1 âThe Elephantâ and Democracy Promotion
Four decades ago, Donald J. Puchala was the first political scientist to use the story of the blind men and an elephant as a metaphor for distinct ways of understanding European integration. The story originated in India and traversed Hindu and Buddhist religious traditions, but it wasnât until several centuries after its initial telling that the American poet John Godfrey Saxe (1816â1887) introduced it to the West. There are more versions of the story. In one version, six blind men were asked to touch only one part of an elephant and from that, relay what the animal looked like. The first, who touched the leg, said it was like a pillar. The second felt the tail and concluded the animal was like a rope. The third felt the trunk, so he supposed it was like a tree branch. The fourth, who felt the ear, said the elephant was like a hand fan; the fifth touched the belly and stated that the animal was like a wall. Finally, the sixth felt the tusk, so his answer was a solid pipe. To anyone who has seen an elephant, the moral of the story is obvious: different perspectives can elicit completely different interpretations, but communication between divergent views is key to illuminating the reality. As long as we know today, after four decades since Puchalaâs (1971) inspiring article, how âthe elephantâ looks like, the present book makes use of the same metaphor to ask whether this European animal has grown up to fulfil one ideal it stands for: democracy promotion.
Democracy promotion on the part of what we know today as the European Union (EU) is a relatively recent phenomenon; the EU has been actively involved in the industry of democracy promotion for a period of slightly more than two decades. Engagement with democracy promotion was part of a reluctant process, which brought this objective to the forefront of foreign policy agenda incrementally. The objective of democracy promotion was introduced for the first time in the EU documents (then Community) with the 1986 Declaration on Human Rights, in which member states expressed their commitment to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries (European Commission 2001a). Following the end of the Cold War, the EU took a more proactive stance on democracy promotion and protection in third countries. Initially this new proactive engagement was limited to Central and East European Countries (CEEC), which expressed willingness to join the EU. Their membership perspective was made conditional on the fulfilment of the so-called Copenhagen criteria. Named after the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen where they were adopted, the conditions stipulated that â[m]embership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minoritiesâ (European Council 1993). Only after CEEC fulfilled this political prerequisite, the EU opened accession negotiations. Moreover, technical and financial assistance for accession countries was also tied to their progress on the democratisation frontâprogress that was subject to a rigorous monitoring process on the part of EU competent institutions. The impressive democratic stabilisation of CEEC is now said to represent the most successful strategy of democracy promotion ever (Fukuyama and McFaul 2007).
Beyond making the democratisation of CEEC a success story, the EU began to engage, albeit incrementally, in a parallel process of democracy promotion in other regions. Launched for Mediterranean countries in 1995, the âBarcelona processâ has made the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms an important condition for a multidimensional co-operation between the EU and countries in the region, though to a lesser extent than the EU enlargement process. The logic of political conditionality the EU used in relation to CEEC was later transplanted to guide efforts to stabilise the Western Balkan region. In addition, less demanding conditions concerning democracy, human rights and rule of law were inserted into the framework agreements and strategies on EU relations with third countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
As the EUâs âbig-bangâ enlargement to the East became irreversible, the EU realised the necessity of reconsidering and upgrading its relations with the neighbourhood it was soon to acquire. Thus, in 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was born from the EUâs interest in fostering a âring of friendsâ in the vicinity with whom it could enjoy close and fruitful relationships. The ENP was designed as a new policy approach to 16 proximate countries 1 and as a response to the extension of the EUâs borders and to the limits of this extension. In the official EU discourse, the ENP aims at avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and at creating a wider area of stability, prosperity and security founded on commitments to common democratic values and practices, respect for human rights, the rule of law and good governance (European Commission 2004a). This aim is framed in the EU discourse as a âwin-winâ: the more stable and secure the vicinity of the EU is, the fewer risks for the EU. The philosophy of the EU hinges on the premise that democracy is a necessary ingredient for greater stability, prosperity and security. It is this credo that explains the EUâs emphasis on upholding and promoting democratic values and practices in the EUâs neighbourhood. To translate this philosophy in practice, the EU builds on its successful experience in contributing to the consolidation of democracy in CEEC and relies on the same mechanisms of influence it did in the context of Eastern enlargement. It conditions delivering the incentives offered within the ENP on compliance with international standards in the field of democracy, human rights and good governance. However, in contrast to accession countries, the membership perspectiveâthe most valuable EU rewardâis not yet or at all on the table for ENP countries.
In the context of the ENP, scholars have asked whether the approach to democracy promotion under this policy can be effective in the absence of membership perspective as the top prize for a successful transformation (Cremona 2004; Lynch 2004). In a comparative study of 36 countries, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008) show convincingly that the EU has no democratising impact in those countries that do not have membership perspective. However, the upper time limit considered in their exemplary study is 2004, and therefore it does not address the effects of EU democracy promotion under the ENP. Several other authors have addressed the more recent past, but still find no evidence for a notable democratising role of the EU in its neighbourhood (Kochenov 2008; Boonstra and Shapovalova 2010; Börzel 2010; Babayan 2015; Börzel and Lebanidze 2015).
Other scholars address particular governance and policy dimensions and paint a more nuanced picture with regard to the EUâs record in terms of promoting its rules in the neighbourhood. Freyburg et al. (2009) employ âthe governance model of democracy promotionââa theoretical construct proposed by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009, 2011)âto reveal that the EU has been able to induce Moldova, Morocco and Ukraine to adopt democratic governance principles, such as transparency, accountability and participation, in three policy areas: competition, environment and immigration. Like functionalists, they argue that once adopted in specific policy sectors, these principles may later spill over into general polity. In line with institutionalist explanations, Freyburg et al. (2009) suggest that effective rule adoption is dependent on the extent to which transposition of democratic governance elements is codified in EUâs acquis and international agreements. Dimitrova and Dragneva (2013) find a disproving case on this account: namely, that Ukraineâs convergence with EU state-aid policies is more limited than with foreign policy, despite the fact that state aid is âlow politicsâ and more institutionalised on the EU level than the âhigh politicsâ of European foreign policy. While a valuable contribution to understanding the EUâs impact beyond accession conditionality, Freyburg et al. (2009) offer an account, which is concerned with the properties of rules and their adoption in sectors that have little to do with democratic process per se. Moreover, there is also need for more knowledge with respect to the interaction between the properties of rules and domestic variables and broader international and transnational factors that have a bearing on the dynamics of political regimes in the EU neighbourhood. A special issue of Europe-Asia Studies, coordinated by Langbein and Börzel (2013), gives evidence that compliance with EU policies occurs despite high costs, limited capacities and the lack of EU membership perspective. However, this issue deals with rule adoption in policy sectors that do not have a direct impact on the parameters of political regimes and leave out two crucial cases: Azerbaijan and Moldova.
In spite of notable contributions to the literature on the EUâs democratising role in its neighbourhood, it is worth reengaging what represents the overarching question of the present book: (Q) Under what domestic and international conditions the EU has an influence on political regimes in its Eastern neighbourhood? This exploration starts from a limitation of existing literature to juxtapose in the same analytic design the EU influence with the role of alternative international (non-EU) and domestic factors. Leverage of and linkage with (non-EU) OECD countries, as well as transnational democratic diffusion need to be accounted for in order to discriminate against external European and non-European influences. Moreover, there are good reasons to assume that political regimes in Eastern ENP countries are also influenced by (to use the same analytic categories) the leverage of and linkage with the Russian Federation. This is not a prosaic phenomenon to be dismissed, but one that has noticeable consequences for the nature of political regimes in Russiaâs ânear abroadâ. The dramatic Ukrainian crisis in 2014â2015 has fully confirmed this phenomenon. In those situations where the interaction between EU-related, international and domestic factors is engaged (cf. Korosteleva 2012; Babayan 2015), the research leaves out some influential cases, which can contribute to a richer causal story.
However, before the above overarching question is approached, three more narrow questions are specified to address distinctively: EU role, international influences and domestic contexts. The influence of the EU is interrogated with the following question: (Q1) To what extent has the EU eastward democracy promotion approach under the ENP been effective and consistent? To be sure, this question is not entirely new, but it is worth reconsidering in a research design that: (a) juxtaposes three distinct contingencies; (b) employs a regional coverage; (c) selects an extended time frame; and (d) opts for a mixed-method approach.
In the same vein, modernisation theory, historical (neo)institutionalism and action theory offer precious insight into the dynamics of political regimes, and therefore there is a need for systematic attempts to juxtapose EU democracy promotion and international (non-EU) influences with domestic socio-economic structures, political institutions, actors and their cost-benefit calculations. Again, these are not trivial contingencies to be left out of analyses concerned with regime dynamics. With a view to mitigate this limitation, the present book also inquires: (Q2) To what extent are regime parameters in Eastern ENP countries explained by the influence of international (non-EU) democratic factors? and (Q3) Under what domestic conditions are Eastern ENP countries likely to be receptive to EU democracy promotion efforts? One can expect a more adequate specification of the EUâs democratising role if it is isolated from and judged against the causal weight of alternative domestic and external contenders.
The literature on EU democracy promotion in its Eastern neighbourhood is also affected by the limited comparability problem, because many research undertakings choose often to draw their conclusions based on oneâthree cases. Such case studies have their own academic merits, but there is also need for research designs that have an explicit regional coverage and aim at extending the generalisability beyond individual cases. With this aim in mind, the research questions above are considered for all Eastern partners of the EU involved in the ENP: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Finally, to address the potential bias brought usually about by pragmatic decisions to focus the research on specific time frames, it is equally important to consider the EUâs democratisation role in a longer perspective. In this regard, the book considers both pre- and post-ENP effects of EU democracy promotion in the period 1991â2004â2014. Because conditions on the ground are constantly changing and to cope with the âmoving targetâ problem, particular relevant events from 2015 and the first half of 2016 are also selectively covered.
2 Method
Juxtaposing EU democracy promotion with (non-EU) international influences and domestic contexts in the same analytical design; opting for regional coverage; and extending the research time frame to the period 1991â2014 pose an important methodological challenge. The solutions to this challenge are theory-guided concept formation and methodological pluralism. First, drawing on Goertz (2005), a concept structure was constructed to reflect the complex effects internal and external factors have on regime dynamics in Eastern ENP countries (Chap. 3, §4). The concept structure condenses several theoretical framesâsuch as the modernisation paradigm, historical (neo)institutionalism, action theory, the external incentives model of governance, constructivism, structuralism and diffusion accountsâin order t...