Citizensā opinion about the functioning of democracy and its institutionsāi.e. the evaluative side of political supportāis a central topic in comparative politics as it allows assessment of the health of democratic regimes and the extent to which they are responsive to peoplesā preferences and needs. The underlying idea is that positive evaluations should indicate a vibrant political culture leading to a legitimate and high-quality political system with greater chances of enduring (Almond and Verba 1963).
Attention to trends and cross-national differences in attitudes towards democratic institutions in Europe has increased dramatically among pundits and scholars in the wake of the recent Great Recession, which hit many countries in the area with negative implications for the relationship between citizens and the state (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; Quaranta and Martini 2016, 2017; van Erkel and van der Meer 2016; van Ham et al. 2017). There is a widespread idea nowadays that democracy is going through a difficult time after having been the most successful idea of the twentieth century (Runciman 2013).
Since the year 2008ācommonly indicated as the beginning of the worst global financial crisis since World War IIādeclining political support has been acknowledged as a link between worsening material conditions and bottom-up political change through the electoral punishment of incumbents and government alternation, with the positive effect of enhancing democratic accountability and public scrutiny of economic policies (Bellucci et al. 2012). At the same time, decreasing trust in representative institutions and political dissatisfaction may also have favoured the emergence of populist radical right and non-mainstream political forces in European national party systems (Kriesi and Pappas 2015; van Kessel 2015) and citizensā propensity to engage in protest politics (Flesher Fominaya 2017), thus increasing instability and societal conflicts.
Without doubt, the economic downturn and its political repercussions in contemporary democracies have contributed to reviving interest in the conditions hindering regime durability, with attitudes towards democracy being one of the fundamental dimensions in these processes. Nevertheless, concerns about the health of democracies and the narrative of eroding political support are by no means novel in the political science literature. On the contrary, fear and apprehension of an imminent democratic crisis in the Western world wax and wane along with cycles in public satisfaction and trust (Crozier et al. 1975; Kaase and Newton 1995; Dalton 2004; Hay 2007; Norris 2011).
While there is much reason to worry, available survey data seem to offer us a more complex picture, showing a fluctuation in political support in Europe over the last four decades with variations both among countries and over time rather than a downward trend. Indeed, there are periods in which support increases and others in which it decreases. Moreover, some European countries show generally higher levels of support than others. In addition, citizens do not share the same evaluations of the functioning of democratic institutions, and this might be due to how they form their opinions and what personal situations intervene in this process.
The main goal of this book is to explain the waves and the cross-national patterns in political support by providing a comprehensive theoretical framework and using well-suited data and empirical strategies.
1.1 Political Support in Europe: Erosion or Fluctuation?
In Western democracies, the debate on declining trust in political institutions reached its apex between the 1960s and the 1970s with an increasing radicalism of student and worker movements. After years of booming economies, peace and affluence; in fact, North America and Western Europe passed through a relatively short but intense period of contestation of traditional politics characterized by mass political protests (Tarrow 1994). The climate of anxiety and concern with the state of public confidence and its implications for the stability of democracy was documented by Crozier et al. (1975), who claimed that dissatisfaction with the functioning of democratic institutions and citizensā lack of confidence in their governments and leaders were widespread and somehow irreversible in the United States, Japan and Western Europe. This led many scholars of the time to predict a gloomy future of instability and conflict that would eventually result in a breakdown of democracy (Kaase and Newton 1995).
Three ānarrativesā can be found in the literature (van der Meer 2017). āLegitimacy crisisā theories interpreted the rising popular unrest as being a result of fundamental contradictions between modern capitalism and democracy (Offe and Keane 1984). In this view, governments had to create the conditions for capital accumulation through greater investment in infrastructure and tax cuts while maintaining welfare state provision to ensure widespread popular legitimation. Therefore, the democratic state was likely to risk an increase in public spending with a consequent fiscal crisis and be unable to reconcile the divergent interests of capitalists and workers. Similarly, āoverloadā theories argued that participation in democratic politics by previously disengaged groups of citizens produced an increase in political demands that were often incompatible with one another. As a result, to translate such a variety of interests into coherent policy plans the state expanded its activity beyond its capacities, feeding a vicious circle consisting of inefficient government, growing public disillusionment and distrust in institutions (Brittan 1975).
Other scholars interpreted declining political confidence as a transformation in the basic values in post-industrial societies due to processes of modernization. Therefore, ācultural changeā theories suggested that advanced democracies had experienced a shift in values during the post-war period ascribable to high levels of prosperity, which enabled the development of more critical citizens (Inglehart 1997). The citizens who experienced this change were younger people who had grown up in a context of affluence and access to education. Driven by new cultural values, younger c...