The Constitutional reforms in the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1989 saw the abolition of the ‘Prime Ministerial’ position as the head of the government and assigned greater roles to the President, which in turn allow them to design their own foreign policy. Yet, the principles and objectives of the Iranian foreign policy remained unchanged as they continued to rely on the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after his demise in 1989. The Presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997), Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) crafted diplomacy unique to their own times and derived specific outcomes in the Iranian foreign policy, which has been written about extensively. While Rafsanjani is hailed as the president who ‘reconstructed’ the country after the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) and brought Iran out of isolationism, Khatami is remembered for his ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’ initiative which helped Iran reach out to almost every corner of the world. On the contrary, the hardliner President Ahmadinejad is remembered as the president whose ventures in diplomacy unfurled an endless roll of criticism from countries mainly in the West along with heavy sanctions from the United Nations Security Council and the European Union with regard to Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.
The footprints of the pragmatic President Hassan Rouhani on Iranian foreign policy after the completion of his first term in the office (2013–2017) were too deep and hence deserved to be analysed thoroughly to understand the determinants of his own foreign policy doctrine and objectives, and how Iran developed its relations with the rest of the world during his tenure. This edited volume has brought together experts from different parts of the world to perform this task. This project started as a workshop organized at the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University, in which the foreign policy trends during the first term of President Rouhani were debated. The discussions culminated with this book, which explores Rouhani’s foreign policy based on theoretical framework and established foreign policy doctrines in the first two chapters. The remaining chapters cover many other important aspects relevant in understanding current issues related to sectarian politics and nuclear issue in particular and Iran’s strategic relations with countries like Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Russia while also including its expanding relations with countries in distant regions like Africa and Latin America.
In his chapter, ‘Exploring President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy Doctrine 2013–2017’, Mahdi Ahouie postulates the possibility of a distinct foreign policy doctrine adopted by the President Hassan Rouhani during his first term. The author has drawn components from both conceptual and operational areas, also taking into consideration the prevailing circumstances of geopolitics during the first term of Presidency. The chapter also provides a comprehensive analysis of both domestic and foreign policy behaviours signalling distinct principles that made Rouhani’s term different from the previous administration. While the author makes conceptual assessments based on ‘progressivism’, ‘pragmatism’ and regionalism’, the chapter also marks impediments during the term, which includes a changed leadership in Saudi Arabia, the American presidential elections, lack of clarity in his ‘moderate’ political discourse, structural complexity that makes it unclear as to who makes final decisions and insufficient credibility and lack of mandate receiving the minimum proportion of votes to win (50.7%), the lowest ever for a president in the history of the Islamic Republic.
Rouhani started his term with the motto ‘constructive interaction’ with the world and was successful in doing so through regional dialogues and cooperation. He believed that peace and security of the Middle East solely depended on economic relations, social and cultural ties, invigorating private sectors, tourism and cooperation of world elites at large. Rouhani assured his neighbours that his government was willing to cooperate with its neighbours on issues like environment, safety of nuclear reactors, joint economic projects, trade, Palestine’s issue, Syrian human catastrophe, tackling extremism and regional security at large. It was a mandate on his government to defy those who treated it like renegade state and redefine its place and role in the international community. The administration succeeded in resolving the nuclear issue, which was one of the most complicated challenges in Iran’s contemporary history, but the author delves deeper into whether the whys and wherefores over the implementation of his motto was ever addressed since the regional dialogue and cooperation never really translated into direct agenda or action plan to solve any particular issue. President Rouhani strongly believed that Iranian practical steps to security and stability was only through development that comes with economic engagement, hoping for political understanding and fostering structural security cooperation to follow.
Such an approach is further elaborated in the following chapter titled ‘Revisiting Rouhani’s School of Thought: A Critical Discussion of Its Developmental and Foreign Policy Doctrines’ wherein Ali Fathollah-Nejad argues that Rouhani’s strategy has been implicitly a rejection of revolutionary foreign policy which is inadequate for stability, which the administration had stressed was central for economic development. His analyses are based on the Developmentalist foreign policy concept as elaborated by the research arm of the Expediency Council—the Center for Strategic Research (CSR). The pillars of this policy are around economic diplomacy, détente and constructive engagement (ta’âmol-e sâzandeh) driven by regime security concerns. The Expediency Council played the role of a mediator to settle disputes between the Parliament and the Guardian Council since 1988 with its research arm CSR created for advising political elites and the Office of the Supreme Leader. It was considered Iran’s most influential think tank on foreign policy matters and was headed by Rouhani since 1991. The Council credits for coming with the Iranian ‘grand strategy’ initiated in 1999 and eventually published by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the ‘Outlook of the Islamic Republic of Iran by 2025’ (Cheshm’andâz-e Jomhouri-e Eslâmi-e Irân dar ofoq-e 1404, henceforth will be referred to as the Outlook). The main targets that the Outlook posits is to put Iran ahead of 28 West Asian and North African countries in terms of economic, scientific and technological indicators while also being an inspiration to the Islamic world for its Islamic and revolutionary ideals without compromising on engaging with the global community constructively. The Outlook’s strategies maybe called Rouhani’s administration manifesto since the President was formerly its long-time Head from 1992 to 2013 and these grand strategies were published in his National Security and Economic System of Iran (in Persian) in 2010. The President’s cornerstones for his foreign policy action can be well interpreted from his ideals prerequisite for economic development when he stresses on the correlation between economic development and political stability which he explains as‚ ‘maintaining dialogue and friendly relations with the outside world’ in his publication. In addition, the concept of national security was present throughout the book as the prime concern which necessitated the need for economic development and thereby stable international relations. President Rouhani’s neoliberal economic model account has been proof enough of the rejection of revolutionary foreign policy ideals that is insufficient to provide Iran the stability in its relations with world powers and particularly its neighbours. However, the author argues that the persistence of US sanctions on Iran despite it fulfilling its obligations under (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) JCPOA has complicated foreign investments and has not shown structural improvements that reformed the economic situation in Iran. This could probably be as a result of contradicting foreign policy behaviour of Iran where on one side its defensive realism effectuated the JCPOA but the offensive realist regional policies adopted by IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s quasi-parallel government thwarts its rapprochement with the West.
Iran’s engagement with the West has been detailed in the chapter, ‘Rouhani, the Nuclear Deal, and New Horizons for Iran–US Relations’ where Zaccara and Haghirian examine the tumultuous relationship with the United States while assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the JCPOA analyzing the impact on foreign and economic policies of Iran. It is also noteworthy to remind that the JCPOA was happening at a time when it was among the top most foreign policy priority for almost all the Democratic and Republican candidates. Although Iran benefitted itself economically when some of the sanctions were lifted, the US primary sanctions on Iran, which continued along with the threats from Trump administration to terminate the US participation in calling it a ‘disastrous deal with Iran’, inhibited any real reforms in Iran’s rapprochement efforts towards the United States in particular. This also comes with Iran’s immediate neighbours who were wishing the isolation of Iran continued because engaging with the United States constructively was giving Iran an opportunity to become a player in the region. This comes at a time when the regional hegemonic players perceive Iran as a major security threat to the existing power equations in the region. This has only been worsened since the onset of the so-called Arab Spring since 2011 with the Arab suspicion of emerging Shia crescent. Throughout the chapter, the authors provide a detailed analysis of economic gains of the Nuclear Deal, which ranged from the lifting of sanctions on Iran’s civil aviation, which were in place for decades for the removal of limitations on Iranian oil and gas exports. The golden period of the Rouhani administration began to fade away with Donald Trump’s victory, which not only impacted Iran’s economy but also hurt Rouhani’s global economic engagement efforts. What followed the victory was Trump administration’s rhetoric that halted several important developmental plans, mega-sized projects and investments inside the country. Under Rouhani’s leadership, the country did witness gradual reforms in economic, political and social realms as sanctions removal facilitated Iran’s re-entry into the International energy markets. The deal was an enabler of normalization of Iran’s status as a rational state having its sovereign rights to enrich its uranium according to rules set by the NPT. However, this was euphobia to its Arab neighbours—particularly Saudi Arabia—as its relations severely deteriorated following the Arab Spring 2011, which viewed Iran as a seriously destabilizing element in the Persian Gulf.
The Saudi-Iranian issue has been highly intractable since the onset of Arab Spring as the stakes for gaining regional influence are higher than ever as the dominant dichotomies are at loggerheads in their pursuit of seeking dominance. This has only intensified the existing ideological feud making constructive trading engagements and diplomacy impossible.
In the chapter ‘The Sectarian Divide in Iran–Saudi Relations’ the author Akbarzadeh examines key areas of tensions between the two regional heavyweights, namely the long existing Islamic ideological feud, the relations with the United States and the rivalry over culturally constructed Muslim leadership. The Saudis have always accused Iran of its expansionist policies at the expense of Saudi interests by providing patronage for Shi’a actors and undermining Sunni regimes in the Persian Gulf region. President Hassan Rouhani who was keen on portraying that the post-Ahmadinejad era was all about positive engagement with its immediate neighbours and far from the populist rhetoric could not pacify Saudi Arabia despite engaging with Riyadh calling it ‘neighbour and brother’. Even the Foreign Minister Javad Zarif reached out to Saudi Arabia stressing on the need to jointly counter terrorism, sectarianism and extremism, but these invitations have been of no avail. Rouhani’s tanesh-zedai (reducing tensions) in the region has only weakened with the Nuclear deal, the execution of the popular Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia, the outbreak of Yemen war and the Saudi–Qatar tensions. The leadership of King Salman bin Abdulaziz continues to see Iran as an intolerable challenge whose role has to be limited, as the Saudis believe pursuing sectarianism agenda especially after their confrontations in the Syrian Crisis.
This is also because Rouhani’s friendship extension has failed to erase memories of Khomeini’s accusations of Saudi rulers of being lackeys of the United States. Not only did he castigate the late King Fahd as someone who promoted anti-Quranic religion called Wahhabism but even warned his own officials that ‘economic and political difficulties shouldn’t compel our officials to forgo the principal task of exporting our lofty Islamic revolutionary goals’. The region had become a hotbed of rivalries and tensions which stood in the way of any conciliation. Nevertheless, the US factor has always been part of the quandary as ‘Anti-Americanism’ was the élan vital of the Islamic Revolution 1979 when Khomeini dynamized the masses against the pro US Pahlavi dynasty and did not spare the Saudi regime from Amrikai insult. The outbreak of the Syrian crisis only made the two belligerents with the United States siding with Saudi Arabia. Saudi–US partnership even strengthened as both fulminated against the nuclear deal. The Supreme Leader accused Saudi rulers of committing treason against the Muslims for aligning with United States and Israel on this subject. The US President despised Iran on his maiden visit to Saudi Arabia accusing it for funding arms and training terrorists in his speech—an expected American strategy as seen earlier with its support for tyrannical rulers in the Middle East. According to Akbarzadeh, Syria is a linchpin of Iranian regional policies as it offers Iran a land corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon and maintain its anti-Israel stance partnering with an Arab State which is also an Israeli arch enemy. The Rouhani administration walked a tightrope between trying to build partnerships with their immediate neighbours and at the same time, not lose their revolutionary posturing as champion of the Muslim Ummah. Iran’s foreign policies constantly compensated confrontational behaviours with conciliatory posturing—which inadvertently becomes indicative even in Rouhani’s Gulf policies.
Given the gravity of the Syrian contention between the two, an entire chapter is dedicated exclusively on Iranian policy towards Syria and Iraq during the Arab Spring 2011. In ‘Iran’s Own “War on Terror”: Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Syria and Iraq During the Rouhani Era’ chapter, the author Wastnidge points out that in the Syrian and Iraqi crises, President Rouhani and his team were not the only drivers of the Iranian foreign policy towards these countries but a number of internal players within the Iranian polity that lead the Iranian engagement in the crises which also is considered as matters within the scope of IRGC and the Supreme Leader. This is particularly evident with the IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qasem Soleimani being outspoken about his planning and strategies in the regional crises stating, “we have created territorial continuity for the Islamic resistance by connecting Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon”. This highlights an interesting feature of Iranian regional policymaking where traditional administrational roles are often overstepped by informal links and personal networks. Despite the President’s own credentials of being one of the chief national security strategists in the Islamic Republic’s history, the regime allows Soleimani’s plan of action by virtue. The Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei honoured him with ‘Order Zulfiqar’—the highest military medal in the Islamic Republic—making him the first Iranian commander to receive. As the ‘living martyr of the Revolution’, Soleimani has assumed several duties within the government, particularly in matters better left to policymakers. The Iran–Syria partnership evolved over a period of time over shared interests in their foreign policies which also included the creation of an ‘Axis of Resistance’ to combat rising US–Israel perceived threats. Keeping the religious reasons aside (Damascus is home to shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab, the daughter of the first Shi’i Imam, Ali, and also granddaughter of the Prophet, and hence a revered figure in Shi’ism), Syria is a significant Arab country that not only helps Iran maintain its conduit to Hezbollah in Lebanon but historically is the enemy of Israel. With the fall of Saddam, the political vacuum was filled in by Shi’i political parties in Baghdad, changing the Iranian stance towards Iraq from extreme scepticism to influencing the political landscape of Iran. Iraq is also home to two most important shrines of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein in Najaf and Karbala respectively. For matters beyond mere sectarianist objectives, Iranian engagement in Syria was further propelled by the changing scene in Iraqi domestic politics, which made the latter a bridge between the Persian and Arab State. Once again, the IRGC has superseded President Rouhani and his executive team’s policymaking roles in the Iraqi scene. Neither ideologies nor sectarianism seem to be the driver of Iran’s Syrian and Iraqi ambitions but nevertheless has been used as powerful justifications in diplomatic armory of the Islamic Republic. A closer look into the Iranian policies in Syria and Iraq reveals its dynamic policymaking underlined by pragmatism which aims to consolidate its regional stakes through its alliances with Iraq and Syria, also involving Russia in its multilateral coalition in the region. The alliance has already been involved in intelligence sharing since 2015 with an effort to unify against ‘Islamic State’ both in Syria and Iraq.
There are joint efforts undertaken by Russia and Iran to maintain regional security in South Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia as both these countries have common commitments to multipolarity world order and unwillingness to obey US dictatorship. The two countries had many political, security and economic drivers to boost cooperation and develop strategic ties despite tightened sanctions. Russi...