1.1 Setting the Scene
This book addresses the security of the global system of maritime-based trade, with a focus on container security. We consider maritime and container security to be synonymous. Hence, the said terms are used interchangeably throughout the book, though the focus remains on container security. We realize that âmaritime securityâ is a wider and an all-encompassing term. As such, we find it difficult to speak about container security without taking into consideration the maritime aspects of the same. This book discusses maritime security from its myriad perspectives, for instance, how we should think about it, how we could measure it, and how we can better manage/control it. Although this work is neither the first nor the last collaborative effort on this subject, we believe that existing discussions about maritime security are almost always tactical, myopic, and fragmented. Hence, we strive to overcome such defects by answering the stated problems from the systemic perspective, rather than from a singular ground-level one. In this way, we strive to examine the ways in which stakeholders can work together to build a more secure and resilient global system of maritime trade.
At the turn of the century, economic growth and supply chain management are two prominent global trends for policymakers, scholars, and industrial practitioners. The seeming incommensurability of these trend linesâopportunity and integrated growth on the one hand, and increased uncertainty and risk on the otherâhas contributed to a dearth of practical dialogue across much of the strategic and commercial communities. Too often, it is assumed that increased security equals decreased efficiency, or worse, that economics and strategy cannot inform one another in any productive way. It is not surprising that the majority of the commercial and strategic communities operate exclusively in their own spheres of influence. Hence, we attempt to overcome such perceived watertight silos of operations. We bring together different stakeholders and communities, as we believe that it helps launch a dialogue on global supply chain security in an environment that seemingly contradicts trend lines. Our effort is to embrace an interdisciplinary context, accounting for and representing stakeholders of all hues. In this context, we try to sketch a truly comprehensive global strategy for maritime security in the contemporary world.
The last decade has witnessed an increasing worldwide concern in terms of the security of trade. The emergence of transnational non-state actors acting in coordination with global criminal organizations has raised the stakes for maritime infrastructure protection. In addition, localized but highly intensified maritime piracy hotspots have increased concern about the security of seaborne cargoes and crew. Hitherto, policymakers are far more worried about the capacity of the containers and their contents. However, they conceal their anxieties so as to prevent chaos and collapse of the already fragile economies. Despite such efforts, it is common knowledge that the security of the global supply chain is precarious. Also, it is commonly known across the industry that numerous incidents of container security failure are detected on a daily basis for which nobody is or can legally be held responsible. The electronic inspection equipment available for non-intrusive scanning of containers is far and few between, and the security personnel available undermanned, overworked, poorly trained, and lowly paid. Such is the state of the global distribution network that sustains the quality of life of billions and underpins the economic conditions of our century, and it is widely acknowledged.
To confront these stumbling blocks and offer a strategic conversation about the security of the global distribution system, we answer the queries with a methodology premised on globalism. In this context, global has at least three meanings. First, it refers to diverse geographic locations. We bring perspectives from around the worldâs busiest container ports in the USA, the European Union (EU), and Asia. We recognize that discussions of the structure and functioning of the container security system need to consider its evolution, organization, and relation to the global security structure at several specific points. Inevitably, this entails a discussion of the various domestic factors that influence the systemâs organization and functioning in key locations. We identify how maritime security issues are defined, agendas established, decisions made in various national contexts, and how these domestic environments relate to the wider container and cargo distribution system and its smooth functioning. Second, it refers to different disciplinary contexts. Maritime security has various reference points from discipline to discipline and from stakeholder to stakeholder, which itself is a reason for continuing dialogue across traditional boundaries. We conduct various interviews and discussions with representatives from various stakeholder communities to make explicit their perceptions and understanding about the object of maritime security and the best ways to accurately account for it. Through comparative looks at global maritime security policies, practices, and structures, to conceptual discussions about the role and treatment of maritime security among key stakeholder organizations including governments, we establish the foundation for a broad-based global strategy in maritime container security. Third, it indicates that the discussion uses the container security system as its primary unit of analysis, rather than the container or the port. We consider maritime security risks and risk management practices with a methodology that reflects not only unit-level but also system-level risks. In this case, we consider the implications that this method reveals the system-level risk to the transport operations. By offering a systemic accounting, each stakeholder can think of and develop better ways to do business and identify opportunities for joint risk management with other partners along the supply chain. This will reduce the overall system risk to themselves and the system as a whole.
To a large extent, maritime security is a function of the ability of states within the international system to secure access to vital goods and resources, not available domestically. It is generally accepted that the process of trade functions most efficiently when it is relatively free. Yet the traditional alternative to a liberal free-trading international economic system is a mercantilist one, in which states seek a high degree of economic self-sufficiency, economic protection, and national control over economic processes often explicitly pursued in the name of national security. A common perception in the past decade was that the relative importance of economic means was rising against military-strategic ones. In this regard, it is well-documented that military power and maritime security go hand-in-hand. Such a rationale lies in the assumption that the primary role of national military or more specifically the navy was defence rather than commercial gain. However, this assumption is erroneous, as judged by the fact that, for instance, the UKâs Royal Navy, to a large extent, assists not only UKâs security but also offers the means for its colonial economic expansion too.
With the rapid pace growth in ocean technology and exploration, oceans have changed from venues of transport to being extremely rich sources of valuable critical resources in their own light. With the signing of the United Nations Conference on Law of Sea (UNCLOS), countries and regions today find obvious links between maritime security and regional/national economic development. Furthermore, with the advent of the information age, the oceans have become important tools for sustained economic development, and also for seizing strategic advantage. Another driving force in highlighting the oceans is the ever-growing demand for the resources, particularly by the worldâs most populous and economically powerful nations such as China, India, and the USA. It is of notable significance that the stated countries are graced with long coastlines. Oceans definitely provide a sustainable solution to the problems being faced by the nations of the world nowadays. In such circumstances, it cannot be anybodyâs case that maritime security is an insignificant issue.
As a result, security becomes ubiquitous for policymakers. This has been a growing trend over the past quarter century, but has increased markedly in the past decade. As the gradient of traditional military threats, especially war between major powers, a euphemism for the USA and the erstwhile USSR (and currently China) has receded in the minds of many analysts and policymakers; the focus shifted from international strategic matters to domestic mundane issues, particularly those concerning economic growth and employment. Even the reaction to 9/11, perhaps surprisingly, favours this trend, as the phenomenon of global terrorism was and continues to be viewed by many governments as law enforcement rather than a strategic problem.
In both academic and policymaking circles, including international organizations and informal âTrack IIâ diplomacy forums, considerable efforts have been spent on developing a conceptual prism through which one could view and apply a new security agenda to the old idea of collective security. With the added concepts of common, comprehensive, and cooperative security, confusion is bound to follow if the term is used to describe different things or conditions under differing circumstances. The question is less of what exactly is security? Rather, it is perhaps better phrased as what are the different ways in which security is conceived? What are the implications for policy? As most theorizing about security has not been maritime-focused, it is essential to place the development of concepts of maritime security within the context of the wider security debate. This leads to a series of questions. Security for whom? Security for which values? How much security? From what threats? By what means? At what cost? And in what time period?
1.2 Container Security
Moving cargoes via container shipping is efficient and economical. However, it is vulnerable to intrusions and misuse. Containers are used to smuggle illicit items and even people across national borders. Even large quantities of biological weapons and/or surface-to-air missiles in a knockdown condition could be concealed by non-state actors among legitimate cargoes. Weapons of mass destruction , explosives, radioactive matter, and other life-threatening products could enter a territory, hidden among legitimately traded goods in a container. For instance, up to 30,000 kg of conventional high explosives could be contained in a Forty-foot Equivalent Unit (FEU) box. It is technically possible to conceal virtually any partially assembled nuclear weapons inside one container, together with shielding materials to make detection difficult. Nuclear weapon components or special nuclear materials could likewise be concealed in a container, as could the materials for a radiological device, or what is colloquially termed as the âdirty bombâ. The possibility of containers being used to bring hazardous radioactive isotopes has been another concern. The threats of terrorists using a container to transport or deliver chemical, biological, radiological, and/or nuclear weapons (CBRN weapons) are not unreal either.
Nowadays, terror threats assume three dimensions: (i) the threats from supply chains: aircraft used as weapons, or containers used as a mode of transport for bombs or similar other hazards, (ii) the threats against the supply chain: attacks against ports or airports causing major breakdowns in the supply chain, and (iii) the supply chain used to support other terrorist activities, such as illegal movement of people in containers or arms smuggling. Terrorist attacks targeting international trade could cause serious interruption of services, closure of ports and terminals, and debilitati...