergence in recent years (Wunderlich 2020), the EU continues to raise concerns about Chinaâs carbon emissions. The EU has called for,
A commitment by China to peak its emissions before 2030 would give new impetus to fighting climate change in line with the Paris Agreement and inspire action globally. In addition, the EU and China should strengthen their cooperation on sustainable finance, to channel private capital flows towards a more sustainable and clima...