âThere was probably few areas in the social science literature on which so much is written on the basis of so little evidence.â1 The substance of this comment on radicalisation, made by leading experts as far back as 1988, has, if anything, been reinforced in the period after the September 11, 2011, attacks. This period has in turn produced a bewildering wealth of reports and academic studies on the nature of radicalisation and, consequently, âderadicalisation.â An enormous academic and conference circuit has developed that seeks to explore these phenomena, with thousands of papers on these twin subjects produced. This circuit does not have a great deal of interaction with individuals from law enforcement, security, and intelligence, who are tasked with dealing with terrorism and radicalisation on a day-to-day basis. Where there has been overlap and interaction, this has not necessarily been of clear benefit. As John Horgan (writing in 2003) observes,
the events of September 11, 2001 exposed a number of gaps in our analyses of terrorism. In the weeks and months that followed, however, a more depressing trend emerged to confirm the fears of analysts that progressive research on terrorist behaviour remains shackled by short-term policy goals and law-enforcement needs while equally subservient to incident-driven research agendas.2
No less an authority than Marc Sageman writes of the âstagnationâ in terrorism research and the bifurcation of academic and intelligence study of terrorism. According to Sageman, âthe gap between these two communities [intelligence and academic] and their respective cultures is unbridgeable without any possibility of fruitful interchange.â3
There is a pressing need for this âfruitful exchangeâ from my own perspective. I spent some time examining counterterrorism and radicalisation issues while working for the Singapore government. Now, as a researcher, academic, and head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), and a think tank in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore, I deal (inter alia) with the same issues and see some of the same bifurcation. There is bifurcation of another sort, too: on the terrorism/CVE seminar circuit, precious little interchange takes place between East and West.
CENS organises an annual workshop dealing with terrorism, radicalisation, and countering violent extremism (CVE), in part aimed at bridging these divides. This workshop brings renowned foreign and local experts from across the world together in a room with a mainly local (Singapore) audience largely comprising practitionersâindividuals drawn from the security establishmentâas well as senior policymakers and academics. After each presentation, the following Q&A sessions dispense with the traditional stand-and-deliver format, with each speaker instead separated from the panel and grilled for an hour. No question is off-limits. (This is unusually hard work for speakers compared to most other seminars of this type, but in fairness it should be observed that ample forewarning is given concerning Singapore hospitality both in and out of the conference rooms.) Over the years running this workshop, some of the key questions close to the heart of government officials working on these issues have been thoroughly aired. What are the essentials of the national CVE systems they work in? What are the key trends in extremism from their perspective? What works? What doesnât? What could be tried? Should we be looking at âderadicalisationâ or something else altogether? What are the new trends? What is the role of social media?
The volume has nine contributions drawn (with one exception) from the CENS workshops of 2016 and 2017.4 Some contributors come from (or have had experience in) government or law enforcement. Others have done frontline work with individuals in the radicalised and pre-radicalised spectrum, while yet others have worked for considerable length of time on these issues with think tanks and NGOs. Individuals were approached to contribute to the volume based mainly on feedback from audience members. The brief given to contributors was a concise one: based on their original (delivered) workshop remarks, to fashion a piece in plain and direct prose for two specific readerships: (1) the general interested reader and (2) practitioners in the field. Contributors were asked to eschew academic jargon.
The volume is divided into four sections excluding the introduction, which are as follows. The first, Ground-Level and Community Approaches, sees the contributors sharing their very personal experiences when it comes to dealing with âradicalisedâ individuals or with a community with a radicalised fringe.
A former mentor from the well-known âAarhus Modelâ for deradicalisation pens his thoughts in terms of how to bring individuals who have gone some way down the path of extremist thought back into mainstream thinking (and mainstream society). This individual (a Danish citizen who for obvious and understandable reasons has exercised his right to anonymity) draws on his personal experiences of working with three four individuals (including one individual who at the outset was very clear he wanted to go to Syria to fight), showing how he engaged them through mentoring. The mentees all had (as the mentor observes) a âcertain religious interpretation of Islam,â and they were all âpart of a radical milieu,â but they were all quite different individuals with their own stories, and all reacted to the approaches by the mentor differently. In the course of his piece, he demystifies several points about the Aarhus Model, showing, for example, that the mentoring is itself not so much about âderadicalisationâ as it is about disengagement. This demystification is important as the âmodelâ is by no means perfectânot everyone who has passed through the programme and the mentoring is completely âdisengagedââa fact pointed out by the mentor, who observes that in one case, a prospective mentee was too âdeepâ into the process of radicalisation, with the arrangement having to be terminated.
The mentorâs experiences when shared in person at the CVE workshop in September 2016 provoked considerable discussion, in part because the approach described differed so markedly from what has been tried in Singapore. The Singapore way emphasises respected religious scholars (members of the Religious Rehabilitation Group or RRG) and counsellors interacting and engaging with radicalised detainees. The approach, which is sometimes (simplistically) termed religious deprogramming, has worked well so far, with a low recidivism rate, but even those with oversight of these programmes in Singapore acknowledge emergent challenges (e.g. online radicalisation and dealing with the self-radicalised).5 The Aarhus Model may hold important clues for future evolutions of the âSingapore Modelââthe Singapore way has always been to observe, and if necessary to borrow, what works and what has value elsewhere.
Learning lessons can be drawn tooânot just for Singaporeâfrom the contribution by Clarke Jones, a criminologist based at the Research School of Psychology at the Australian National University. Drawing on his experiences of extensive interaction and work with the Australian Muslim (and especially Salafist) community, Jones provides a ground-level perspective of the efficacy of Australian government anti-radicalisation policies. As Jones notes, âResponses have tended to be developed and driven from the top down, rather than working with communities to develop grass-roots solutions. This top-down approach has resulted in very little âbuy-inâ by young people or their families and communities.â Jones argues that the lack of real headway in addressing violent extremism can be put down to the absence of genuine grassroots consultation in the development and application of strategies and responses. Alternative approaches are neededâessentially, CVE approaches that are cocreated with local communities. These are more likely to be trusted and to receive buy-in. Jones makes the telling point that interventions should not just address those in the âradicalisedâ stage (or those who are already enmeshed in the criminal justice system) but should also address those vulnerable to radicalisation, to most vulnerable to radicalisation, pointing out that there are very few secondary-level intervention programmes designed to support them.
Jones rightly does not offer straightforward solutions. Instead, he highlights the need for new approaches, emphasising the need for long-term, effective partnerships with communities. This is preferable in his view to the current overemphasis on CVE, which has led to the stigmatisation of Muslim communities. Jonesâ arguments may well prove controversial with some, but his thesis should be taken seriously, as it is borne of deep experience within the communities themselves and also within policing, military, and intelligence.
Bartolomeo Conti, a sociologist at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), describes his experiences of being part of a small team charged in 2015 to carry out an experimental âaction researchâ in two French prisons (would that more governments allow this kind of access for researchers!). Conti discusses the programme, which had two aims: first, to update the tools for the identification of âradicalisedâ inmates and second to come up with a programme, called âengagements citoyensâ (âcivic commitmentsâ), that would treat the inmates in a manner where their reintegration into society could be discussed in a civil fashion even within the confines of prison. Conti attempts to show that what emerged from discussions, rather than a need for the much bandied-about âdisengagement,â was in some ways much more interesting: the need to support individuals âin their efforts to re-define the modalities of their commitment.â As Conti notes, the key is to âre-commitâ the radical person, in keeping with the idea that âcommitment is the cornerstone of citizenship.â Contiâs approach and central thesis arguments play into observations made by other experts who have suggested that âderadicalisationâ in context, and when taking into account the exact nature of local circumstances, really means reconnecting individuals to society.6
The second section, Best Practices, has two contributions. The first is by Daniel Koehler, the founding director of the German Institute on Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation Studies (GIRDS) and editor in chief of the Journal for Deradicalisation. Koehler has advised governments and court systems on both sides of the Atlantic on CVE and deradicalisation, and was also a counsellor of the Hayat programme in Berlin (which he also co-founded) that pioneered approaches relating to focuses on counselling the families of those drawn to jihadi groups, with the goal of stopping (or even reversing) further radicalisation. Koehler draws on his wide experience to provide an overview of what âbest practicesâ really means in the context of CVE and deradicalisation programmes. Koehler also takes on the vexed issue of evaluationâwhat âsuccessâ means in deradicalisation programmes. Examining various approaches that the key experts in the field have put forward in the past, Koehler makes the important observation that although there have been âcomparatively detailed and sophisticated approaches to evaluating deradicalisation programs, virtually no attempts to implement them in practice have been tried.â The majority of evaluative studies have been made on the basis of anecdotal evidence, without a thorough grounding in quantitative or qualitative data. Pointing to actual case studies, Koehler notes that the main conclusion from his years of frontline experience and research on deradicalisation programmes worldwide is that programmes must have structural integrity if they are to maximise chances of success on individual cases. Unfortunately, most existing programmes, he notes, do not have this: âmost countries still treat deradicalisation largely as a soft-power social work and support tool without any measurable effect on the violent extremist and terrorist milieu.â Koehlerâs observations are important and should be borne in mind when reading contributions in this book (Conti, Jones).
In the first part of his piece, Maarten de Waele, project officer with the Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities (VVSG), goes through the recent history of jihadist activity in Belgium, dealing in particular with the recent homegrown plots and the uptick in activity after 2012. He shows that the radicalisation process can vary markedly between individuals. At the same time, there are shared factors: including the sense of grappling with issues of identity and future prospects. De Waele then sketches out the federal (nationwide) approach in Belgium, showing the various critical components (preventing radicalisation, person-centric approaches, and reintegration/aftercare). De Waele also offers thoughts on the need to go for all at the frontline (teachers, imams, youth workers) to make connections to those who feel alienated in society. The idea of âconnectionsâ also comes out strongly in another facet of de Waeleâs argument: the importance of multidisciplinary teams dealing with radicalisation and FTF (foreign terrorist fighter) issues. As de Waele notes, the LIVC, or Local Integrated Security Cell, which sees key institutions and individuals (the mayor, local police, social services, and other partners), discusses issues in a âmultidisciplinary case consultation,â which if necessary can devise interventions on a person-specific basis. De Waele (correctly) does not claim the Belgian model to be unique: it is these multidisciplinary teams that also figure at the heart of the Aarhus Model (a model which is also used throughout the rest of Denmark).7 One suspects these multi-agency models, which have the advantage of breaking down historical silos between agencies, will be in greater evidence in the years to come.
The third section, Theatres, features contributions on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and Russia. The contribution from Mike Niconchuk (Senior Researcher, Beyond Conflict Innovation Lab for Neuroscience and Social Conflict) is not simply a survey of the problem of terrorism in MENA, although Niconchuk has considerable experience dealing with radicalised or pre-ra...