1 Introduction1
Delegation is at the very heart of the European integration process. Since the 1950s, national governments in Europe have delegated ever more rule-making powers to the supranational level. Doing so, they have created and strengthened the European Union (EU) in an effort to solve collective action problems and because they expect delegation to be beneficial. Yet simultaneously, member states have also opted to keep control on European politics and European policies. They remain the masters of the EU budget; hold decisive power in the appointment of Commissioners, judges in the Court of Justice and other influential positions; retain sovereignty over the implementation and transposition of much EU legislation; or put the intergovernmentally organized European Council at the centre of the most salient EU decision-making processes. Today, with growing Euroscepticism and open contestation of European authority by national politicians, the mere issue of delegation to the EU has become more controversial than ever. In contrast, more European integrationāand thus delegation of more and deeper powers to the EUāis often advocated as the solution to many of the crises the EU is currently facing, be it in the domains of macro-economic governance , migration or foreign policies. In other words, the division of power between member states and the EU is a matter of contentious debate and is still in flux. This shows that delegation and control are highly political and that their study touches upon the essence of European politics.
Once powers have been delegated to the EU, its institutions receive specific authority, but they are also kept under control. Indeed, when diverting our focus from the EU integration process (and thus delegation to the EU) towards the functioning of the EU political system (and thus delegation to EU institutions and actors), we see similar patterns of delegation and control. The European Commission ās powers in the execution of European legislation, the vexed autonomy of the European Central Bank, the influence of the High Representative and the European External Action Service in the foreign policy realm, and the autonomy of rapporteurs in the European Parliament vis-Ć -vis their committees , political groups or national constituents are all the result of a decision to delegate and the ensuing quest to maintain control.
Given the omnipresence of delegation and control in the being and the functioning of the EU, it does not come as a surprise that scholars are interested in questions on the design and effects of delegation and control. The principalāagent model has become a popular analytical framework to study such political processes. It offers theoretical insights into the reasons, modalities and consequences of āprincipalsā (e.g. member states) delegating powers to āagentsā (e.g. the EU or its institutions). Moreover, the principalāagent model enables us to better understand the divisions of power within the EU. As such its empirical findings may also inform normative debates about the evaluation of the democratic nature of the EUās institutional structure (Brandsma and Adriaensen this volume).
However, despite the modelās attractiveness in the study of the EU, more and more questions are being asked on the contemporary relevance of principalāagent analyses. With its exclusive focus on hierarchical, dyadic relations, the principalāagent model seems at first sight ill-equipped to study an empirical reality where decision-making is increasingly characterized by large, horizontal networks among a plethora of public and private actors. This book assesses the use and limitations of the principalāagent model in a context of an increasingly complex European political system. It claims that the principalāagent model is still extremely insightful for a better understanding of well-chosen political phenomena in the EU, but that the model has to address a number of conceptual, theoretical and methodological challenges.
This introductory chapter first briefly introduces the principalāagent model. Section 2 traces its origins and evolutions in the study of the EU and its status as a heuristic tool . Section 3 then presents the main puzzle that lies at the source of the book. We portray the major challenges faced by the principalāagent model to grasp contemporary European politics and we suggest a way to deal with it, namely using the model for three well-defined purposes: (1) mapping institutional structures and political interactions; (2) studying the reasons and modalities of delegation; and (3) investigating the consequences of delegation in terms of the resulting balances of power. In Sect. 4, we present the main objectives and the overall approach of the book and we introduce how the remainder of the book is structured.
2 The PrincipalāAgent Model in the EU Studies
The principalāagent model is a heuristic tool that helps to identify the key factors for understanding and explaining the politics of delegation and discretion. It allows scholars to understand why, how and with which consequences certain actors delegate the authority to execute a particular task to other actors (Tallberg 2002). The former are called principals, and the latter agents. The social interactions between principals and agents point to fundamental political processes: Why is authority given up and put in the hands of others? How is the contract between a principal and an agent designed? What does this mean for the new division of power between them once delegation has taken place?
2.1 A Short Introduction to the PrincipalāAgent Model
A principalāagent relationship is established through an act of delegation by the principal, which can be considered as a contractual relation between a principal and an agent. Such a contract can be more or less formal. The most formalized acts of delegation in the EU are included in the European Treaties where the member states delegate competences to the EU and different types of powers to the EU institutions. Such macro-delegation is complemented with a variety of acts of micro-delegation that take place in everyday decision-making (DĆ¼r and Elsig 2011). This occurs in a formalized manner, for instance when the Commission is granted implementation powers by the European legislators or when it receives the authority to conduct international negotiations from the Council. The act of delegation is then respectively a legislative act or a negotiation mandate. Yet, it also happens in a non-formalized way, for instance when the European Council cuts the final Gordian knots in legislative policy -making when the Council could not (Kroll this volume) or when the Council secretariat drafts proposals in intergovernmental negotiations (Reykers and Beach this volume). Hence, the act of delegation can also be informal or implicit (Hawkins et al. 2006a). As Niemann and Huigens (2011: 421) argue: ā[a]lthough a [principalāagent] relationship presupposes the presence of a contract between the actors, this contract need not necessarily be explicit or legalizedā. However, irrespective of whether the act of delegation is formal or informal, its mere existence is essential to conceive a social relationship as a principalāagent relationship. To put it clearly, there is no principalāagent relationship without an act of delegation. Consequently, applying the principalāagent model for studying a political or social phenomenon where no act of delegation can be identified is pointless.
But why and when does delegation occur? A principal delegates powers to an agent because the former considers it functional and beneficial to do so (Dijkstra this volume). The main motivations for delegation are the reduction of transaction costs in policy-making or the signalling of a credible commitment to the relevant stakeholders (Epstein and OāHalloran 1999; Majone 2001; Pollack 2003). Delegation occurs because principals find it beneficial that agents execute functions on their behalf. These functions are extremely diverse and range from monitoring compliance and thereby addressing collective action problems; solving problems of incomplete contract ing; providing technical and independent expertise; being blamed for unpopular decisions; and reducing instability by locking in political agreements and setting the agenda (Garret 1992; Pollack 1997; Kassim and Menon 2003).
A key aspect of the principalāagent model is that delegation not only implies benefits for the principal, but also agency costs. Yet the benefits initially always outweigh the costs since otherwise delegation would not occur. The costs of delegation relate to the fact that there is a real possibility that the agent will act opportunistically and behave contrary to what the principal wants. If that occurs, it is called āagency slack ā or āagency lossā. The costs of delegation are caused by preference divergences and information asymmetry between principal and agent. On the one hand, an agent may haveāand try to realizeāhis proper preferences, which can differ from those of the principal.2 On the other hand, the agent can be better informed than the principal and...