From Protest to Pragmatism

The Unionist government and North-South relations from 1959-72

D. McCann

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781349505326, 9781137499530
• eBook ISBN: 9781137499547
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

How do two ideologically opposed governments co-operate? The Unionist government struggled to answer this question during the sixties and seventies. This book charts the development of this government's policy towards its neighbor in Southern Ireland and explains how it ended up in a total stalemate with the emergence of the Troubles.

1

Diplomacy via Press Release: North-South Relations from 1959–64

Abstract: McCann provides an analysis of how relations developed in the aftermath of Seán Lemass becoming Taoiseach in June 1959. Focusing on the Unionist government, he details how the new economic and political approach from the Irish government wrong footed the Brookeborough administration in Belfast. As well as looking at the internal debates within the cabinet, McCann highlights that the arrival of Terence O’Neill in March 1963 did not immediately represent a new approach from Unionism towards the Irish government. The failure to create coherent policy on co-operation left O’Neill politically vulnerable, McCann argues. This weakness was exploited by rivals such as Brian Faulkner, who used North-South co-operation to appeal to the liberal wing of Unionism, who by 1964 were increasingly disillusioned with the O’Neill administration.

McCann, David. From Protest to Pragmatism: The Unionist Government and North-South Relations from 1959–72. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. DOI: 10.1057/9781137499547.0007.

The fact remains, however, that so long as those in authority demand Ulster, improved relationship will be very difficult to establish because this demand cuts right at our nerve centre.¹

Northern Ireland Prime Minister, J.M. Andrews to Major General Hugh Montgomery

These private thoughts delivered by Northern Ireland’s wartime Prime Minister at the height of World War II are indicative of just how penetrating the issue of the constitutional recognition was for Unionist politicians. At a time of total war with Nazi Germany and not long after the Belfast Blitz, a major concern for Andrews was the fact that the relatively new Irish constitution, Bunreacht na hÉireann, contained within it a territorial claim on Northern Ireland. This drive to maintain constitutional integrity would be a constant for his successor Lord Brookborough, who also took on the charge of facing down constitutional challenge from the Irish government. Whilst Southern Ireland pursued a policy of vocal anti-partitionism, it was relatively easy and at the time electorally beneficial for a Unionist leader to rebut the Nationalist challenge. In tandem with the rhetoric, the relatively favourable economic position of Northern Ireland compared to the Irish Republic allowed political leaders in Belfast to draw attention the higher living standards that the province enjoyed within the United Kingdom. Yet, by 1959, both of these pillars of the Unionist argument came under challenge with the ascension of Seán Lemass as Taoiseach, bringing a new approach to Northern Ireland and the economy.

1.1Cautiously into the nineteen-sixties

As Eamon deValera brought the curtain down on his long 21-year period as Taoiseach, the debate over the positions and temperament of his successor was debated within the Northern Ireland media. The change in leader in the Irish Republic received a guarded welcome as the Belfast Telegraph ran positive editorials stressing Lemass‘ moderate instincts and greater interest in economic affairs. In their editorial, the paper referred to Lemass as a ‘man of action’ with the qualities of an ‘efficient company director’.² Such positive comments from Unionist friendly papers would give Lemass hope that a new departure in North-South co-operation was possible. In attempting to change the conversation between the two states, Lemass did move quickly to shift the emphasis on North-South co-operation away from constitutional arguments to more practical economic co-operation. He proposed the creation of an all island trade committee to examine areas in which co-operation between the two states could be enhanced and barriers to trade removed.³ Lemass persisted throughout 1959 with his message of economic co-operation with the Northern Ireland government delivering a speech in September to the Oxford Union arguing that greater trade between the two states would help eliminate the economic handicaps of partition. Likewise, speaking at his first Ard Fheis as Fianna Fáil leader, he made another pitch to the Unionist government in the area of recognition of Northern Ireland arguing, ‘we make no secret that our aim is to bring partition to an end; but we recognise the fact that it exists’.⁴ Lemass sought to assuage Unionist concerns by inviting them to talks that did not touch upon any constitutional issues.

However, the Unionist government was seemingly unimpressed by the more liberal attitude from Dublin. The Prime Minister, Lord Brookeborough, dismissed Lemass‘ proposals for economic co-operation arguing, ‘we would be conceding that in these fields at least we had interests which marched with the Republic rather than Great Britain’.⁵ Brookeborough’s rejection was a contradiction in terms as he had tacitly acknowledged this already by embarking upon joint projects in the nineteen-fifties with the Erne Hydro-electric scheme and Great Northern Railway line. The main problem for Unionism was not the economics of co-operation, rather the politics of it. Debating the issue of economic co-operation with the South in a cabinet meeting in July 1959, the Unionist government came to the determination that despite the positive changes in the Irish economy that even limited free trade could not be supported on ‘political grounds’.⁶ The prioritisation of political concerns over economic benefits would be the hallmark of how the government in Belfast viewed proposals for North-South co-operation for the next four years.

For Unionism, the Irish Republic’s territorial claim on Northern Ireland coloured how they viewed the change in approach from Dublin. Speaking at the 1960 Unionist party conference, Brookeborough acknowledged that the arrival of Lemass did represent a change in approach but still believed that the end goal for the Irish government was dismantling the Northern Ireland state as he told delegates ‘if Eire wanted friendship then they would have to accept the constitution of Northern Ireland, but if they were going to use that friendship as a means of inveighing Northern Ireland into the garden, Ulster would not have it’.⁷ The fear within the government did not just extend to figures regarded as being on the conservative wing of the Unionist party, as even moderate ministers like Lord Glentoran, opposed joint ventures in tourism as he feared supporting publicity materials which might be regarded as ‘anti-partitionist’.⁸ Even the most trivial of events came under scrutiny if there was a perceived threat to Northern Ireland’s constitutional position as the cabinet rejected an invitation for Sir Graham Larmour, President of the Irish Association, to visit the Governor, Lord Wakehurst, due to the association’s liberal stance on co-operation with the Irish government and Irish unity.⁹

These retrograde steps from the nineteen-fifties of quietly supporting acts of co-operation between the two states, to public and private hostility have to be viewed in the wider political context of the IRA border campaign which by the early nineteen-sixties had dramatically escalated with attacks on RUC patrols along the border. The Unionist government regularly derided the security policies of the Irish government, over what they perceived as a sympathetic attitude towards what the IRA was doing in Northern Ireland. Attacks led by the Home Affairs Minister, Brian Faulkner, called on Lemass to do more arguing, ‘If their security arrangements are serious they ought to know about the presence of armed men on their side of the border and they have a duty to act firmly on that knowledge’.¹⁰ Despite Lemass’ regular condemnations of IRA violence as being a hindrance to the cause of Irish unity, rather than an act of progression, it was still viewed from Northern Ireland as not going far enough. Not until 1961, when visible raids by and acts of co-operation by the Gardai and RUC began taking place did the any positive statements begin emanating from the Unionist government. Even after the IRA announced an end to their campaign, the tone from Northern Ireland was not one of gratitude to Lemass, rather it was one of not acting soon enough as Faulkner spoke about the military courts being introduced ‘only when the recent campaign was on the wane, but next time they must not wait’.¹¹ Likewise, a Newsletter editorial argued that the Unionist government had been vindicated in their analysis that the Irish government were too slow to act on the IRA.¹² As Kelly notes, it was Lemass’ hope that by tackling the IRA, he could possibly open the door to a more friendly relationship with the Unionist government, but in the immediate aftermath, the response from Northern Ireland was lukewarm at best to the policies he had put in place.¹³

Frustrated by the intransigent attitude of the Unionist government on co-operation with the Irish government, a number of Northern industrialists began approaching Dublin, seeking their own trade exemptions.¹⁴ Getting over the general surprise of the approach, officials in the Department of Industry and Commerce and even Lemass himself, were cautious as they feared taking unilateral action, without co-operation from the Northern Ireland government. Once the industrialists obtained the approval, but not co-operation, of the Unionist government, in early ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  Diplomacy via Press Release: North-South relations 195964
• 2  The Politics of Co-operation: North-South Relations from 196566
• 3  Co-operation falters: The Politics of North-South Relations: 196668
• 4  Breakdown in Relations: 196869
• 5  North-South Relations during the Troubles: 196972
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index