Launched in 1996 as an initiative of the Singaporean and French governments to enhance Asia-Europe relations, the first Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit in Bangkok, Thailand , in March 1996 brought together the then 15 member states of the European Union (EU) , the European Commission , 7 members of the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) , China , South Korea , and Japan . Today, ASEM’s membership has expanded to a total of 51 European and Asian nations, in addition to the EU and the ASEAN Secretariat. ASEM remains the sole platform dedicated exclusively to Asia-Europe relations and is increasingly transforming into a Eurasian forum with recent membership expansions to Russia , Kazakhstan , and Mongolia . Still an intergovernmental platform without the legal framework of an international organization, European and Asian governments meet within its ambit to discuss the future of inter-continental relations, interregional interaction at numerous levels, and global affairs. In two decades of its existence, the forum has brought together leaders from both sides, in addition to providing a continuous dialogue mechanism for officials, experts, parliamentarians, and civil society on foreign affairs, economic, financial, environmental , cultural and educational issues. As such, ASEM has promoted interregionalism in unprecedented ways.
Furthermore, in the light of ASEM’s extraordinary growth over the past two decades, the forum’s potential global weight is undeniable. According to recent figures, the total population of ASEM countries hovered around 4.6 billion in 2015, accounting for 62.1% of the global population (Eurostat 2016a, p. 12). ASEM includes seven out of ten of the world’s strongest economies, as well as regional powers such as China, India , Japan , and Russia . It comprises two of the world’s most integrated regions, the EU and Southeast Asia . It is therefore no surprise that ASEM is also a juggernaut in terms of economy and trade . According to EU figures, ASEM countries produced 57.6% of global GDP 1 , and accounted for nearly 70% of global merchandise trade 2 in 2014, namely 71% of exports, and 67% of all imports (Eurostat 2016b, p. 1–2).
Nevertheless, Europe -Asia relations continue to perform below their potential. Both regions recognize a shared future but fail to build a sustainable path towards it. Strategic differences exist in political issues such as the Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, security matters including territorial disputes, and efforts to liberalize interregional trade. Europe currently views Asia principally through a geopolitical lens, a perspective the EU as a sui generis organization finds hard to adapt. Today, individual EU member states have lost the global weight they once bore to have an impact on Asia’s turbulent geopolitics. Furthermore, when it comes to trade, EU member states each follow a geoeconomic approach towards Asia, which sees them competing against each other for preferential treatment in trade and investment, in particular in countries with whom the EU does not have a free trade agreement (FTA) . The EU has endeavored to sign FTAs with almost all of its Asian ASEM partners, yet its approach has lacked strategic direction, and most FTAs remain under negotiation for nearly a decade. Third, the EU and individual member states prioritize certain Asian countries such as China over other ASEM members, which reflects poorly on Europe’s relations with other Asian countries. As for Asia, geopolitical crises in the EU’s southern and eastern neighborhoods are less of a priority than economics. Asia’s key consideration in relations with the EU and its member states concerns bilateral trade and investment ties. For almost all of Asia (except perhaps Japan , Australia , and New Zealand), geopolitical themes are sovereign matters of a state. Most Asian countries continue to harbor a suspicion of Europe given the continent’s colonial history. Trust remains an issue.
ASEM itself as an interregional forum at twenty years of age, in spite of its potential global weight, is exposed to external criticism and faces key internal hurdles. Most importantly, as the only platform solely dedicated to Asia and Europe the process is seen as failing to play a relevant role as a major international cooperation structure. Dubbed a mini-United Nations , the forum is seen as lacking concrete outcomes, remaining at the level of a talking shop. Most of ASEM’s initiatives lack visibility and mass appeal. The general public’s awareness of ASEM as an actor in the global power structure remains remarkably low. Internally, not all member governments are equally involved, and some may even be losing interest in the forum, at a time when it has become crucial to underscore Europe -Asia relations in an increasingly interconnected world subject to transnational crises. The lack of a shared vision and different opinions on the way to move forward constitute some of ASEM’s greatest challenges.
Nevertheless, ASEM remains important for multiple reasons. First, ASEM represents the combined weight of Asia and Europe, and underscores the political, economic, and sociocultural interdependency between both continents. As such it serves as a mirror of the progress that both regions have made in establishing a political dialogue including on sensitive issues such as human rights ; in promoting two-way trade and investment; in enhancing cultural and social exchange; and in involving different stakeholder groups in order to include a bottom-up dimension to a summit-level process.
Second, ASEM remains a crucial test case of inter-regional engagement in practice. It is certainly true that ASEM’s initial region-to-region setup has transformed. Membership has expanded to include South and Central Asian countries, Russia , Australia , New Zealand, and non-EU countries Norway and Switzerland . Reflecting a world that is increasingly multinodal (or multipolar) in nature, ASEM has evolved into a rather diffuse and comprehensive transregional (Eurasian) gathering. The role of well-integrated regions displaying a certain degree of actorness has diminished, and an increasing resistance can be witnessed against the transfer of sovereign power to transnational entities, as the EU’s internal crisis and the outcome of the Brexit referendum show. Even so, ASEM retains its “bipolar” structure and coordination, and improving the interlinkage (in all its dimensions) between both regions (or continents) has even turned into ASEM prime raison-d’être. ASEM therefore remains a salient forum, not so much to examine pure region-to-region relations, but to observe the interplay between multilateral, transregional, interregional, subregional, and bilateral relations. It other words, it provides an important opportunity to observe what happens to the contours of interregionalism, when a large number of states and non-state actors from two regions in addition to two regional organizations come together in an international institution.
Third, ASEM’s significance as a dialogue forum is only growing, in particular in an era of political polarization, increasing economic inequality, rising populism, and transnational challenges (often referred to as non-traditional security challenges) such as climate change , sustainable development, and migration . Importantly, ASEM is still a forum without the United States. It therefore provides the opportunity for European and Asian countries, the EU and ASEAN to promote a habit of cooperation and address shared interests in the economic or non-traditional security sphere, even if both regions continue to entertain strong relations with the United States in terms of hard security. The absence of the United States and the focus on dialogue can also continue facilitating the engagement and “socialization” of emerging regional and global powers, such as China , Russia , and India .
Fourth, ASEM’s role as a forum gathering not only political leaders, but also businesspeople, academic communities, civil society representatives and NGOs , parliaments, labor fora, and youth is gaining in importance. As this volume shows, ASEM’s “democratic dimension” has made significant progress, and both horizontal communication between the different stakeholder groups and the input they can deliver to the government level will be key defining factors for the future of the forum.
It can therefore be said that the ASEM process, bringing together a highly diverse membership with different priorities, has made remarkable achievements in transcending numerous differences. Not only has it brought together the highest level of leadership in a cooperative environment , but it has also connected a high number of other stakeholder groups. The most recent summit in Mongolia , held under the overarching theme of “Partnership for the Future through Connectivity ,” endorsed a “strong resolve to work together to energize ASEM, promote further connectivity, mutually beneficial partnership and cooperation between Asia and Europe” (ASEM 2016). The future of Asia-Europe relations and of ASEM lies precisely in this ambition to connect regions and their people.
On 15 and 16 July 2016, Heads of State and Government or their high-level representatives from 51 European and Asian countries, and leaders from EU and ASEAN institutions gathered in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia , to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the ASEM process. At this important junction, this edited volume sets out to look back at ASEM’s two-decade history, by focusing on the process’s key dimensions, defining themes, main driving forces, and core challenges. What are ASEM’s achievements, and to what extent has ASEM withstood the test of time? To what extent is external criticism, that ASEM has not ...