Philosophy and Political Engagement

Reflection in the Public Sphere

Allyn Fives, Keith Breen, Allyn Fives, Keith Breen

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781137445865
• eBook ISBN: 9781137445872
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Filosofia etica e morale

Do philosophers have a responsibility to their society that is distinct from their responsibility to it as citizens? This edited volume explores both what type of contribution philosophy can make and what type of reasoning is appropriate when addressing public matters now. These questions are posed by leading international scholars working in the fields of moral and political philosophy. Each contribution also investigates the central issue of how to combine critical, rational analysis with a commitment to politically relevant public engagement. The contributions to this volume analyse issues raised in practical ethics, including abortion, embryology, and assisted suicide. They consider the role of ethical commitment in the philosophical analysis of contemporary political issues, and engage with matters of public policy such as poverty, the arts, meaningful work, as well as the evidence base for policy. They also examine the normative legitimacy of power, including the use of violence.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Allyn Fives and Keith Breen (eds.)Philosophy and Political EngagementInternational Political Theory10.1057/978-1-137-44587-2_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Allyn Fives¹  and Keith Breen²

(1)

School of Political Science and Sociology, UNESCO Child and Family Research Centre, at the National University of Ireland, Galway, Republic of Ireland

(2)

Queen’s University, Belfast, Northern Ireland

 

End Abstract

Do philosophers have a responsibility to their society that is distinct from their responsibility to it as citizens? If so, what form does this responsibility take? It has been argued by many that philosophy has a specific contribution to make to the discussion and resolution of public matters. Such a philosophical enterprise concerns itself with issues that are of a public rather than a purely private nature, or issues that have political rather than simply intellectual or academic relevance. This was the conclusion of many philosophers who began to engage in practical ethics in the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, Joseph Mahon argued that, as moral language is used in appraising everyday practices—political, legal, religious, economic, educational, and domestic—then philosophers should ‘concern themselves with these practices, and make that concern primary, pervasive and lasting in their professional practice. It is good philosophical sense to do so, and, ultimately, the only professional initiative that can be justified’ (Mahon 1975, pp. 10–11). The main objective of this edited volume is to explore both what type of contribution philosophy can make to public matters and what type of reasoning is appropriate when addressing public matters now. These questions are addressed by leading international scholars working in the fields of moral and political philosophy.

The essays in Part I of this book examine the role of philosophy in practical ethics. It is the case that many believe philosophy is ill-equipped to help address the fundamental challenges faced in contemporary democratic politics. In his introductory chapter to Part I, Allyn Fives asks whether we are caught on the horns of the following dilemma. On the one hand, to successfully engage in critical, rational analysis one must establish some distance with respect to the everyday world and its prevailing presuppositions and practices. Does it follow that philosophers will be too detached from political reality to have any appreciation of, and impact on, public matters? On the other hand, if philosophers do become engaged in practical matters, will they then lose the detachment necessary for truly general and abstract philosophical work? In the following three chapters, the role of philosophers in practical ethics is further explored. Joseph Mahon investigates the contributions of philosophers to public matters in the twentieth century and asks what this tells us about the proper role of philosophy now. He charts the course of a debate, spanning more than a century, concerning the role of philosophy in practical and applied issues, a debate marked by the prevailing influence of both J.S. Mill and Karl Marx. James E. Mahon extends this exploration, analysing the role of philosophers in debating the rights and wrongs of abortion. In particular, he considers the impact on the field of practical ethics of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s seminal 1971 essay on abortion and then analyses the contrasting views of Thomson and Joseph Mahon on this important and pressing topic. In their essay, Richard Hull and Annie McKeown O’Donovan examine the case for assisted death in certain clearly defined circumstances. Through an analysis of the distinction between acts and omissions, they conclude that we should continue to question our traditional moral landscape and to encourage more action in the light of our humanitarian convictions.

The essays in Part II address the issues of ethical commitment and political engagement. Are philosophers entitled to let their ethical convictions influence their philosophical analyses of contemporary political issues? Indeed, is philosophy a barren and meaningless endeavour without such ethical commitment to provide its starting point and its parameters? Alasdair MacIntyre takes up this theme in his analysis of the works of George Bernard Shaw and G.K. Chesterton and their public interventions on the social evil of poverty. MacIntyre asks what does it matter for society as a whole if philosophers—and, indeed, non-philosophers—no longer presuppose answers to fundamental philosophical questions, answers provided in part by Aristotelian and Thomist accounts of the human good? It is argued by many, in particular by liberals, that in our contemporary pluralist and individualist age, citizens are entitled to disagree about the bigger ethical questions that these philosophical accounts and traditions claim to answer. However, in their respective essays, Russell Keat and Keith Breen argue that ethical commitment to some account of the human good—or, more precisely, of a plurality of human goods—is unavoidable and that such ethical commitment is valuable when reflecting on the policy issues of meaningful work and the state’s support for cultural goods. Returning again to the observation that we will encounter a plurality of such ethical commitments, Allyn Fives examines the role of philosophical analysis in situations where ethical principles come into conflict, focusing in particular on the longstanding debates about research ethics and the institutional review of research in universities. He argues that philosophy has a dual role, combining the abstract and general reasoning involved in theoretical analysis, on the one hand, with the practical reasoning required to work through moral conflicts, on the other.

Finally, we turn to the justification of power, as well as resistance, in Part III. What role can philosophy play in the normative justification of power relations, distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate power? Philip Pettit puts forward the case for a republican model of democracy. Pettit’s argument is that such a regime is legitimate because it rests on power relations that preserve rather than hinder individual freedom, that is, relations of non-domination. However, throughout the modern period many philosophers, including Marx and his followers, have questioned the very possibility of making a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power relations in societies structured in line with capitalist imperatives. In his essay, Allen W. Wood re-examines Karl Marx’s writings on capitalism, ethics, and revolutionary activity and argues that these writings remain necessary reading for those who hope, however forlornly, for future human progress. In his contribution, John Foley adds to this theme by revisiting the debate between Albert Camus and his critics on the left, in particular Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, over whether there can ever be a justification for political violence. Exploring the phenomenon and lived experience of violence further, Felix Ó Murchadha then questions the very possibility of a philosophical examination of violence that is not itself implicated in the very violence it seeks to examine.

The themes and issues considered here are assuredly varied, highlighting different societal problems and concerns. But while varied, these highlighted problems and concerns are linked insofar as they are faced by all of us in our various roles, including our roles as (ideally) reflective persons and responsible citizens. We therefore hope that taken together the essays in this volume, in throwing light on what is required of us as reflective persons and responsible citizens, illustrate the continued relevance of philosophy as a discipline and of philosophical thought generally to everyday life and practice.

Reference

Mahon, J. (1975). Philosophy and public matters. Understanding, 5, 5–11.

Part I
Practical Ethics

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Allyn Fives and Keith Breen (eds.)Philosophy and Political EngagementInternational Political Theory10.1057/978-1-137-44587-2_2

Begin Abstract

2. The Role of Philosophy in Public Matters

Allyn Fives¹

(1)

School of Political Science and Sociology and UNESCO Child and Family Research Centre at the National University of Ireland, Galway, Republic of Ireland

End Abstract

This book explores the role of philosophy in public matters and poses the following question: does philosophical reflection have a public or political role and, if so, what is it? In posing this question, there are good reasons to believe we are, or appear to be, caught on the horns of a dilemma. The appearance of dilemma arises in the following way. On the one hand, the understanding that is ‘distinctively philosophical’ is ‘general and abstract, rationally reflective, and concerned with what can be known through different kinds of inquiry’ (Williams 1985, p. 1). So as to successfully engage in such critical rational analysis, one must establish some distance with respect to the everyday world and its prevailing presuppositions and practices. While there are various methodological approaches taken in philosophical reflection, common to them all is a process of disengaging from the everyday world so as to better pursue a critical rational analysis of what is taken for granted. However, to the extent that philosophy is disengaged, will it also be ill-suited to play a public or political role? Will philosophy be uninformed about practical matters or too distant from those who need to be convinced by philosophical argument, or will it lack credibility among those who are making decisions and implementing their programmes in the public sphere?

On the other hand, some philosophers have called for a direct engagement in public matters, if philosophy is ever to be successful in attempts to persuade or actively collaborate with those who hold office, fill public roles, or agitate for public reform (Wolff 2011). However, again this seems problematic, for such direct public involvement, it can be argued, is antithetical to the philosophical disengagement required for critical rational analysis in general and also, specifically, for the impartial and dispassionate analysis of social mores and social injustices, as well as for the critique of ideology and its distorting effects on human consciousness. Can we remove ourselves from the horns of this dilemma? Is it possible to combine philosophical reflection with political engagement? Can the type of philosophical disengagement required for critical reflection somehow be made compatible with active involvement in public matters?

The contributors to this volume endeavour to answer questions of this sort, and each attempts to demonstrate how philosophy can engage with public matters. In doing so, the contributors are continuing a tradition of philosophical engagement with public matters that is, in one sense, as old as philosophy itself. It is a tradition that can be traced from classical Athens right up to revolutionary and reformist writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and beyond. However, we can only undertake politically engaged philosophy if we take into consideration why many philosophers rejected such a project during the last century. It was argued that while philosophical reflection can help improve the concepts used in public debate, it is singularly ill-suited to play any role in resolving the substantive issues raised in such debates. What is more, it was argued, when philosophers stray beyond these limits, they are prone to make meaningless statements (philosophical nonsense) and also to promote a political environment hostile to critical rational enquiry.

In this chapter, I will first outline the reasons why many philosophers argued that they had only a restricted role in public matters. I will then look at subsequent efforts to expand that role. First, many philosophers began to make substantive normative arguments, promoting a particular type of society or a particular resolution to one of society’s problems. And, second, some philosophers left the campus behind, entered the public arena, and tried to sway and influence people and events, whether as public commentators or as members of committees. Two themes will be central to this discussion. Because of the diversity of philosophical doctrines, there is no one distinctively philosophical approach to public matters, and philosophers employ different and perhaps incompatible methodological approaches. Second, there is a diversity of moral considerations appropriate to public matters, and it is possible for these to come into conflict in any one instance. Given the diversity of methods and the possibility for moral conflict, how can philosophers engage in public matters in a way that is meaningful?

1 Philosophy as Conceptual Improvement

As we have seen already, for one school of thought philosophy should play only a limited role in public matters. I want to draw attention to two versions of this argument. The first, and perhaps the more extreme, derives from the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and A.J. Ayer. They make a distinction between ethics, on the one hand, and science and philosophy, on the other. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), Wittgenstein concluded by stating that ‘What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence’ (1921, § 7, p. 89). While the propositions of mathematics and the empirical sciences can convey definite cognitive information, ethical and moral statements cannot. Therefore, ‘it is clear that ethics cannot be put into words’ (1921, § 6.42, p. 86).

A similar distinction is made in A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (1946). It was an overriding aim of that book to identify and reject what Ayer referred to as ‘metaphysical nonsense’:

For we shall maintain that no statement which refers to a ‘reality’ transcending the limits of all sense-experience can possibly have any literal significance; from which it must follow that the labours of those who have striven to describe such a reality have all been devoted to the production of nonsense (Ayer 1946, p. 34).

Ayer argued that a proposition is meaningful, if and only if, it can be empirically verified, whether directly through observations or indirectly based in part on observations and also analytic statements (Ayer 1946, p. 13). In contrast, many statements made about moral and ethical issues cannot be empirically verified and therefore, he believed, are nonsense.

There are good reasons to question the assumptions of Ayer and other logical positivists, in particular the view that meaningful statem...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontmatter
• 1. Introduction
• 1. Practical Ethics
• 2. Ethical Commitment and Political Engagement
• 3. The Justification of Power and Resistance
• Backmatter