Indonesia's Ascent

Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order

C. Roberts, A. Habir, L. Sebastian, C. Roberts, A. Habir, L. Sebastian

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781137397409
• eBook ISBN: 9781137397416
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume explores the domestic and transnational considerations associated with Indonesia's ascent, referring to its rise in terms of hard and soft power and its likely trajectory in the future. The range of contributors analyse economic resources, religious harmony, security, regional relations, leadership and foreign policy.

1

Ascending Indonesia: Significance and Conceptual Foundations

Christopher B. Roberts and Leonard C. Sebastian

As Indonesia’s economy grows, it is increasingly being referred to as a rising middle power, and there is mounting speculation that Indonesia might eventually join the ranks of Asia’s great powers. Regardless of just how far Indonesia will rise, its government and the will of its people will become increasingly influential in terms of its regional leadership and the values and the norms Jakarta espouses. Such speculation raises questions as to the domestic opportunities and constraints that inform Indonesia’s rise, and how various domestic contexts affect Indonesia’s foreign policy and the values it espouses. Meanwhile, the image of Indonesia as an increasingly stable and democratic nation has contributed to its significant deepening of security ties with other nations such as Australia and the United States. But how might these ties be perceived across East Asia, and how might East Asian perceptions affect relations with those countries? Within Southeast Asia, what will the rise of a more independent and potentially assertive Indonesia mean for the future of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)? Will it serve to strengthen this body as Indonesia strengthens what many regard as its natural leadership role within ASEAN, or will it threaten ASEAN’s continued viability and strategic centrality as a more assertive and independent Indonesia opts increasingly to forge its global path independent of other regional nations? And what will Indonesia’s rise mean for the Asian balance of power more generally? Will the Indonesian archipelago, with its vital sea lanes for instance, become a theater for great power competition? Will a rising Indonesia substantially influence the Asian balance by allying with either the United States or China? Or might Jakarta continue to hedge and maintain an equidistant position between the two great powers, thereby acting as a Southeast Asian ‘swing state’? These are the questions and issues that are examined by a diverse range of specialists from Indonesia and its immediate neighborhood.

Why a book on this subject? Aside from the above dynamics, issues, and questions, Indonesia is the fifth largest country in terms of population. Further, it is the world’s largest majority Muslim nation and the third largest democracy. While this mix is in itself important in demonstrating that both Islam and democracy can coexist, Indonesia’s economic record is equally impressive: between 2010 and 2014, it has simultaneously maintained an economic growth rate averaging 6 per cent in Real GDP.¹ Just over a decade ago, and following the domestic devastation of the East Asian Financial Crisis, some regional analysts viewed Indonesia as an economic and political ‘basket case’, ready to implode at any moment.² Despite such pessimistic predictions, Indonesia’s economy—in purchasing power parity terms (PPP)—now represents 33.67 per cent of the combined GDP of all ten of the ASEAN countries, and Indonesia’s GDP has long since surpassed that of conventional middle powers such as Australia and may, within the next few years, also surpass South Korea.³ Moreover, 37.6 per cent of ASEAN’s population is Indonesian (248 million people) and the median age of Indonesia’s population is just 29.2 years. The country also has an abundance of natural resources including hydrocarbons, tin, nickel, timber, bauxite, copper, fertile soils, coal, gold, and silver.⁴ Regarding its territorial size, the landmass of the Indonesian archipelago is nearly half the combined landmass of ASEAN (42.5 per cent), and within broader East Asia, Indonesia’s territorial size is second only to China.

While the above trends and statistics bode well for Indonesia’s future, some of them simultaneously highlight the extent of the catastrophe that would befall the broader Indo-Pacific region should the country significantly destabilize in the future. As will be analyzed in later chapters, Indonesia still faces significant issues regarding the quality of its democratic institutions, economic structures, and infrastructure, as well as continued problems with corruption, religious intolerance, organized crime, terrorism, and separatist movements. The nation shares land-based borders with Malaysia, Timor-Leste, and Papua New Guinea. Indonesia’s territory is separated from Singapore by only ten kilometers of sea; it is 110 kilometers from the Philippines (vis-à-vis Borneo), and just 240 kilometers from Australia (vis-à-vis the tip of Cape York).⁵ With 17,508 islands—6,000 of which are inhabited⁶—and the porous nature of their associated borders, the future onset of significant state fragility—or even state failure—could lead to devastating consequences regarding the maintenance of law and order, the eruption of significant violence, the large number of potential refugees, and the onset of heightened piracy and other forms of organized and transnational crime such as illicit narcotics, human trafficking, and arms smuggling. While the risk of significant state fragility will hopefully never be realized, it is important to acknowledge and analyze the challenges that Indonesia continues to confront because, in the very least, their analysis leads to an important discussion regarding how best to respond to these problems and, moreover, such analysis is central to the book’s assessment concerning the future trajectory of Indonesia’s ascent.

Despite Indonesia’s rising regional and global stature, together with the potential risks and consequences of a failed democratic model, only two substantive works have addressed the issue of Indonesia’s rise.⁷ While these works provide critical insights in a number of spheres, much has happened at the domestic and regional levels since their date of publication. Moreover, nearly half of the authors in the present book are from Indonesia and this, together with the way the book has been structured, is designed to result in a more representative analysis of the domestic and international issues and consequences associated with Indonesia’s ascent. These include analysis of bilateral relations—such as with Australia and also critical ASEAN partners—as well as Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN. There is also a deeper and wider range of contributions concerning the domestic considerations that inform the nature of—and possible constraints to—Indonesia’s ascent. As an expansive archipelagic state, the book also addresses critical issues such as the country’s maritime interests and Jakarta’s potential influence vis-à-vis its neighbors, ASEAN, and the great powers. The analysis in this book has also been reinforced by the application of fundamental conceptual and theoretical insights concerning the impact of identity and norms on the nature of Indonesia’s leadership regarding issues such as religious tolerance and human rights. Further, this book distinguishes itself from other works on the subject by examining the conceptual and analytical properties behind considerations of what it means to be a rising power and how such a phenomenon should be analyzed and measured.

Conceptual foundations: The nature of power and influence in international relations

Within the international relations literature, a country that is ascending is generally taken to mean that it is rising in terms of power. Max Weber defines power as ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’.⁸ However, as Robert Gilpin argues, definitions concerning the concept of power are among ‘the most troublesome in the field of international relations’.⁹ A common realist approach has been to calculate the sum total of a country’s tangible and intangible capabilities—known as the ‘power as resources’ (or capacities) approach, by which resources are interpreted as ‘possessions’ or ‘property’ of the state.¹⁰ While the size of each country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the most common single indicator of power, other tangible indicators include population, territory, resource endowment, and military strength.¹¹ Less tangible indicators include ‘political culture, patriotism, education of the population, and strength of the scientific and technological base’.¹² Most of the indices that rank the power of states rely on the measurement of some combination of these resources or capabilities. Examples include the Correlates of War ‘Composite Index of National Capability’ (CINC), the Google Public Data ‘Power Index’, and China’s ‘Comprehensive National Power’ index.¹³

As argued by Waltz, when seeking power, state actors are in fact seeking to maximize security (that is, survival) rather than the other way around.¹⁴ Here, the argument is that through a strong military, which is enabled by a strong economy, countries can mitigate their security dilemma. However, the obtainment of greater security—that is, material power—by one state creates a security dilemma for other states. This dilemma can lead to a cyclical process of action and reaction regarding military procurements and/or investments designed to enhance each state’s military capabilities.¹⁵ In a worst case scenario, the process can escalate to the point of an arms race, in which a stable balance of power can be difficult to obtain and significant resources from other sectors are redirected toward state responses to the constantly shifting security dilemma. Within this realist perspective, material power is the core of international relations and security is synonymous with state survival.¹⁶ Accordingly, discussions of security are primarily limited to an assessment of military and economic capabilities.¹⁷ Thus, Vayrynen argues that a state and its people are only secure when there is

a low past, present and future probability of using serious coercive force between or within nations. Coercion can be both military and economic in nature as both of them can inflict major damage and pain on the targeted people. Peace is broken … if people are subjected to physical destruction and suffering. In other words, peace and security mean, ultimately freedom from coercion and its threats.¹⁸

The maintenance of ‘security’ within a given state’s territory is a condition that both superpowers and great powers are normally able to sustain. With the exception of fundamental disruptions to the international order—for example, the two world wars—great powers are usually in a position to maintain a ‘balance of power’ by shifting their alignments with other great or emerging powers, and sometimes middle powers, in order to balance against a perceived threat—whether from a great power or a superpower. In the case of the latter, the United States (US) is currently the only country to be characterized as a superpower. While superpowers are generally distinguished from great powers through their possession of global influence in most domains,¹⁹ in practice the United States has struggled to assert its will without sufficient international support, particularly in the security domain. Thus, less tangible factors also constrain the actions of superpowers, as the experiences of the US in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq aptly demonstrate.²⁰ Finally, at the material level, superpowers can also be constrained by contending alignments, and in this regard a new balance in the int...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures and Table
• Acknowledgements
• Notes on Contributors
• Chapter: 1 Ascending Indonesia: Significance and Conceptual Foundations
• Chapter: 2 Leadership and Dependency: Indonesia’s Regional and Global Role, 1945–75
• Chapter: 3 The Economy in Indonesia’s Ascent: Making Sense of it All
• Chapter: 4 Yudhoyono’s Third Way: Muslim Democracy, National Stability, and Economic Development in Indonesia
• Chapter: 5 Key Security Fault Lines—Unresolved Issues and New Challenges
• Chapter: 6 Democratic Achievement and Policy Paralysis: Implications for Indonesia’s Continued Ascent
• Chapter: 7 Politics, Security and Defense in Indonesia: The Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy
• Chapter: 8 The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values and Identity
• Chapter: 9 Indonesia and International Institutions: Treading New Territory
• Chapter: 10 Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, Challenges and Potential
• Chapter: 11 The Middle Power Moment: A New Basis for Cooperation between Indonesia and Australia?
• Chapter: 12 Key Intra-ASEAN Bilateral Relationships: Opportunities and Challenges
• Chapter: 13 Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN: Mediation, Agency and Extra-Regional Diplomacy
• Chapter: 14 Indonesia among the Powers: Will ASEAN Still Matter to Indonesia?
• Chapter: 15 Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook: The Law of the Sea, Maritime Security and the Great Powers
• Chapter: 16 ‘Consensual’ Regional Hegemony, Pluralist-Solidarist Visions, and Emerging Power Aspirations
• Index