In the summer of 1799—or more specifically on 22 July—the editor of the Scottish newspaper the Caledonian Mercury found reason to raise an issue of considerable concern. Under the heading of ‘DUNDEE—19th July’, a worrying story was reported in the following manner:
Discovered by the author when he was looking through the editions of the Mercury in the National Library of Scotland (NLS; this was before digitalisation) while researching a completely different topic, this brisk statement seemed to raise a number of questions. How could it be that a privateer—as a representative of a country at war—had brought a captured merchant ship into a neutral port since, at this point in time, the dual-monarchy of Denmark-Norway was neutral in the war that had raged in Europe since 1792? Was it compatible with neutrality for the government of a neutral country to permit this kind of activity to take place in its ports, and if not, why was it allowed to happen? The editorial certainly seemed to suggest that something was amiss, but did not say exactly what the problem was. Furthermore, was the Danish government, as well as the local officials and inhabitants in Bergen, not afraid of British reprisals, and why would, in any case, a small state such as Denmark-Norway risk provoking one of Europe’s great powers? Perhaps the phenomenon of privateers operating out of Norwegian ports—and as we will see, Bergen was far from the only privateers’ ‘nest’ in Norway—even played a role, first in the breakdown of British-Danish relations in 1801, and subsequently in the outbreak of war between the two countries in 1807? The privateer in question was French, and Denmark-Norway would, of course, become an ally of Napole on in 1807.1 Such, at any rate, were the early musings of this author after his discovery in the NLS’ reading room.This morning brought intelligence of the capture of the Tay Greenlandman, a full ship, off Kennairdhead, 16 days ago, by a privateer of 16 guns, which carried her into Bergen. The crew were landed at Aberdeen yesterday from Norway. The ship and cargo are valued at upwards of 6000l. and will be a heavy blow to this place. It is to be hoped that Government will at last take some effectual measures to have this nest of pirates and robbers rooted out, which has so long been allowed to insult our country and injure our trade.
While it can be stated straight away that the impact was arguably not that great, it gradually emerged from researching relevant source material that the question of French privateers and Norwegian ports was an ongoing issue in the diplomatic correspondence between the two countries throughout the 1790s, and a cause of almost constant tension. The British government tried to bring the practice to an end, while the Danish government insisted on keeping the ports open to privateers, and did so until a series of events forced it to call an official closure in July 1799. Why was that, and why was the British government not able to persuade its Danish counterpart to agree to a closure of its ports to privateers straight away, or at least before so many years had passed? These questions formed the main point of departure for the study underlying the present book, the central focus of which is the bilateral relationship between Great Britain and Denmark-Norway, and the attitudes the two countries held towards neutrality and privateering . This means that the approach adopted here differs from that of most works on Danish foreign policy, or British-Danish relations in the period in general. Existing research has focused primarily on the question of neutral trade , and the ways in which the Danish government tried to defend its right to trade with belligerent nations, particularly through the adoption of convoys for Danish merchant vessels.2 Less work has been done on the Danish policy on privateering and the British response to that but, as it will be argued in the subsequent chapters, this was of greater importance than the lack of attention among historians so far would suggest. Moreover, just as the question of neutral trade raised issues concerning the relationship between neutrals and belligerents, and their relative ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ under international law, so the phenomenon of privateers operating out of neutral ports gave rise to equally thorny questions about what constituted ‘proper’ neutral behaviour. This legal element was central to the topic under discussion here, and while this is primarily a book on history, an attempt has been made to see the historical events and developments covered in the context of international laws and bilateral treaties. Alongside the more theoretical and legal questions pertaining to privateering and neutrality, however, there was also a more practical side—the experience of privateering as it unfolded—and both are investigated here.
Chapter 2, the first and longest of the regular chapters in this book, addresses the diplomatic debate that ensued between the British and Danish governments in the wake of first sightings of French privateers on the coast of Norway in the spring of 1793 . Although the British side tried to argue that it was unacceptable for privateers to operate out of neutral ports, it proved difficult to establish quite why that should be the case. An agreement of sorts was reached in August 1793, whereby privateers were allowed to come into the ports of Norway (not Denmark) on certain conditions, but allegations of breaches of the agreement led to discussions lasting on-and-off until 1799. These debates form the mainstay of the chapter, but sections have also been devoted to the French point of view, and to the question of who had the better argument in the debates as seen from a legal perspective. The diplomatic debate was, as the term would suggested, carried out by the diplomatic representatives of the two countries, but a possibly even more important function was filled by the British consuls in Denmark and Norway, and Chap. 3 goes into detail on this. Emphasis has been placed on the many difficulties facing consuls who were asked to carry out war-related duties while based in a neutral country, as well as on the role played by the unusually industrious and resourceful British consul at the southern-Norwegian port town of Kristiansand, John Mitchell. This chapter covers the whole period from 1793 to 1807. Where Chap. 2 addresses the principled debate on privateering and neutral ports, Chap. 4 looks at what has been termed ‘privateering in practice’, the actual operations of French privateers from 1793 until 1799 (and from 1795, also Dutch privateers). This practical dimension concerned both general issues such as the use of ‘false flags’ by privateers, and individual cases of particular interest. It was often through controversial individual cases that the difficulties involved in applying the agreement of 1793, as well as other rules relating to the relationship between belligerents and neutrals really became clear. Among these individual cases, that of the British merchant vessel the Bell & Ann and Captain Robert Lawson stands out as more extraordinary than most, and has been examined in detail. Chapter 4 also looks at the sale of vessels brought into Norwegian ports through the example of auctions advertised in the newspaper the Christiansand Weekly Gazette .3 These three chapters form the main bulk of the discussion contained in the book, but they are complemented by another two chapters that are somewhat shorter. Chapter 5 addresses the impact the French invasion of the Netherlands in 1795 had on the war in the North Sea. The Dutch Republic had been an ally of Britain from 1793 until the invasion, but was now forced to change sides in the war. One consequence of this was the introduction of Dutch privateers hunting for British merchant ships alongside those from France; another was the new threat posed by the Dutch Fleet, which had previously fought with the Royal Navy. Again, particular emphasis has been placed on one individual case of great interest, that of the Dutch ‘Captain von Dirking’. Lastly, Chap. 6 picks up where Chaps. 2 and 4 left off, looking at the state of affairs in the Norwegian port towns after the official closure of these ports to privateers. For this period also, one particular case came to dominate, that of the French Captain Jean Jacques de St Faust in 1803–1804.
The primary sources consulted for this book consist mainly of correspondence, where the British Foreign Office Correspondence-series for Denmark forms the main source. It is the richness of this archive that has made it possible to investigate the topic at hand, and while the FO-series consists predominantly of British material, it includes ‘non-British’ documents such as official statements by the Danish government too. This series has then been supplemented by a number of other sources such as Admiralty papers, treatises, court transcripts and newspaper articles, as well as contemporary published works. Finding the relevant material has involved quite a lot of ‘detective’ work and, in that sense, this is a book based on a classic historian-in-the-archives-type study.
As is arguably the case for all historical investigations, there will be roads not taken, and issues of potential relevance and interest, which there was no room to include; so also with this book. The story of French and Dutch privateers operating out of Norwegian ports arguably has three to four main protagonists: Great Britain, Denmark-Norway, France and the Batavian Republic, if we are to see the latter as a protagonist and not simply a protégé of France. The focus of this book, however, is primarily on the first two, and particularly on Britain. Although the topic of privateering has an international ring to it, related as it was to the development of international law in this period, and the diplomatic debate between Britain and Denmark-Norway was a bilateral affair, this book has nonetheless been devised as primarily a work in British history. Its central focus is on the British government’s approach to privateering out of neutral ports, and the ways in which it tried—through its diplomatic and consular corps—to address the problems this generated. This means that there are related and interesting issues, which have not been dealt with in depth here, as well as room for ...