Of Mice and Men
This book provides a critical analysis of three major Iranian thinkers of the mid-twentieth century, namely Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, Ali Shariati and Mehdi Bazargan.1 Each one was a leading proponent of what is known as ‘Political Islam’ during the 1960s and 1970s, in the critical lead-up to the Iranian Revolution (1979). This study sheds light on the implications for Iranian society of their thought, and in terms of the evolution of their ideas from post-revolutionary Iran to the present day. Their key texts and conceptualisations of Political Islam will be examined in this study and compared in order to demonstrate the core arguments advanced in relation to normative objectives.
The term ‘Political Islam’ in Iran refers to the political groups and associations which sought the establishment and continuity of an Islamic government in Iran. The main theme of the discourse around Political Islam is its emphasis on the continuing central relevance of Islam and its holy texts to the way modern societies operate and how they should operate. Arguments, theory and methodology are premised on the notion that the best, most moral/ethical society and polity is one in which politics and political discourse are inextricably intertwined with elements of religion. Advocates for Political Islam all share a belief that divine revelation is enshrined in the Qur’an and the Hadith, and that these provide an essential directive on how to live one’s life and organise society. Intellectuals and politicians of this particular tradition have therefore advanced and utilised concepts which are closely indexed to the Islamic religion and its holy texts. The revival and the relevance of religious texts and their applicability to the needs and problems of modern or contemporary societies have been central themes in debates about contemporary Political Islam in Iran and indeed, throughout the Islamic world.
The ultimate goal of Political Islam is the creation of a community governed according to the principles of Islam. To achieve its goals, Political Islam seeks power to reorient society on a religious basis. Proponents view Islam as a comprehensive ideology that encompasses temporal and spiritual ends. Political Islamic discourse strongly critiques those who draw a line between religion and politics—‘secularists’ in its own terminology. One of the pillars of Western liberal democracy—the division between ‘church and state’—is therefore rejected outright. Religion and politics are said to be intimately and irreducibly intertwined.
Nonetheless, Political Islam, as a relatively recent phenomenon, has also been perceived as a product of Western modernity, something that has had a pervasive influence on many Muslim countries. This is because Political Islam attempts to combine, selectively, positive elements of Western modernity with certain traditions present in Islamic or Muslim societies (Hosainizadeh 2007, p. 18). Much of the mainstream discourse in Political Islam does not reject modernity as such, but rather seeks to fuse aspects of it with traditions mainly originating in religious texts. However, the philosophical approach of Political Islam does reject certain dimensions of Western secular modernity. Some thinkers within Political Islam consider Western modernity to be a decayed version of a true or healthy society. To save society from such moral decline, Political Islam seeks to reinterpret religious traditions in order to reinfuse society with a moral bearing and thereby reinvigorate normative traditions.
The politicisation of religion has, over the course of time, evolved into different schools of thought. Despite the fact that all schools seek an Islamic state, their chosen methods and philosophical approaches diverge. Over the 1960s and 1970s, Political Islam evolved into three main schools of thought in Iran: Liberal Islam led by Bazargan, Leftist Islam led by Shariati and Jurisprudential Islam led by Khomeini (Hosainizadeh 2007, p. 195). Opponents of the royal Pahlavi regime made an attempt to politicise religion and came up with an alternative project which reflected certain unique characteristics of Shia Islam. These opponents of the secular Shah were of the view that secular ideologies had failed Iranian society and their own project was seen as a viable, indeed essential, alternative that would take into account these unique Iranian cultural characteristics. The peculiar social and political conditions enabled Political Islam to come to the forefront of the struggle against the secular vision of the Pahlavi regime (1925–1979).
Religion was promoted as being able to play a more effective and influential role given Iranian cultural characteristics. As a consequence, elements of the cultural milieu of Iran and religious undercurrents were able to gain a dominant voice in critiques of the social crisis and economic transformation which engulfed the country during the 1960s and 1970s. This politicisation of religion manifested itself in popular discourse in a variety of ways. Differences emerged with respect to the interpretation and use of Islam in addressing the chronic issues that beset Iranian society. More specifically, the differences in emphasis of the participants in this discourse can be summarised broadly within the tripartite typology of the legalistic Islam championed by Khomeini, the politically left-wing interpretation of Islam predicated on the scholarship of Shariati, and the reform-orientated Islam based on the ideas of Bazargan and those around him.
This book provides an analysis of these three broad schools of thought. Its own contribution to scholarship on contemporary Iran lies in its analytical approach contrasting the ideas of the main exponents of the three schools, identifying their similarities and differences, investigating their relative success or failure, and their influence or relevance, to the present. The importance of this analysis is that it offers a coherent textual treatment of the ideological and ideational bases of the Islamic revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, not yet satisfactorily achieved in other scholarly works. The Islamist discourse and political agenda has been the subject of much debate in various Islamic countries, but the peculiarity of this package in the Iranian case lies in how it was filtered through Iran’s particular version of Shia Islam, and how this affected its ultimate manifestation. Furthermore, the enduring importance of this topic can be seen every day in the Middle East as the region goes through astonishing changes in which the Islamist discourse in all countries remains, in some cases, a salient overriding variable. The revolutions of the ‘Arab Spring’2 reflect the return of religion to a central role in the politics of many states. For example, some strands of the Islamist discourse now posit Iran (jurisprudential Islam) and Turkey (liberal Islam) as two models for post-revolutionary societies in Egypt, Tunisia and to an extent in Libya. In the case of the Iranian political spectrum there has been a change of leanings over time: Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Shariati and his followers were ideologically closer to the ideas of Khomeini, however this gradually shifted in the post-revolutionary era towards the ideas of Bazargan.
Significance
The significance of this topic lies in the uniqueness of the Iranian version of Islam, namely Twelver Shi’ism. Shia Islam is quintessential to contemporary Iranian national identity, and remains a central pillar of Iranian society. Furthermore, this identity is a mix of Shia Islam coupled with an evolving, if primordial, nationalism amalgamated in the crucible of modernity. During the time of the Pahlavi dynasty’s reign there was a concerted attempt to marginalise religion not only in political institutions, but also in the wider public sphere. This was done without taking account of the central role of religion for many individuals as a component of Iranian identity. The Shah’s social and political programme was underpinned by a desire to fuse modernity and secular nationalism. But many believe the Shah’s programme did not reflect the Iranian cultural context, rather it was seen as an import from the West. In other words, the Shah’s programme had two conflicting pillars. On the one hand, it advanced the notion that Iranian nationalism should be based on the symbols and glories of the pre-Islamic era, and on the other, that modernity should be strictly secular (Hosainizadeh 2007, pp. 112–117). This was not a small problem. This was a serious structural flaw that would not disappear with time. Political Islam, by contrast attempted to strike a balance between three interconnected dimensions of Iran’s national identity: Religion, nationalism and modernity. In doing so, thinkers of Political Islam attempted to give religion more space to play a role and run its course in society and state institutions. Following the revolution, an unforeseen outcome occurred with religion gaining ascendance over both nationalism and modernity. Iranian thinkers were originally of the view that aspects of tradition deeply rooted in Iranian culture and modernity could be combined and reconciled. These factors brought to the fore the paradoxical nature of political thought which survived in pre and post-revolutionary Iran.
Three fundamental dimensions underpin the significance of this topic. The first is the fact that in Iran, during the constitutional era (1905–1911), and in its aftermath, there developed an intense interest in Political Islam. The sanctification of the political realm further intensified in the 1960s and 1970s. Political groups and associations, emerged within the relative shelter of the religious realm, wanted to apply an Islamic agenda to address the issues which engaged the Iranian masses. These political factions, by utilising an Islamic platform, wanted to stand against the Pahlavi dynasty which promoted a secular ideology and which was said by its critics to emanate from the West. The religiously oriented factions were able to mobilise and galvanise a broad section of Iranian society around Islamic discourses and energise them with religious slogans. Furthermore, the vacuum which the political system created in the 1960s and 1970s paved the way for Political Islam to step in and fill the space following the imprisonment of secular and liberal intellectuals by the Shah. They presented an Islamic agenda in a new form and this appealed to many marginalised Iranians.
The second dimension underpinning the significance of the topic lies in the fact that Political Islam took power, in practical terms, in three countries in the twentieth century: Iran, Afghanistan and Sudan. In the case of Iran, Political Islam came to power through mass protests by the Iranian people which manifested itself in the Islamic revolution of 1979. In the context of Afghanistan, Political Islam seized political power in the aftermath of the civil war (1992) which dominated the political scene in the post-Soviet communist-backed government led by Mohammad Najibuallah. In the context of Sudan, Political Islam took power after a military coup (Fuller 2003, p. 97). The proponents of Political Islam in Iran were able to form a government because they capitalised on Iranian Shia tenets which form a part of modern Iranian national identity.
Political Islam in Iran became a blueprint or role model for other Islamic-oriented movements in the region. The basic reason for this development was the fact that for the first time Political Islam transformed both the structure of the government and its underlying administrative principles. The ideals behind the Iranian-Islamic revolution played an influential role within other countries in the region. Some Western observers believe that because of the accumulated problems, which remain unresolved in Iran, Political Islam has failed to achieve its goals (Gilles 2002, p. 365). According to Roy, a prominent expert on Political Islam, the approach has been unsuccessful. He asserts failure is related to Islamist involvement with terrorism and the acquisition of power by force (Roy 1994). However, Political Islam still defines the identity of large numbers of Iranian people. According to a 2006 survey conducted by the Ministry of Culture, 80% of the people are not content with the prevailing situation in Iran, although less than 30% of Iranians are in favour of fundamental change (Hosainizadeh 2007, p. 506). It seems that in the contemporary era, and despite the existence of many pressing political issues, Political Islam is not a spent force. This enquiry has its foundation in that assumption, in relation to the ideological implications and prevailing discursive practices.
The third dimension which underlies t...