The Theory of Recognition and Multicultural Policies in Colombia and New Zealand

Nicolas Pirsoul

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9783030594251
• eBook ISBN:
  9783030594268
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Social Sciences

This book analyses the policies of recognition that were developed and implemented to improve the autonomy and socio-economic well-being of M?ori in New Zealand and of indigenous and Afro-descendent people in Colombia. It offers a theoretically informed explanation of the reasons why these policies have not yielded the expected results, and offers solutions to mitigate the shortcomings of policies of recognition in both countries. This in-depth analysis enables readers to develop their understanding of the theory of recognition and how it can promote social justice. 

© The Author(s) 2020

N. PirsoulThe Theory of Recognition and Multicultural Policies in Colombia and New Zealand Palgrave Politics of Identity and Citizenship Serieshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59426-8_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Nicolas Pirsoul¹

(1)

University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Nicolas Pirsoul

Email: [email protected]

End Abstract

Overview

This book will investigate the notion of recognition both as a political concept and as a practice. It will use New Zealand and Colombia, two states with strong bi/multicultural political agendas, as case studies to explore the theoretical implications of the theory of recognition and its implementation.

Recognition is a contested political concept. It is contested in two ways. The first debate over the term relates to its potential to improve or impede social justice. Some scholars have seen this term as a solution to all social injustices plaguing human society. Other scholars, however, criticise the concept for a variety of reasons. Many others have taken various positions falling somewhere between these two opposite poles. This book will tackle this debate. However, the debate over the potential of recognition to further social justice will be subordinated to a second dispute: the dispute over the meaning of the term itself. It is obvious that one can only pass judgement on a concept if the meaning and scope of the concept has been clarified.

In order to understand the meaning of recognition, it is important first to review the literature dealing with the topic and understand what people mean when they talk about recognition. Indeed, what is the object of recognition? Is it difference, equality, difference embedded within equality, culture, the right to be different or to have one’s culture or identity respected? IsRecognition

it groups or individuals, or both? There are many variations in the meaning and scope of the concept among the many authors who assert the importance of recognition to increase social justice, and each of them offers a different account of the theory.

I believe that the best way to clarify both dimensions of the debate is via a two-dimensional analysis. On the one hand, the concept of recognition needs to be dealt with at a purely theoretical level. On the other hand, however, the theory of recognition cannot be analysed and understood without appeal to the real social experiences and legal implications informing a political order implementing policies influenced by the theory. Failure to do so would reduce recognition to an abstract concept devoid of any political pertinence. Such analysis is important because contemporary political debates over multiculturalism, migrants, indigenous rights, secularism, amongst others, all relate implicitly or explicitly to the concept of recognition and political decisions influencing many lives are taken with a particular conception of recognition (either pro or con) in mind. These decisions are usually the result of intense debates, outcries and crises, and have the power to reshape radically political orders and social mentalities.

In this book, I will, therefore, go back and forth between theoretical and empirical analysis. In other words, I will revise the normative judgements that inform my theoretical framework by taking into account the findings of the empirical analysis, and the theoretical framework will in turn clarify and increase the intelligibility of the empirical phenomena. The dialectical method using both normative judgements and empirical facts to reach conclusions used in this book closely relates to Axel Honneth’s ideal of developing “a theory of justice as an analysis of society”.¹ As Honneth explains, “we would do well to take up once again Hegel’s endeavour to develop a theory of justice on the structural preconditions actually existing in society”.² This means that political theory should be immanent and not detached from the normative claims and values, the “ethical life”, informing a given society’s institutions. Yet, the goal of such endeavour is not merely descriptive. Indeed, the purpose of the investigation is not merely to reinforce and justify existing practices and institutions, but instead “to correct and transform them” from within the existing ethical life informing society.³ The point of this endeavour, what he calls a “procedure of normative reconstruction”, is to demonstrate “the extent to which ethical institutions and practices do not represent the general values they embody in a sufficiently comprehensive or perfect fashion”.⁴

In the case of the present book the provisional conviction informing my moral judgement about justice is that the denial of recognition, and/or the misrecognition, of particular identities impacts negatively the lives of the bearers of these identities and that remedial action is justified. I therefore propose a critical analysis of the concept of “recognition” which, I argue, currently informs the “ethical life” of the societies I study in this book. The meaning and scope of recognition as well as its political implementation will, therefore, be opened to revision through this investigative process as I show the extent to which the ethical institutions and practices of recognition at stake in the case studies do not sufficiently represent the values they claim to embody.

Indeed, while I intend to clarify the understanding of policies of recognition as they are implemented in two different contexts, I also expect that such enquiry will allow me to clarify and revise some of the views held (pros and cons) about the theory of recognition. Analysing two states and three ethnic groups (which share strong similarities and differences) as case studies will help me to further triangulate information and, therefore, enrich the theory. By triangulating information, I mean a way of cross-checking information coming from different sources in order to discover recurrent patterns which can be used to draw sounder conclusions.

Case Studies

My chosen research method requires a careful selection of relevant case studies. I have chosen to focus on Colombia and New Zealand for a variety of reasons. One of them is that the social reality of indigenous people within the English-speaking world (the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and the indigenous people living in Latin American societies are usually not studied together. I intend to remedy this lack. But most importantly, my case studies choice can be justified because the two countries share two key characteristics which are beneficial to the triangulation method of my analysis.

The first shared characteristic relates to the demographic status of the ethnic groups at stake. Latin America is the geographical area of the world most populated by indigenous people. In order to keep my comparative study consistent with New Zealand, it is therefore necessary to study a country where indigenous people are a minority. Indigenous people in Colombia represent approximately 3.5% of the population. A country such as Bolivia with a majority indigenous population and an indigenous president would not have provided an adequate comparative framework since Māori are a demographic minority in New Zealand. Afro-Colombians also represent a demographic minority (approximately 10% of the population), whose presence tends to be even more invisible than the indigenous presence despite its stronger demographic weight. Since the book focuses on the claims for recognition of minority ethnic groups which suffer from a long legacy of misrecognition, analysing the state of Afro-Colombians alongside indigenous people in Colombia is therefore equally relevant since (1) they have suffered similarly to indigenous people from European imperialism; (2) unlike other Afro-American peoples, Afro-Colombians are now the recipients of an institutionalised recognition which mirrors very closely the institutional recognition offered to indigenous people (land rights and reserved seats in parliament, for example) and (3) it would allow me to discuss the state of an ethnic group usually left out by a literature narrowly focused on indigenous recognition. Moreover, since the book is not primarily concerned with the unique claims of indigeneity—defining who is indigenous is in fact already a matter of great scholarly debate—but instead with claims to recognition as such, an analysis of the state of Afro-Colombians will allow me to consider whether indigeneity grounds different claims to recognition from that demanded by other severely misrecognised groups and to draw sounder conclusions about institutional recognition and multiculturalism.

Second, and most importantly, both countries promote actively a model of institutionalised multiculturalism or biculturalism. The book will focus on the way recognition/misrecognition materialises through institutional practices. A state with a strong institutional framework promoting the recognition of ethnic minorities is, therefore, necessary. Colombia is one of the best case study in Latin America for this project because the Colombian state has developed the most extensive legal framework on the whole continent for the recognition of its two main ethnic minorities (indigenous and Afro-Colombians) with the exception (arguably) of some states with a strong left-leaning agenda such as Venezuela and Ecuador (who do not recognise their Afro-descendant populations). Colombia ranked the highest in Donna Lee Van Cott’s classification of Latin American state promotion of indigenous recognition through multicultural policies before Ecuador and Venezuela (her taxonomy uses similar criteria to Banting and Kymlicka).⁵ Such recognition is assured through article 7 of the 1991 constitution which stipulates that the state recognises the ethnic and cultural diversity of the nation. This recognition materialises through policies such as reserved seats for representatives of the indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities in the democratic ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction
• Part I. Theoretical Framework
• Part II. Case Study One: Recognition in Colombia
• Part III. Case Study Two: Recognition in New Zealand
• Part IV. Analysis
• Back Matter