Introduction
Federalism as a governmental system became popular as a means of nation-building at the end of the Second World War, especially in the British Commonwealth. The British imperial powers promoted the federal idea in many of its ex-colonies, including Canada, India and Nigeria, perhaps as the most viable option for a multi-cultural country. Likewise, in the post-Cold War era, there was an increased interest in the federal system, as it was increasingly conceived as a tool of conflict management in war-torn countries based on experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (1995), Ethiopia (1995), and Iraq (2003). Given its utility in multi-dimensional ways, federalism is adopted for different reasons by different countries, in response to disparate situations. The system is particularly attractive to such countries with large size and population as Australia, India, Nigeria and the United States of America. It is also appealing to countries with a high degree of social heterogeneity as Ethiopia, India and Nigeria as a means to achieving unity.
In the 1950s, for example, there was high optimism for federalism in Africa due to the suitability of the system to the heterogeneity that exists in those societies (Burgess 2012a). This optimism, however, disappeared with the collapse of federations like Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–1963) and many more. In India and Nigeria, for example, besides the British federal instinct (see, for instance, Burgess 2007) and the desire of the individual founding fathers, the recognition of diversity constitutes the driving force behind the formation of the federations . In these two countries, the federal system was adopted to ‘hold together’ the diverse elements inhabiting the countries (Stepan 1999).
Nigeria, being a product of colonialism , was a victim of a problematic unification of two protectorates, which saw peoples of diverse linguistic, historical, religious and cultural backgrounds brought together. The plural nature of the state made a unitary form of government seemingly unrealistic, making the adoption of federalism in 1954 a pragmatic decision. Therefore, the most significant step taken by Nigerian leaders, with the active support of the British colonial government in response to the country’s ethnic diversity was the adoption of a federal political framework. Unlike the American federation, where small units desired to ‘come together’ and cede to the federal government some measure of their sovereignty, the Nigerian federation was born from a hitherto unitary state (Stepan 1999).
The British had promoted the federal idea in Nigeria hoping that the regions with their different economic resources would complement each other. Moreover, they had hoped that their architectural design would produce a structure capable of reconciling the different diversities in the country, or simply put, that the design would produce unity in a country of over 350 ethnic groups.1 Likewise, the country’s founding fathers had hoped that the interests of the multifarious groups would be better protected under a federal political arrangement. Thus, federalism was both promoted and championed as an instrument of unity in diversity . Contrary to the optimism expressed by the architects of the idea (including the British colonial government), the country’s diversity appeared to be an encumbrance on the system. We are not in any way suggesting that diversity in itself is the problem, rather the manner in which the elites have continuously manipulated ethnic and religious sentiments, among others, has become a source of the problem. A federal idea seems appropriate to the socio-political situation of Nigeria but the structural imbalance inherent in the society has made the framework less able to cope with the hydra-headed strains that result from a federal system. Problems of bringing together different peoples continue to provoke debate and controversy. Accusations of inequalities in the federal structure continue to dominate political discourse.
The Nigerian federation inherited from the colonial government a three-region federal system but its leaders have since increased the number of constituent units to its current thirty-six.2 At inception, the federation had four notable features. One was the entrenchment of a tripartite system of government with each component unit consisting of a dominant ethnic group and a host of minority groups. Each of the units—the Northern, Western and Eastern Region—was large enough to form a country of its own. Riker (1964, p. 31) confirmed this, noting that Nigeria was the ‘only one of ex-British federalisms that does not display the unification of a number of separate colonies no one of which would have been viable alone’. This ‘arrangement’, coupled with the regionalisation of the national economy, afforded regional bourgeoisie the opportunity to compete amongst themselves for regional political power (Williams 1976, pp. 25–28), which was regarded as a prerequisite for economic power, which in turn was a prerequisite for power acquisition at the federal level. The result was the ruthless ethno-regional competitions, which continue to characterise politics in the country. At a point, the struggle took the form of two regions conspiring against the third, as was demonstrated during the Western Region crisis of 1962 and in the creation of the Mid-Western Region in 1963. Furthermore, politics during this period revolved around a system of patronage, in which regional governments were turned into conduits for private capital accumulation. The ruthless struggle for state patronage culminated in the collapse of the country’s first attempt at a federal system, which saw the emergence of the military on the political stage in 1966.
Another feature was that the federal structure was a reflection of the cultural, political and economic differences among the three largest ethnic groups in the country—the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo—which dominated the Northern, Western and Eastern Regions respectively. In fact, the system was equated with regionalism because the units were in line with the ethnic structure of the country (Awa 1976, p. 2). To use Kirk-Greene’s (1967, p. 5) word, these regions were not as ‘self-contained’ as they looked, as each consisted of the majority and other minority ethnic groups, and the majority dominated the minorities. In the Northern Region, for instance, are other ethnic groups such as the Kanuri, the Tiv, the Igala, the Igbira and so on, which when put together, constitute a large chunk of the country’s population. The Region was not an ethnic entity, and the same was true of the Eastern Region where one finds the Ibibio, Efik and other peoples, and in the Western Region where we find such minority groups as the Benin and Edo to mention a few.
This tripartite ‘design’ seemingly put the fate of the country in the hands of the three major ethnic groups, setting the stage for a triangular struggle for the country’s resources. The arrangement also resulted in the majority/minority dichotomy, as well as the marginalisation of the minority groups that continue to shape the politics of the country. The implication of this tripodal structure for the minority groups is best captured by Nnoli (1995) who observed that the minorities were only important as resources for the majority groups to strengthen the latter’s political power or to weaken the power of their rivals in other Regions. This development set the tone for the politics of the country. Therefore, one main challenge that confronted Nigerian leaders following decolonisation was how to genuinely bring together the different peoples brought together by British imperialism. Nigerian leaders have had to contend with the daunting task of ensuring that Nigerians continue to live together in harmony and within a single political unit as envisaged by the British.
Yet another feature was that the Northern Region was bigger than the other two Regions combined, thereby affording it the opportunity to out-compete both the Western and Eastern Regions. This period marked the beginning of the fear of political and economic domination usually expressed by regional elites; a fear heightened by the economic disparities in the Regions. A federal arrangement in which one constituent unit is excessively big negates the principle of equality of states (Macmahon 1962, p. 7; Wheare 1963, p. 50).
A further feature was that the federating units, due to their enormous resources, enjoyed substantial political and economic powers. Nolte (2002) refers to the federal system, as constituted then, as regional federalism because the federal arrangement was such that the component units were constitutionally allowed to enjoy extensive political and financial autonomy. The units were so powerful that the centre was subordinated to the Regions to the extent that, in the event of a conflict, for example, regional laws took precedence over federal laws in the areas of joint legislative competence (Ayoade 1988, p. 23).
These features, however, disappeared with the emergence of the military on the political stage, an era coinciding with that of the oil boom. The increased inflow of oil rents into Nigeria’s economy in the early 1970s gave way to a new era of politically and economically strong federal centre. This completed the transformation of the country from a peripheralised to a highly centralised federation. This transformation brings to the fore the link between Nigeria’s oil and the practice of federalism. What Suberu (2001) refers to as the ‘hyper-centralisation’ of resources is fundamentally at the heart of the imperfection characterising the operation of federalism in the oil-rich federation. Over-centralisation has become the defining feature of Nigeria’s federal system. If federalism is typically a non-centralised system, then all is not well with Nigeria’s federal system. The increasing agitation for ‘true federalism ’, especially in the current democratic dispensation is an indication that the system is defective.
The Nigerian state has since the oil boom of 1973 operated an oil-centred economy. Prior to the emergence of oil as the principal source of foreign exchange earnings, Nigeria’s economic success revolved around agriculture . The economic centrality of the federal centre, resulting also from the necessities of the civil war (1967–1970), ensured a complete concentration of resources at the centre. As resources become increasingly concentrated at the centre, so, the constituent units became politically and economically impotent. Moreover, the centre became a battleground for ethno-regional competition for federal economic resources and political power. In all of these, the federal government remains domineering, overseeing the distribution of oil rents . The source of centralisation goes back to 1966 when the military first intervened in Nigerian politics through coup d’état. The military did not just intervene, they actually entrenched a system characterised by ‘tightly centralised controls’ (Suberu 2001, pp. 1–2). Given its command structure, a military rule may be likened to a unitary system of government. Clearly, the military’s style of administration seriously affected the operation of federalism in Nigeria.
In an ideal federal arrangement, governments at all levels are expected to have an independent revenue base, but this is not the case in Nigeria where the present thirty-six states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) depend heavily on the centre for sustenance. This is a negation of the federal principle, which enjoins every constituent unit to be self-financing. Wheare (1963, p. 51) particularly emphasised the significance of the economic viability of the constituent units to the formation, operation and survival of a federation. He argued that the units must possess sufficient economic resources to support themselves as well as the central government. Thus, a weak independent revenue base among Nigeria’s constituent units makes the sharing of centrally-collected revenue a norm. The sharing is, however, loaded with contentions. One reason for the usual acrimony is that the constituent units lack viable sources of revenue of their own, and by implication, find it extremely difficult to discharge their constitutional duties without fiscal transfers from the centre. Another source of contention has been a lack of consensus among the contending parties on a revenue-sharing formula, as every constituent unit, as well as every ethnic group, wants to maximise its share of the national resources (Elaigwu 2007, p. 204). The political sensitivity of revenue sharing has also been compounded by the ‘perceptions of regional ethnic dominance’ among the ethnic minorities (Baker 1984, p. v).
By the time a democratic rule was re-established in 1999, after thirteen years of military dictator...