Russia-Cyprus Relations

A Pragmatic Idealist Perspective

Costas Melakopides

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781137347145
• eBook ISBN: 9781137347152
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Vergleichende Politikwissenschaften

This study assesses Moscow's special bilateral relations with Cyprus since the mid-1950s, with particular emphasis on the post-Cold War years. Melakopides develops the theory of 'pragmatic idealism' when describing the way in which Moscow's Cyprus policies were meant to satisfy not only mutual interests but also international legal and ethical principles and norms. The book recalls Cyprus's dramatic vicissitudes since the 1950s and revisits the controversial 'political realist' policies of Washington, Ankara and London against the interests and needs of the Greek-Cypriot majority. Melakopides then goes on to analyse the regional geopolitical context; Turkey's hegemonic ambitions and its ongoing aggressiveness against Cyprus; Nicosia's current efforts to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy that also engages Greece, Israel and Egypt; the strong Russian-Cypriot diplomatic and political relations as well as their relations in trade, banking, energy, tourism, culture, energy and defence; and the origins of Russia's historical, religious and 'spiritual' sentiments and bonds towards Hellenism and Cyprus.

1

The “Pragmatic Idealist” Logic of the Book

Introduction

Arguably, a serious reason for writing the present book was that “the challenge was up there”, understood in Sir Edmund Hillary’s manner regarding why he decided to climb Mount Everest. Less melodramatically, one reason was that no such book existed in either Greek or English. And yet another challenge arose after realizing that all journal articles or book chapters on Moscow–Cyprus relations were premised on the concepts and the assumptions of “power politics” or “political realism”.¹ In other words, they were taking for granted that Moscow’s Cyprus policies aimed to serve, exclusively or merely, the superpower’s own –state-centric and self-regarding – interests since, according to this hegemonic theory of international relations (IR), this is exactly what all states do or try to do.

My own perception of these policies, however, led me to a distinct conception: that Moscow’s Cyprus policies were much richer in goals and intentions since, besides interests, they were also caring about some principles, some sentiments and particular values. In short, Moscow’s policies towards Cyprus from the 1950s to the present have exhibited – with minor reservations – an impressive cohabitation of interests-based “pragmatism” with dimensions of “idealism”. The latter concept is appropriate in order to reflect Moscow’s persistent efforts to apply to Cypriot affairs the principles and norms of international law and international ethics. This application, moreover, has produced policies of solidarity, protecting Cypriot sovereignty, supporting Cypriots’ human rights, and assisting Cyprus to confront external challenges and threats.

This synthesis of pragmatism and idealism or “pragmatic idealism” was my contribution to IR theory through my 1998 book, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945–1995.² Its theory sprang from studying the verbal and non-verbal actions of Canadian statesmen and politicians that consciously shaped a Cold War foreign policy intended to be good for Canada by being good to the world. Analsogous, I argued, was the foreign policy style and content of the “like-minded middle-powers” – primarily Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand – which also represented the heart of pragmatic idealism: for their policies also protected human rights, supported weak states, preferred diplomatic solutions to international problems, respected international law and international organizations, etc.

By observing Moscow’s attitudes to Cyprus, the following intriguing hypothesis arose: with various degrees of intensity but with remarkable consistency, Moscow’s policies defended the positions of the Greek Cypriot majority and protected their interests and needs. Simultaneously, Moscow’s decisions and actions vis-à-vis Cyprus regularly contradicted the policies of three protagonists in Cypriot affairs, that is, London, Washington and Ankara. The Cyprus policies of the UK, the US and Turkey essentially exemplified the assumptions, concepts, and prescriptive categories of political realism which, as Chapter 3 will remind us, bluntly embrace the notions and goals of power, military strength, “national interest”, state-centricity, international anarchy, and so on.³ Therefore, since Moscow’s decisions and actions vis-à-vis Cyprus opposed or contradicted the self-regarding policies of the other three while defending the interests of the Greeks of Cyprus, it follows that it was erroneous to apply a priori the same canon of political realism to the description and explanation of Moscow’s Cyprus policies, without discriminating their nature and sources.

In other words, enamoured with the positivist features of political realism and its concomitant anti-normative commitments – which tend to ignore values, sentiments, friendly attitudes, religious bonds, and cultural affinities – the realist analyses of Moscow–Cyprus relations were bound to miss all the dimensions that the present book will bring to the surface. Their error, I submit, was caused by the fallacy of petitio principii or begging the question: for they assumed without ever doubting that Moscow treated colonial Cyprus (before 1960) and then the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) exclusively and unquestionably for the satisfaction of the USSR’s and the Russian Federation’s self-serving interests, as if the Cypriots’ own interests were non-existent. The present book, then, aims to remedy this fallacy.

My working hypothesis will be strengthened by revisiting the post-1945 geopolitical entanglements in Cyprus’ relations with the UK, the US, Turkey, and Greece. This approach will allow us to recall, inter alia, that Cyprus was perceived by Washington and London primarily as “a strategic piece of real estate”;⁴ that Turkey was bent on partitioning the island since the mid-1950s; that the formation of the Greek Colonels’ Junta was at least “inspired” by American secret services and demonstrably assisted by Washington; that the coup against President Makarios was at least “tolerated” by Washington and London; that the subsequent Turkish invasion was not prevented by Henry Kissinger although it certainly could have been; and that the ongoing military occupation of 37 per cent of Cypriot territory has not been reverted by Cyprus’ powerful Western “strategic partners” who seem, instead, bent on exculpating Turkey by legitimizing the fruits of the invasion by “diplomatic” means.

With one arguable exception,⁵ Moscow stood against the just-mentioned litany of “Western” errors, crimes and sins, identifying its decisions and actions with the interests and needs of the Greek Cypriot (GC) majority. In recent years, pride of place in this regard should be reserved for Moscow’s veto at the Security Council, a few days before the April 2004 referendum on the Annan plan, the first Russian veto in 10 years. The veto, which respected the will of the GC majority, saved the RoC from the campaign to dissolve it, as we discuss in Chapter 2. Therefore, since Moscow’s decisions and actions conformed overwhelmingly to the needs of the Cypriots and the interests of the legitimate government of Cyprus, it cannot be surprising that the GCs turn to Moscow for understanding and support in most crucial moments of their convoluted recent history. Similarly, it is totally rational and reasonable that the GCs are grateful for Moscow’s extended and consistent help, while they are repeatedly disappointed and frequently angry at the absence of solidarity by Washington and London.

This book, then, will describe and evaluate the various phases in Moscow–Cyprus relations with particular emphasis on the critical historical junctures such as those recalled above. In addition, since the proposed alternative approach transcends “political realism” and emphasizes the presence of “idealist” dimensions, this book will illustrate primarily these dimensions. This being a principal theme of the present work, other main themes follow primarily from the aforementioned realization that Moscow’s Cyprus policies were not determined exclusively by the (“power-political”) exigencies of the post-1947 Cold War until 1991 and by Realpolitik thereafter. Moscow’s policies, I will argue, were also seriously affected by undercurrent sentiments and perceptions associated with the long history of Russia’s positive relations with Hellenism; with the concomitant bonds of mutual friendship; with religious and “spiritual” affiliation;⁶ the cultural similarities and influences; and the ethical and axiological affinities that are alive and flourishing today.

Moscow as Counterweight to “Western” Errors and Sins in Cyprus

As Chapters 4 and 5 will show, in addition to the just-mentioned positive sentiments and concomitant perceptions, a number of factors contributed to Moscow’s emergence as a powerful counterweight to the protracted hegemony over Cyprus by the UK and the USA, in association with Turkey’s return to Cypriot affairs in the mid-1950s – in clear violation of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty – as a result of British inspiration.⁷ These factors, which have caused bitterness and anger to the Greek majority against Washington and London, generating the simultaneous respect and gratitude towards Moscow, included such historical facts as the following: that Cyprus was liberated from British colonialism – which began in 1878 – after paying a protracted heavy price not confined to the 1955–59 anti-colonial struggle; that, during that struggle, London mobilized in Cyprus its “divide and rule” policies in an exclusively anti-Hellenic and blatantly pro-Turkish manner;⁸ that the post-1960 new Republic was marked from birth by an externally imposed and manifestly unworkable Constitution; that Washington and London were subsequently taking superficial and erroneous decisions, the latter concerned primarily to retain its “Sovereign Base Areas”, the former being eager to subsume it under NATO’s influence, while Turkey was aiming constantly to partition the island.⁹

More dramatic facts like these, illustrating profound human pain, and originating from the two powerful Western capitals, were accumulated regarding Greece with direct extensions to the RoC. For our purposes, let us first recall the military regime that was established in Greece from April 1967 to July 1974, arguably at the CIA’s inspiration but demonstrably through American protection and support. This Athens Junta engineered a coup d’état against the Cyprus government of President Makarios, arguably at the inspiration of Henry Kissinger but definitely through his demonstrated toleration. This coup ushered in the Turkish invasions of Cyprus in July and August 1974 under false “legal” pretences. The invasion has resulted in the illegal and inhuman military occupation of 37 per cent of Cypriot territory ever since. Despite the immediate international condemnation of the invasion and the occupation, Turkey continues to violate the relevant principles and norms of international law and international ethics. Finally, disappointment and anger vis-à-vis Washington and London are being experienced by the GCs, primarily because both capitals have been misrepresenting the real nature of this unending international scandal. In fact, they have been working actively, first, for the satisfaction of their self-regarding geopolitical and strategic interests and, second, for Turkey’s wholesale exculpation, as with the Annan plan in 2002–2004 or with the latest initiative for the “resolution” of the Cyprus problem that was essentially orchestrated by the US before February 2014.¹⁰

It seems to follow as inevitable that the GCs would turn to Moscow for diplomatic protection and multidimensional support. Importantly, such support and protection were overwhelmingly provided to Nicosia from the mid-1950s, because of the aforementioned combination of pragmatic and idealist motives, reasons and causes.

A Word on Adopting “Pragmatic Idealism”

Whereas my Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945–1995 (1998) proposed and applied its analytic framework to Canada and the “like-minded middle powers” as mentioned earlier, the present work will argue that even a superpower, in a particular or special bilateral relationship, may exhibit “idealist” proclivities, decisions and actions that necessitate abandoning the narrow “power-political” stereotype. Needless to say, the endorsement of the proposed application of pragmatic idealism to a superpower will entail significant implications for the theory of international relations: that is, that the real world of international relations may, after all, be less cynical, less unkind and more hopeful than classical political realism would like us to believe.

To establish the superiority of the pragmatic idealist approach to the sui generis bilateral relationship of Moscow (including Soviet Moscow) with the RoC, it will be argued that this relationship was bound to be affected by the remarkable nexus of historical, religious, political, cultural and axiological affinities and bonds of friendship that have marked the centuries-old relations of Russia and Hellenism (i.e. Greece and Cyprus). Therefore, beyond the obvious and tangible material interests experienced and enjoyed by Russians and Cypriots, it can be shown that, especially in the post-Cold War years, the two peoples also cultivate and enjoy a host of positive sentiments and axiological norms and attitudes that result in the harmonious cohabitation of interests with values.

Beyond studying and establishing the empirical (political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, etc.) record, the evidence for the pragmatic idealist reading of Russia–Cyprus relations has been derived primarily from elite interviews with Russian and Cypriot diplomats and academics, with former Cypriot Foreign Ministers, interviews and conversations with Cypriot and Greek ambassadors to Moscow, and from the relevant English and Greek bibliography. My numerous interlocutors from the diplomatic service of Cyprus and Greece, as well as many distinguished Russian academics, have tended to respond positively to my working hypothesis or have even endorsed fully this conception as capturing better the synthesis exhibited by Moscow’s Cyprus policies. Thus, in May 2010, I received unqualified support for my proposed thesis, at its embryonic stage, following my lecture at the Department of International Relations of St Petersburg State University. Another early endorsement was provided by Dr Zaslavskaya, the referee for the first publication in the Russian-language journal, who wrote inter alia:

The paper is based on a serious theoretical conceptualization of Russian foreign policy…. [T]he authors’ position is very well argued and they managed to explain why particularly this term “Pragmatic Idealism” characterizes better Russian policy. It is obvious that this essay is the result of serious scientific research. Very interesting sources, including interviews with former Cyprus leadership, were used.¹¹

Later on, we will share the relevant opinions and reflections of such distinguished Russian experts as Dr Nadia Arbatova (Russian Academy of Sciences), Dr Tatiana Romanova (St Petersburg State University), and Dr Igor Torbakov (Uppsala University). It also seems appropriate to reveal in this chapter some additional stimuli for embarking on this project, including insights from the valuable book by the former Russian Ambassador to Nicosia, Georgi Muradov, and numerous telling official statements and actions by Russian decision-makers manifesting Moscow’s commitment to defend the Cypriot Republic’s sovereignty according to international law and “universal values” and to support its interests and needs against external threats and provocations.

A Bird’s-eye View of the Bilateral Relationship

Over the years, Russia–Cyprus relations have developed and expanded in a variety of fields, including trade, tourism, banking, energy, defence, cooperation of local administration, cultural exchanges, and political and diplomatic convergence. At first sight, this picture might not appear much different from countless other successful bilateral relationships, if it were not for the fact that Cyprus is a semi-occupied state since the 1974 Turkish invasion, under constant further threats by the occupying power and also subject to serious political and diplomatic pressures by various international actors, headed by the UK, the US and even the United Nations Secretariat. It follows that Nicosia has needed manifold political protection and diplomatic support. It is here, inter alia, where Moscow has traditionally extended consistent and pronounced assistance to the RoC, both in the United Nations Security Council and bilaterally, by both verbal and non-verbal actions.

Overwhelmingly, Moscow’s Cyprus policy has been faithful to the original values and norms of the United Nations. This is demonstrated both by explicit support for all relevant UN resolutions and, especially, by crucial initiatives that regularly defended Nicosia from the frequently detrimental actions and unfriendly intentions of Ankara, Washington and London. Additionally, there are countless concrete developments that entailed the cultivation of mutual interests and bonds. Among the most telling of such cases, this book wil...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• 1 The “Pragmatic Idealist” Logic of the Book
• 2 The Cyprus Problem, International Law, and the Annan Plan
• 3 Revisiting Pragmatic Idealism: Assumptions, Main Concepts, and Some “Neighbouring” Theoretical Structures
• 4 Moscow’s Policies towards Cyprus during the Cold War: Realpolitik versus Latent Pragmatic Idealism
• 5 Russia and Cyprus, 1991–2012: Pragmatic Idealism versus Realpolitik
• 6 Nicos Anastasiades’ First Two Years in Power
• 7 The Russo–Turkish Labyrinth and the Cyprus–Egypt–Israel–Greece Rapprochement
• 8 Russo–Cypriot Prospects
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index