The increasing transnational interdependence fuelled by the need for tackling the current global challenges are questioning the predominance of state actors in ruling the world. In the last fifty years, the number of non-state actors dealing with rulemaking and regulatory functions experienced a remarkable increase. At the same time also states went through a process of disaggregation passing from 50, in 1945, to almost 200 in 2010 (Cassese 2012). Such a trend diffused the concentration of power to other actors of global governance, favoring the emergence of different kinds of non-state entities in the international arena. This coupled with the rising challenge of governing globalised markets where trade, finance, health, and environmental issues are interconnected led to the creation of 265 inter-governmental organizations (IGOs),1 almost 8000 Internationalânon-governmental organizations (INGOs)2 as well as a large number of international regulatory regimes, multilateral agreements, and private institutions with regulatory functions. All such pieces of global governance (Karns et al. 2010) contribute to shape the administration of the world.
Among these, the inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) experienced the most spectacular growth in number, size, and competences, becoming those entrusted with higher responsibilities for shaping and managing global challenges (Karns et al. 2010). From one side, such growth reflects the need for states to cooperate to manage the main transnational and global challenges. However, on the other side, the rising importance of international organizations increased their level of intrusiveness in the national sphere. According to ZĂŒrn (2004: 261), the need for âenlarged and deepened cooperation in the age of globalization led to new and more intrusive international organizations respect to the traditional onesâ, raising democratic, legitimacy but also management issues. While democracy and legitimacy of international organizations is a rather investigated topic (Zurn 2004; Mehde 2007; Schneller 2010; Weilar 1991; Schimmelfennig 1996; Stokes et al. 1999; Bohman 2005), by contrast, their management aspects received little attention by scholars although both are linked to each other (Bauer 2007; Balint and Knill 2007). As much as international decision-making substitutes decision making at the national level, as much international organizations are in need to justify their authority in the exercise of power (Mehde 2007). The international organizations now address issues that were previously decided at the national level, and their decisions are increasingly affecting people within states (Woods and Narlikar 2001). The increased binding character of the decisions taken by the international organizations, as well as the extended span and scope of their content impact on individuals, firms, or states, put pressure on the justification of their power. Often such international organizations are perceived as undemocratic, favoring âunjustâ solutions, as well as mostly inefficient, resources waste and ineffective, as not being able to transform policies into actions (Stutzer and Frey 2005).
Although the debate over the legitimacy of international organizations is very complex, triggering endless discussions among lawyers, sociologists, and political scientists about the introduction of national legitimacy mechanisms in international organizations, less attention was devoted to the concept of the output legitimacy (Schimmelfennig 1996). This latter focuses on the positive results that any state or administrative entity brings about (Schimmelfennig 1996). Following this perspective, the legitimacy of a political system depends on its capacity to achieve the citizensâ goals and solve their problems effectively and efficiently, leading to conclude that the extent the actions taken by the international organizations are legitimized depends on the results of such actions. In other words, âif an institution exhibits a pattern of egregious disparity between its actual performance, on the one hand, and its self-proclaimed procedures or major goals, on the other, its legitimacy is seriously called into questionâ (Buchanan and Keohane 2006: 422). According to this approach, legitimacy is invariably linked to performance, and improvements in performance lead to an increased legitimacy of the organization as such (Mehde 2007). If this is true, then performance becomes a crucial aspect, especially for the more intrusive international organizations (Zurn 2004). From a management perspective, performance depends on how inputs are processed to deliver outputs and how these latter impacts in the organizational environment producing outcomes. Thus, performance improvements are linked to the modernization of the management structures dealing with inputs, outputs, and outcomes. According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017), a huge amount of public management reforms mushroomed in many countriesâ administrations together with comparative studies and analysis highlighting common trajectories and reform models.
By contrast, the management reform of international organizations attracted minimal attention and was hardly subject to comprehensive investigations (Balint and Knill 2007). Until very recently, international organizations were often considered as mere platforms or devices in the hands of the member state governments, useful for transnational decision-making only. They were not perceived as administrative bodies, and the research focus was primarily on the political structures (Mehde 2007). In such a context, linking their management reforms to an increase in performance and organizational legitimacy was âconsistently neglected in the analytical framework of global governance and its alleged democratic deficitâ (Mehde 2007: 168). Despite this, reforming international organizations should be now a primary concern, considering their recent spectacular growth, in the number, size, and competences, as well as their chronic management problems, quickly transforming into pathologies unless correctly addressed (Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003). Nevertheless, evidence shows that many international organizations recently started modernizing their internal management structures in an attempt to be more effective and more efficient (Bauer 2007).
Several international organizations embarked on lengthy reform programs with very ambitious aims. The United Nations committed to âadapt the internal structure, the operational processes and the culture of the United Nations to the expectation of greater efficiency, effectiveness, openness, and problem-solving readiness of the constituencyâ (United Nations 1997: 2). Similarly, the European Commission management reform aimed âto equip the Commission to fulfil its role in addressing the challenges facing Europe with maximum effectivenessâ (European Commission 2000: 1), as well as âmaking sure that every action taken delivers maximum performance and value-addedâ (European Commission 2014: 3). On the same line, the World Bankâs reform aimed at making the Bank more effective in delivering its regional program and in achieving its basic mission of reducing poverty (World Bank 1997).
In this context, reforming the management structures became a priority.
- However, to wh...