Political party membership is often viewed as an anachronism, a relic from bygone days before the mass media and state subsidies rendered the communication and fundraising roles of members obsolete. Scholars have analysed the declining role of members in political parties since the 1960s, when âmass partiesâ evolved into, or were superseded by, âcatch all partiesâ (Kirchheimer, 1969). Linkages between parties and society have since weakened, while the relationship between parties and the state deepened (Mair & Katz, 1997). By the beginning of the twenty-first century, van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke argued that party membership in Western democracies had reached âsuch a low ebb that it may no longer constitute a relevant indicator of organisational capacityâ (2012, p. 24).
Against such a backdrop, it was predicted that membership parties would not develop in the post-communist democracies of central and east Europe (KopeckĂ˝, 2008; van Biezen, 2003). These countries were democratising in an age where party members had little value. They also had fundamentally different social structures from their western European counterparts after decades of communist rule. However, as the post-communist democracies consolidated, considerable cross-country variation in membership levels appeared. By 2008, the percentage of the population across 11 central and east European democracies that claimed to be a political party member ranged from 0.8% in Latvia to 6% in Romania (European Values Survey, EVS).
This book demonstrates that electoral systems contribute to cross-country variation in membership levels. Presenting surveys and interviews from three central and east European democracies, it examines elite strategies in detail, showing the causal mechanisms driving electoral system effects. In Western European democracies, high magnitude proportional electoral systems provide strong incentives for party-driven, centralised campaigning (Bowler & Farrell, 1992); similar patterns were observed in central and east Europe, with communication via mass and digital media at the fore. Low magnitude proportional electoral systems encouraged specific patterns of âpersonalâ vote-seeking (Carey & Shugart, 1995); however, they also stimulated grassroots campaigning, creating a role for members. The single member district section of mixed electoral systems also stimulated grassroots campaigning, this time with activism concentrated in âmarginalâ districts (Cox, 1990). This meant that members played an active role in party campaigning where electoral systems were âdecentralisedâ, stimulating higher levels of party membership.
Presenting detailed fieldwork from three central and east European democraciesâEstonia, Lithuania and Slovakiaâthis book provides rare insights into aspects of party organisation and campaigning that are often hidden from view, including voter contacting and fundraising. In doing so, it examines the causal link between party membership and electoral systems, analysing how electoral systems influence party elitesâ demand for members. As a result, this book makes an original contribution to the scholarly literature on electoral system effects, political campaigning, party membership, party institutionalisation and, ultimately, democratic consolidation.
Members and Campaigning in the Twenty-First Century
The role of members has evolved significantly since the 1950s, when Duverger (1954) posited that the value of members varied according to political party ideology. He noted that âmass partiesâ were usually socialist parties: their members helped their partyâs cause by raising money and providing a political education to the working class. Meanwhile âcadre partiesâ, typically conservative or classical liberal parties, valued quality rather than quantity of members. Prestige, connections and the ability to secure votes were prized. However, no sooner had Duverger noted these differences than the dynamics of party competition started to change. From the 1960s onwards, structural changes in society and the development of mass communication technologies revolutionised how parties and voters communicated with each other.
Noting these changes, Otto Kirchheimer (1969) predicted the dominance of âcatch-all partiesâ, which would prioritise electoral success over programmatic coherence. In this context, membership parties would suffer an âevolutionary disadvantageâ, being less ideologically nimble than their unencumbered competitors. They would, therefore, downgrade âthe role of individual membership, a role considered a historical relic which may obscure the newly built-up catch-all imageâ (Kirchheimer, 1969, p. 360). Building on Kirchheimerâs theory 20 years later, Angelo Panebianco (1988) argued that the blurring of class cleavages, combined with the influence of mass media on Western societies, had led to the emergence of âelectoral-professionalâ parties. Such parties had professional strategists, rather than members, at their core. Rapid developments in technology and communications allowed strategists to reach beyond traditional class cleavages which were, in any case, becoming blurred. Technological developments and the increased role of âelectoral professionalsâ also changed the dynamics of organisational power (Panebianco, 1988, p. 266), and the role of members was further downgraded.
By the 1990s, the environmental factors identified by Panebianco had, it was argued, pushed parties into a closer relationship with the state. Richard Katz and Peter Mair noted that the rising costs of campaigns, combined with the increasing difficulty of recruiting members, encouraged parties to turn to the state in search of resources (Mair & Katz, 1997, p. 96). They posited that parties increasingly operated as âcartelsâ, using laws on media access and public financing, along with electoral system thresholds, to constrain the entry of new parties. The âcartel partyâ theory describes a form of politics that is increasingly self-referential, with party representatives less concerned with reaching out to society than with their own self-perpetuation. With financial resources coming from the state and communication with the public mostly channelled through the mass media, âcartel partiesâ would value members for their âlegitimising functionâ only (Mair & Katz, 1997, pp. 110â111). van Biezen (2004) later argued that political parties were becoming âpublic utilitiesâ, providing a service of public decision-making with minimal linkage to wider society.
In these accounts of the changing nature of political parties, voters are presented as passive recipients of partiesâ tactical manoeuvring. However, in recent years, voters have made their discontent clear. As new (often anti-system) competitors emerged in the early 2000s, illusions of a cosy cartel were shattered. Mair, MĂźller, and Plasser (2004) noted that the most pressing problem now faced by established political parties was how to deal with popular disengagement and dissatisfaction, which was feeding support for their new populist rivals. The economic crisis of 2008â2012 further fuelled cynicism and discontent. However, re-building connections with society in the volatile world of twenty-first century politics would be far from simple for âtraditionalâ political parties. A variety of tactics have been adopted: in 2017, Scarrow, Webb and Poguntke found that âonly a minority [of parties] can meaningfully be assigned to the types of cadre, mass, catch-all or cartel partyâ (ibid., p. 319).
Political Parties in Central and East Europe
Against the backdrop of increasingly distant relationships between voters and their elected representatives in the established democracies of Western Europe, the countries of central and east Europe began democratising in 1989â1991. From a starting point of âfloating parties and floating votersâ (Rose, 1995), during which party elites were unable to focus on any goal beyond short-term survival (Lewis & Gortat, 1995, p. 601), they would have to find a way of stabilising both their party systems and their individual parties. However, given the context of declining party membership in established democracies, the chances of membership parties forming in the new democracies of central and east Europe were thought to be remote. If Western European parties maintained membership bases through âorganisational inertia or nostalgiaâ (van Biezen, 2003, pp. 43â46), no such path dependency or sentimentality would apply in post-communist democracies.
Biezen argued that low levels of party membership were likely to persist in central and east Europe for three reasons. First, the sequencing of organisational development meant that parties acquired public office immediately after their creation and, as such, were âinternally createdâ. In Biezenâs view, this emphasis on institution-building in the early stages of transition would encourage a long-term orientation towards the state (van Biezen, 2003, pp. 31â33). Second, the lack of social differentiation after decades of communism would push parties further towards the âelectoralâ model of political communication, with the communist past a âthwarting experience for the structural consolidation of both political and civil societyâ (ibid., p. 50). Third, Biezen argued that the availability of state funding created an organisa...