Why Counterinsurgency Fails

The US in Iraq and Afghanistan

Dennis de Tray

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9783319979922
• eBook ISBN: 9783319979939
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines why theU.S. counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed andpresents a solution for future counterinsurgency campaigns that was developed and tested in Afghanistan in the hope that it will spark a conversation that will shape the next counterinsurgency war to U.S. advantage. The author argues that both development assistance and counterinsurgency campaigns - which often go hand in hand - overwhelm weak states with too much money, too many projects, and too many consultants, leading to weaker rather than stronger governments. The solution proposed, was initiallydeveloped by David Petraeus but never effectively implemented. Using an insider's perspective, this volume explains the details of this solution and the problem with its mis-implementation in Afghanistan.

© The Author(s) 2019

Dennis de TrayWhy Counterinsurgency Failshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97993-9_1

Begin Abstract

1. How It Ended in Afghanistan, How It Started in Iraq

Dennis de Tray¹

(1)

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, USA

Abstract

De Tray describes high-level military enthusiasm, which produced no lasting effect, for expanding a development program, the People’s Development Fund. The program aimed to strengthen ties between the Afghan people and their government, a prime objective of counterinsurgency strategy, by shifting accountability for development projects to Afghan provincial and district governments from the international coalition led by the United States. De Tray had developed and piloted the program with the 173rd Airborne Division in two provinces of Afghanistan in 2009–2010. In a briefing, David Petraeus, then commander of the US Central Command, and John F. Campbell, commander of forces in the region of Afghanistan where the pilot took place, both urged that the program spread. But that did not happen. De Tray also describes his recruitment to the team, its civilian and military makeup, its meetings both inside the Green Zone in Baghdad and throughout the country, and its recommendations. The team’s first recommendation was that the coalition encourage the Iraq government to take ownership of the development program, overcome political obstacles to progress, and create pathways for advisors in government institutions.

Keywords

AfghanistanCounterinsurgencyISAFNATOIraqGovernment Assistance TeamRule of law

End Abstract

Close, but Not to Be

I start toward the end of my story, at a briefing that followed more than a year of working with the 173rd Airborne Brigade under the command of Colonel James Johnson in Afghanistan ’s Wardak and Lowgar provinces. With the 173rd, I had developed and tested a new approach to implementing “COIN ,” the counterinsurgency strategy developed by General David Petraeus.

It was now showtime. On 12 August 2010, we were to brief General Petraeus, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, and 70-plus Kabul -based senior US, coalition, and Afghan officials on the approach, the People’s Development Fund .

The People’s Development Fund was a new contribution to implementing counterinsurgency strategy. By giving local governments the ability to serve their people , it strengthened the link between people and their government. This was a pillar of US counterinsurgency strategy in principle if not practice. Though other programs under the US-led coalition claimed to do the same, the People’s Development Fund went much farther than similar efforts in putting local governments in charge.

The briefing took place under extraordinarily tight security in Maidan Shar, the capital of Wardak Province, about 35 kilometers from Kabul . If the insurgents landed a rocket on the tent where the briefing took place, they would have won a huge psychological gain and given a devastating blow to coalition and government leadership, not to mention the de Tray clan.

Although the meeting was kept hush-hush, the arrival of a stream of Blackhawk helicopters in a relatively small provincial capital was a tip-off that something big was in the offing. So, even with all the security the 173rd had put in place, the insurgents were not to be denied. As the briefing began, the audience could hear mortar explosions, close enough to be noticeable, but not so close as to interrupt the proceedings.

Petraeus , who was giving his welcoming remarks when we heard the first mortars, never flinched. The rest of us took our cue from him: we acted nonchalant, casually adjusting our flak jackets, helmets, and so on.

In the end, in a war zone, one is either a fatalist or a nervous wreck. Over my time in Afghanistan, I had become a consummate fatalist. If my number was up, so be it, and if not, no point in worrying.

The most nervous person at the briefing, I suspect, was Colonel Johnson, since he and his brigade were responsible for security. The days preceding the event had been a blur of dry runs—where the helicopters would land, how the 173rd would transport parties to the briefing area, where the different parts of the briefing would be held, how to secure the area around the briefing site, and much, much more. In a war zone no detail is too small.

My part of the briefing took place in the provincial government center’s library, where the brigade had placed two podiums, several whiteboards, and a projector and screen. A fundamental law of military briefings, I had learned, was that they required PowerPoint presentations, the more complex, the better.

My briefing focused on the People’s Development Fund, the program we developed during the 173rd’s 2009–2010 deployment in Lowgar and Wardak Provinces (Map 1.1; Chapter 4 describes the People’s Development Fund in detail). It aimed to better implement Petraeus ’s counterinsurgency strategy by building on my knowledge of the mistakes the international development community had been making in fragile states for decades. It was in its early implementation stage at the time of the briefing but was showing signs of success.

Map 1.1

Afghan Provinces

(Source Central Intelligence Agency)

The People’s Development Fund was designed to meet the primary counterinsurgency objective of strengthening the ties between the Afghan people and their government. It did this by shifting accountability for delivery of development projects from the international coalition and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF ) to provincial and district governments . Shifting accountability is essential to successful counterinsurgency.

To emphasize Afghan ownership of the program, I had asked Governor Mohammad Halim Fidai of Wardak Province to give the briefing. The governor’s English was excellent, and he gave a luci...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. How It Ended in Afghanistan, How It Started in Iraq
• 2. Reflections on Iraq, 2008
• 3. On to Afghanistan
• 4. Reflections on Afghanistan
• 5. Postscript, 2018: Why Counterinsurgency Is Still Flawed
• Back Matter