U.S. foreign policy is at a crossroads today. Around the world, the nation faces numerous challenges, from immigration pressures and the rise of China to Russian meddling in democratic elections, rogue state nuclear ambitions, and global trade imbalances. At home, bipartisan consensus on foreign policy priorities has collapsed, and President Trump and members of Congress seem to disagree on even basic questions regarding international commitments. Studies of these dynamics often focus on explanations such as partisan polarization in Congress (Stonecash et al. 2018; Iyengar and Westwood 2015) or a failure by presidents to carefully consider grand strategy (Dueck 2015; Beinart 2018). This book contends that one of the most important and under-studied factors that shapes contemporary U.S. foreign policy is the splintering of political parties into ideological groups, or factions. Just as the gulf between Republicans and Democrats widened, so, too, have the differences within parties (Caldwell et al. 2018). Party unity voting scores have fluctuated dramatically in the past two decades, for example, and cleavages are presenting challenges to the leaderships of both parties (Miller, February 28, 2019; Noel 2016). This has created space for the emergence of strong dissident voices who seek to shape the political agenda, block major initiatives, and advance policy innovations.
Factions and factionalism represent some of the most interesting, yet under-studied, dynamics in U.S. politics today. Dissidents and innovators in political parties in Congress are challenging authority, pushing new ideas, and changing the foreign policy-making environment. They employ traditional and nontraditional means, including persuasion, legislation, and issue framing. By working alongside other groups, tapping into civil society and public attitudes, and confronting the establishment, they are fostering policy changes. In the Republican Party, for example, two conservative intraparty factions, the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus, have emerged as more visible and influential forces over the past decade. Their members have steadily moved the GOP to the right through a combination of strategic dissent and policy innovation. The Tea Party and Freedom Caucus helped block comprehensive immigration reform during the Obama administration, and Freedom Caucus members allied with President Trump to end U.S. engagement in the Iran nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Democrats are also divided. These differences were clearly illustrated in the 2016 presidential primary contest between Progressive Bernie Sanders and Centrist Hillary Clinton, as well as the rise of other candidates on the far-left. The number of Democratic voters who describe themselves as liberal grew from 30% in 2001 to 50% in 2018 (Edsall, October 18, 2018), and Progressives gained the largest number of seats in history in the 2018 midterm elections. Newly elected representatives like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) demanded seats on powerful committees as well as access to Democratic fundraising programs (Carter, November 15, 2018), while Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) promised to end Americaâs longest war in Afghanistan and cut the military budget. At this writing in 2019, far-left and far-right factions in Congress have become active and energized, while moderates and establishment party leaders seem increasingly defensive.
The stakes of this battle among factions are quite high for U.S. foreign policy. Yet, at the very time when the president and congressional leaders might need to present a unified front on critical matters in foreign affairs, the country is exhibiting more incongruence than certainty. Divisions seem rife. Beinart (2018) describes the situation today as âa crisis of foreign policy solvency,â where there are more questions than answers about international commitments (Lippmann 1943). Studies also show a significant rise in affective polarization and ânegative partisanshipâ in Washington politics that has made it harder for members of Congress and concerned citizens to find room for compromise (Campbell 2018; Iyengar et al. 2012; Schultz 2018; Sitaraman, April 15, 2019). It is in this environment, perhaps best characterized as disequilibrium, that radically different lawmakers are offering radically different solutions to the solvency crisis. And in certain circumstances, these voices have greatly influenced foreign policy development. Cast in this light, attempts by some scholars to dismiss factionalism as a temporary distraction from politics-as-usual, or as a âdysfunctional aberration,â seem especially shortsighted (Belloni and Beller 1978: 2; Lasswell 1951; Miller and Schofield 2008).
This book presents the story of the contemporary battle over foreign policy. It focuses on factions and the sophisticated strategies they have developed for âminorityâ influence, and it charts their impact on the policy process and outcomes. Our new model draws on insights from social psychology and studies of political parties. We explore propositions for the significance of factional strategies of influence, including the importance of direct legislation, issue framing, and persuasion. This study conducts a plausibility probe of the model through a structured, focused comparison of eight critical instances of activism by the Tea Party, the Freedom Caucus, and Progressives Democrats over the past decade. We find that factions that are persistent in issue framing, consistent in support of minority positions, and employ entrepreneurial legislative and non-legislative challenges can influence the scope and direction of foreign policy commitments. In short, groups in U.S. politics that some have dismissed as âtoo small to winâ may sometimes have a profound impact on its engagement with the world.
Congress Matters: Representation and Policy Influence
Presidents often promote their own foreign policy agendas in a separation of powers system, and they work with members of Congress to achieve their policy objectives (Dewan and Squintani 2016; Howell and Pevehouse 2007a, b). Indeed, presidents are typically described as dominating the foreign policy process by asserting their authority, especially their power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Rudalevige 2008; Weissman 1995). Article II of the U.S. Constitution vests the president with power to establish the executive branch of the federal government to carry out and enforce federal laws. The president commands the armed forces, while at the same time controls diplomatic means such as treaty negotiation and bilateral engagements through appointed ambassadors. Political scientist Aaron Wildavskyâs âtwo presidenciesâ thesis argued that even when domestic political debates are fraught, presidents often enjoy significant, bipartisan support for major initiatives in Congress for foreign policy initiatives (1966). A corollary to this can be seen in Arthur Schlesingerâs early 1970s model of the âimperial presidency,â which catalogued the dominance of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policy-making during the Cold War. Facing a series of challenges to national security, Schlesinger claimed, presidents have pursued an âunconstitutional executive usurpation of authorityâ through âthe appropriationâŚof powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congressâ (1973: viii). Subsequent works have linked the imperial presidency to dominance of security and trade policies, as well as the potential for overstretch (Wolfensberger 2002; Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008).
Even in cases where presidents do not try to exert dominance, critics charge that Congress has abdicated its own authority in foreign affairs (Lindsay and Ripley 1992; Goldwin and Licht 1990). For ex...