Introduction
This bookâs purpose is to analyse the most significant changes that have taken place in the Whitehall model since the Conservative-led Governmentâs formation in 2010.1 The developments of recent years originate in previous initiatives, particularly the novel ideas for reforming the state initiated by the Thatcher and Blair administrations. The core argument is the traditional Whitehall paradigm is being replaced by the âNew Political Governanceâ (NPG), an alternative model centred on political campaigning, ministerial advisers, personalised appointments, and a âpromiscuously partisanâ governing machinery (Aucoin 2012). The civil service has gone beyond a âtipping-pointâ or âcritical junctureâ. The nature of the state bureaucracy in Britain is being altered fundamentally.2
New Political Governance and the End of Whitehall?
The concept of NPG is derived from the work of the Canadian public administration scholar, Peter C. Aucoin . He foresaw a paradigmatic shift in governance and public management in the Anglophone states.3 Their bureaucracies are experiencing growing conflict and discord: in this environment, âthe propensity for perceptions of politicisation to grow becomes almost unavoidableâ (Grube 2015: 318). On the one hand, civil servants feel vulnerable to attack. Their influence and privileges are diminished by politicians unperturbed when officials become the target of vilification. The former Cabinet Secretary, Lord Butler, complained of, âan unprecedented spate of recrimination against named civil servants, made worse by the fact that much of it has been through unattributable, backstairs briefingsâ.4
At the same time, Ministers are increasingly frustrated at the incompetence and âaccountability deficitâ that allegedly characterises civil service performance. After merely a year as Prime Minister, David Cameron was, âfighting something approaching an attritional civil war with what his advisers call âthe machineâ.5 The appetite for reform of the Whitehall machinery on the part of the political class grew stronger.
It was not always this way. In previous generations, British government was perceived to be both democratic and competent, uniquely combining qualities of âefficiencyâ with âeffectivenessâ, the envy of politicians everywhere (King and Crewe 2013: xi). The first post-war Prime Minister, Clement Attlee (1956: 124), boasted the British civil service was, âunequalled in all the worldâ. Yet over the last thirty years, the reputation of Britainâs public administration has become increasingly tarnished (King and Crewe 2013: xi).
This introductory chapter outlines the bookâs conceptual framework, clarifies the intellectual terrain, and then maps the period in which the traditional civil service model has allegedly been eclipsed. The chapter begins by considering the institutional roots of the Whitehall âparadigmâ. The chapter then turns to the recent history of Whitehall reform through to the Conservative governments of David Cameron and Theresa May. Finally, the chapter considers the remorseless rise of NPG as the autonomy and independence of Whitehallâs bureaucrats has been assailed.
The argument throughout is the Whitehall model is being radically reshaped. The state bureaucracy in Britain is subject to âpermanent revolutionâ. Two key claims animate The End of Whitehall. The first is the Whitehall âparadigmâ is being eroded to the point where it is scarcely recognisable. Secondly, the destruction of the British tradition of public administration is detrimental. In Weberâs terms, âpoliticsâ is being allowed to encroach upon and weaken the values of âadministrationâ. Increasingly, partisanship prevails over the pursuit of the public interest. The âdeliberative spaceâ for policy-making has been denuded at the expense of good government and the public service ethos.
The heyday of the Whitehall model in the decades after the Second World War is perceived to have been a âgolden eraâ for British government. In many ways, it was far from âgoldenâ. Professional bureaucrats saw citizens as passive subjects of the Crown. The gentleman in Whitehall apparently âknew bestâ. Conceiving policy change as pulling the levers of the centralised state stymied the progress of economic and social reform. Yet the challenge to the Whitehall paradigm over the last thirty years scarcely gives grounds for confidence. Fundamental constitutional principles have been breached. The climate of âhyper-innovationâ led to waves of confusing managerial reforms. As a consequence, the UK state is more exposed than ever to the danger of egregious âpolicy blundersâ .
The Whitehall Model
The Whitehall âparadigmâ is a structure of governance that emphasises the virtues of non-partisanship, neutrality, parliamentary accountability, bureaucratic permanence, and most importantly, mutual trust between politicians and civil servants (Page 2010). The âmodelâ was elaborated by Colin Campbell and Graham Wilson in their seminal book, The End of Whitehall: Death of a Paradigm? (1995). The Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of 1854 and the Haldane report published in the aftermath of the First World War decreed that Ministers and officials were mutually dependent. Politicians relied on civil servants to provide objective advice and uphold constitutional propriety; officials depended on Ministers to safeguard anonymity and protect the privileges of bureaucrats, maintaining the âmonopolyâ of the civil service over policy advice. According to the Armstrong Memorandum, âThe Civil Service as such has no constitutional personality or responsibility separate from the duly constituted government of the dayâ.6
The Whitehall model is a rational âWeberianâ bureaucracy. Politicians and administrators rely on one another but are âdistinctly separatedâ, performing contrasting roles inside government institutions; officials are, âbound by [their] obedience to the power-holderâ, while politicians are confident civil servants will protect them in the struggle for power (Weber 2015: 156; Savoie 2008). As Campbell and Wilson (1995: 9) attest, âTo understand British executive politics, one needs to understand the world of the politician, the world of the bureaucrat , and the interaction between the twoâ.
In Weberâs ideal-type bureaucracy , civil servants carry out the instructions of Ministers but as administratorsâa separate breed from politicians: âThe honour of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of superior authorities, exactly as if the orders agreed with his own convictionâ (Weber 2014: 19). The Whitehall administrative tradition is thus characterised by a âloyalty paradoxâ. Officials loyally serve the government of the day, but not the partisan interests of the governing party (OâMalley 2017: 404). The Whitehall model is part of the European âRechstaatâ tradition of a non-political civil service faithfully serving Ministers (Guy-Peters et al. 2005: 1292). According to Lord Vanisttart, former Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister (cited in Hennessy 1989: 483): âThe soul of our service is the loyalty with which we execute ordained errorâ.
The mutually respectful relationship between politicians and civil servants was the âgoverning marria...