Studying the Joseonjok/Chaoxianzu in the Context of the State–Community Relationship
The world has become increasingly globalized and interconnected, and migration, the highly dynamic phenomenon of people’s movement, has drawn a great deal of attention from the broader epistemic community. The number of people who live outside their country of birth in 2015 was 244 million—3.3% of the world’s population (OECD 2016, p. 23)—up from 173 million in 2000; “officially classified” refugees accounted for 7% of this total. In addition, armed conflict and the threat of violence have driven millions of people from their homes and across international borders in search of safety. At the end of 2015, there were 16.12 million refugees and 3.21 million asylum seekers worldwide (The United Nations Refugee Agency 2016). 1 This modern exodus occurs continuously as people seek higher incomes, improved individual and family welfare, cultural comfort, fundamental safety, and better opportunities for their offsprings. Migration generates both positive and negative consequences for the societies involved in terms of the mobility of human resources—for example, brain gains and brain drains from the receiving and sending countries’ perspectives. Other associated issues include social cohesion, welfare burdens and the rise of welfare chauvinism, labor market restructuring due to competition over certain jobs, ethnostratification , security concerns, chain migration , and ethnic hatred. Migration studies linked with security or social and economic development have increased because of people’s greater mobility and the interconnectivity of labor markets in the globalizing world. Therefore, the control and integration of migrant populations (both internal and external) has become a high national priority for many countries, both developing and developed. China (The People’s Republic of China [PRC]) has preserved a particular form of modern multiethnic state with an ethnically diverse population. China has experienced rapid internal migration and has gradually become a receiving country while remaining the fourth largest sending country, with 9.5 million people in overseas Chinese communities across the globe. By 2015, the number of internal rural–urban migrants in China reached 150 million (IOM 2016, p. 5). For these reasons, China has been a focus of academic research in the fields of Chinese diasporas, both enduring and new ethnic tensions and conflicts , and internal Chinese migration. Since China has become the preeminent world economy and is undergoing multifaceted full-scale transformation, migration analysis should be expanded accordingly to fully understand the state–community relationship in this rapidly developing and transitory period. Reflecting these changes, China’s previously territorially confined ethnic minority communities have also been at the edge of disintegration , with a variety of political (security), socioeconomic (development), and cultural (identity) problems in different regions in China.
Against this backdrop, this project, a case study taking an interdisciplinary academic field of ethnic relations , investigates the formation of the Joseonjok ( Chaoxianzu , the ethnonym of the pre-modern Korean diaspora) identity, 2 the PRC’s policy toward minority regions, and the prosperity (“thriving” in an inclusive sense beyond short economic well-being) of northeast China, focusing on the communities of the Joseonjok, the 13th largest ethnic group in China, concentrated in a region generally known as Dongbei (formerly Manchuria) , which comprises the three provinces of Jilin , Heilongjiang, and Liaoning (Table 1.1). The project presents the process and nature of the formation of Joseonjok identity and changes in their community in contemporary China, dividing it into the three distinctive historical periods: the period surrounding Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door policy , the period of rapid economic reform, and the post-Deng era. A multiple-level analysis is made in each period, including general theoretical discussions on the relationship between communism and ethnonationalism ; explanations of the Chinese particularities of the conflicts and synergies of seemingly contradictory human groupings in the Chinese context; and applications of the two levels of discussion to the Joseonjok case. The theoretical propositions inform the comparative analysis. Given the significance of regionally confined ethnicity and ethnonationalism in a modern multinational state due to their linkages with national security , stability, and prosperity , studying the state–community (social group) relationship is an essential part of political science, public policy studies, and international relations. This case study also contributes to the literature on ethnic relations in the context of Northeast Asia .
Table 1.1
Total and minority populations in minority regions (2013) (unit: 10,000)
Total population | Minority population | Ratio (national total ratio): 49.23% | |
|---|---|---|---|
Jilin | 331.28 | 176.18 | 53.18% |
Liaoning | 326.42 | 112.75 | 34.54% |
Heilongjiang | 24.81 | 5.16 | 20.80% |
Tibet | 312.00 | 304.04 | 97.45% |
Xinjiang | 2264.00 | 1406.57 | 62.13% |
By focusing on the question of how minority ethnic groups have built a distinctive collective identity and survived political turmoil throughout China’s modern history, this project disentangles the contradictions and synergies between nationality , locality, and development in China. The pre-modern Korean diaspora population is concentrated in the region of Dongbei , which surrounds the Yanbian/Yeonbyeon Joseonjok autonomous prefecture (yanbianzizhizhou) and Changbai/ Jangbaek autonomous county (changbaizizhixian). Nationwide, China has eight officially recognized ethnic minority provinces (shaoshuminzuquyu): Inner Mongolia , Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang . China also has five minority ethnic autonomous regions: the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (neimengguzizhiqu), the Xinjiang Uyghurs Autonomous Region (xinjiangweiwuerzizhiqu), the Guangxi Zhuang Ethnicity Autonomous Region (guangxizhuangzuzizhiqu), the Ningxia Hui Ethnicity Autonomous Region (ningxiahuizuzizhiqu), and the Tibet Autonomous Region (xizangzizhiqu). In Dongbei’s three provinces and the rest of northern China, there are, in addition to the Han Chinese , five main ethnic groups: Mongols (2200,000), Joseonjok (1923,842), Ewenkezu (30,505), Hèzhézú (10,000), and Orogenzu (8196). However, the Joseonjok are the only ethnic group who reside in all three provinces of Dongbei , which is adjacent to the Korean peninsula . The populations of Hèzhézú and Orogenzu are concentrated in Heilongjiang only. Mongols are spread more widely, residing mostly in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region but also in Xinjiang and other parts of Dongbei (NBS 2012). As of 2000, approximately 92% of the Joseonjok lived in Dongbei, of which about 60% lived in Jilin Province, 20% in Heilongjiang, 12% in Liaoning , and 7.7% outside Dongbei, with 1% in Beijing (Kim 2010, p. 97) Tables 1.2 and 1.3 .
Table 1.2
Joseonjok population change
1964 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 | 2012 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Yanbian | 861,572 | 842,549 | 736,900 | 796,524 | |
Jilin | 867,000 | 1184,000 | 1146,000 | 1040,100 | – |
Liaoning | – | 230,378 | 230,000 | 239,537 | – |
Heilongjiang | – | 452,398 | 388,500 | 327,806 | – |
Total | 1339,569 | 1920,507 | 1923,842 | 1830,929 | – |
Table 1.3
Joseonjok population (%) in Yanbian (per non-Joseonjok)
Year | 1949 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Rate | 63.36 | 51.82 | 44.76 | 40.41 | 40.54 | 38.55 | 35.66 |
The administrative divisions of China’s ethnic minority regions are as follows: 77 ethnic autonomous groups at the prefecture level (dijiminzuzizhidifang), 31 cities at the prefecture level (dijishi), 30 autonomous prefectures (zizhizhou), 705 ethnic autonomous regions at the county level (xianjiminzuzizhidifang), 72 cities at the county level (xianjishi), and 120 autonomous counties (zizhixian). Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture is one of the 30 autonomous prefectures (zizhizhou), whereas Changbai Joseonjok autonomous xian (hyun in Korean) in Jilin is one of the 120 autonomous counties (zizhixian). In addition, although not categorized as “autonomous” (zizhi), there are an additional 11 Joseonjok counties (hyang in Korean) in Jilin, 13 in Liaoning , and 19 in Heilongjiang (NBS 20...