Migration and Identity in a Post-National World

K. Tonkiss

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781137309075
• eBook ISBN: 9781137309082
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica europea

Katherine Tonkiss offers a succinct account of constitutional patriotism theory, specifically arguing that it involves a commitment to free migration. She draws on qualitative research to explore the implications of this claim for the dynamics of post-national identity and belonging in local communities.

Part I
Theoretical Concerns

1

Nationalism and Democracy

Proponents of liberal nationalism argue that the promotion of national sentiment and the protection of a national context are crucial to the realisation of liberal goals and practices (Kymlicka, 1995; 2001; Miller, 1995; 2000; Tamir, 1993). In the absence of a shared national context, individuals would lack an appropriate range of meaningful options in making choices concerning their life plans. Further, in a variant of the approach, which I will term ‘democratic nationalism’, national sentiment is said to be necessary to shared rule. It is argued that, without it, individuals would be unwilling to be bound by collective decision-making or to contribute to a welfare state. In this chapter, I set out to examine the democratic nationalist thesis, and specifically David Miller’s seminal claim that democracy and welfare distribution is dependent on a shared national context (Miller, 1995, pp. 96–8; 2000, pp. 31–3).

Miller claims that shared nationality provides the trust that is necessary for democracy and welfare distribution to emerge. In what follows, I give reason to think that shared nationality cannot be shown to be doing the binding work that Miller has assigned to it. First, I explore what is meant by liberal nationalism, tracing its origins within the broad nationalist tradition. I provide an account of how this distinct approach to nationalism has been conceptualised on the basis of the conditions necessary for the realisation of liberal autonomy. I then move on to consider specifically democratic nationalism, as a branch of the liberal nationalist thesis, focusing in particular on the claims presented by Miller.

Next, I present an in-depth critique of Miller’s democratic nationalism. I begin by exploring the existence of other, non-national identity group affiliations within the national context itself to suggest that, contrary to Miller’s argument, democratic practice exists in multicultural contexts. I consider the existence of multinational yet democratic states to demonstrate that democracy exists despite the absence of shared national identity; and I engage specifically with the claim informing Miller’s emphasis on trust: that the trust stemming from shared nationality is essential for democratic practice and a robust welfare system. I highlight how this may be called into question, focusing on both democracy and social justice to demonstrate that the link between shared nationality and liberal democratic practice may not be as straightforward as the democratic nationalist thesis itself would assert.

In the final section of the chapter, I consider some reasons to question whether such a national context should be selected as a unit of political organisation. Here I highlight the ways in which it may be desirable to develop shared rule beyond the nation state, given that many of the rules and policies by which our lives are shaped are currently taken at the trans-state level. Finally, I suggest that an emphasis on strong national identity is morally problematic within a liberal framework, because there are reasons to believe that national identity sits in tension with liberalism itself.

Liberal nationalism

Analyses of nationalism have tended to cluster around two definitional aspects: ethnic and civic nationalism. The two are typically distinguished by their account of the origins of the nation. While ethnic nationalism is characterised by the inherited nature of ties between individuals sharing the same nationality and territory that they occupy – their shared history and ancestry on that land (Schnapper, 1998, p. 129; Smith, 1995, p. 86), civic nationalism takes national identity to be a result of individuals, who live in close proximity to one another, voluntarily consenting to enter into cooperation together. On the one hand, ethnic nationalism supposes that the nation is a ‘primordial’ object of attachment and thus exists prior to political organisation; and, on the other hand, civic nationalists argue that national identity is constructed as a result of the contexts in which individuals find themselves (Calhoun, 1997, p. 30; Tamir, 1993, p. 64).

The dichotomy between ethnic and civic nationalism has, however, met with criticism. Firstly, scholars have noted that it is relatively rare to find an ethnic group that is genuinely primordial. Rather, most modern nations have formed through the conglomeration of different identity groups. Members of nations may hold myths of origin and a sentiment of kinship, but these tend to involve imagined, rather than genuine, ties of common ethnicity (Canovan, 1996, pp. 57–9). Secondly, the civic characterisation of nations is argued to often be conflated with the cultural aspects of identity, founded on traditions, beliefs, practices and myths. In other words, an emphasis on purely civic nationalism misses precisely the imagined kinship that Canovan describes (Miller, 2000, pp. 28–31; Shulman, 2002, pp. 557–9; Yack, 1996, p. 207). Thirdly, the dichotomy itself is said to be flawed in its historical account of the transition from ethnic to civic nationalism which has not taken account of realities such as the fact that, for many Eastern European states, that transition has actually been from communism to civic nationalism (Kuzio, 2002).

The distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism may not therefore be so useful. Rather, nationalism tends to contain a balance between ethnic, civic and cultural components; and the nation can thus come to be understood as representing a combination of ethnic and cultural ties, alongside political elements resulting from voluntary cooperation in a nation state (Spinner-Halev, 2008, pp. 605–8). The ethnic features of nations include shared ancestry, history and race, while the cultural features are made up of beliefs, languages¹ and traditions. The civic features are those involving the institutions of the state, and include citizenship and territorial rights (Shulman, 2002, p. 559). Different combinations of these aspects are found to different extents within different nation states.

The specific definition of the nation that I will use here is that provided by David Miller, who is the most prominent and rigorous proponent of democratic nationalism. Miller defines nations as ethical communities; that is, they confer duties towards co-nationals that are more extensive than those held towards other individuals outside of the national context. Secondly, nations have rights to self-determination that will enable national citizens to make decisions about what is good for their community; and, finally, nations may form a part of personal identity (Miller, 2000, p. 27). National identities then have five composite features:

• they exist when members of the national community believe that they do;
• they represent historical communities that confer obligations on community members into the future, as a result of sacrifices made in the past by ancestors;
• they are active, in the sense that those holding the identity act together to make decisions;
• they are tied to specific geographical territories; and
• the people who hold the national identity all have some specific characteristics in common.

(Miller, 1995, pp. 22–7; 2000, p. 30)

Two important clarifications are required. Firstly, the shared characteristics are not limited to shared ethnicity. Rather, ‘(t)he common traits can be cultural in character; they can consist in shared values, shared tastes or sensibilities’ (Miller, 2000, p. 30). Secondly, a point regarding historical continuity: Miller does not simply believe that everything that is a part of the national construct is historical fact, but rather that some element of myth may exist and that these myths play an important part in bringing citizens together (pp. 30–1).

Liberal autonomy and self-expression

Now that I have defined the key terms of nationalism, I will turn my attention specifically to liberal nationalism as a distinct perspective within this wider tradition. Liberal nationalism seeks to defend national sentiment on the grounds that the self-determination of nations is primarily important in the realisation of robust liberal democratic practice. Proponents argue that a shared national context is necessary for the realisation of the liberal goal of individual autonomy (Kymlicka, 1995; 2001; Tamir, 1993). By individual autonomy, theorists are referring specifically to the ability of individuals to make choices about their own lives. Liberal morality demands not only that individuals might be free to pursue their own way of life, but also that they are able to question and revise that chosen way of life; and it is the claim of these scholars that a national culture is necessary to facilitate such choices (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 81).

The goals of liberalism and nationalism may appear to be divergent, because while liberalism emphasises individual agency and rights, nationalism suggests that the individual must be situated within a nation if they are to find full self-expression – and thus emphasises the importance of group rights (Tamir, 1993, pp. 16–18). Liberal nationalists, however, assert that the two are not mutually exclusive. Kymlicka, for example, cites historical lessons from Quebec and Belgium to argue that as states have liberalised, the nationalistic tendencies of their composite groups have not diminished; on the contrary, liberal reform has been accompanied by the continued desire to protect the homogeneous nation (Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 87–9; 2001, p. 209). Thus, it is argued that liberalism and nationalism may be thought of as reconcilable, as Tamir notes,

Both schools of thought can agree on a characterisation of individuals as agents who look to society to lend context to their personal thoughts, namely, as agents who acknowledge that their ends are meaningful only within a social context, but who do not necessarily accept socially dictated ends unreflectively. Their conception of the good is neither wholly individualistic nor wholly communal, and they may at times place their personal good before the common one while overturning their priorities at others. Society is thus seen as essential for the fulfilment of some ends, and as an obstacle hindering the attainment of others. (Tamir, 1993, p. 18)

According to this view, the right to autonomy, realised in the ability to choose, reflect on and revise an individual way of life, may only be achieved in a social context that can assign meaning to specific choices. Our social context will have an impact on our choices, because different ideas and traditions will have had an impact on the decisions that we might make. Thus Tamir asserts, ‘(l)est we end up selecting options at random, choice is contingent on having a socially acquired set of values that serve as criteria for evaluation’ (p. 22).

We are unable, the liberal nationalist would contend, to make informed choices about our lives in the absence of a shared cultural context, and thus we are unable to achieve the liberal goal of autonomy. In other words, unless we are able to make the options available salient to our individual circumstances, we are not in a position to choose between those options in any meaningful way. What do liberal nationalist scholars mean by this shared cultural context? Kymlicka defines this as a ‘societal culture’,

that is, a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language. I have called these ‘societal cultures’ to emphasise that they involve not just shared memories or values, but also common institutions and practices. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 76)

According to Kymlicka, national cultures can be defined as societal cultures because they meet the criteria listed in this quote. He argues that shared national contexts have significant value because they reflect the cultural make-up of the nation, and so offer an all-encompassing meaningful context which, Kymlicka asserts, is crucial to the realisation of liberal individual autonomy. The national context provides choices for individuals which have meaning to them, and as such is seen as key to the achievement of this liberal goal.

A national public sphere will, it is argued, be meaningful to the individual because it is a part of individual identity and therefore an extension of self-expression. The self-determination of the nation is justified to the extent that it is of benefit to the individual in terms of the self-respect it confers. Self-respect is viewed to be ‘among the most vital human interests’ and a failure to recognise the value of national identity undermines this self-respect for the individual – contrary to the ideal of individual autonomy (Margalit and Raz, 1990, p. 467; Miller, 1995, pp. 85–7). Tamir summarises the bond between personal and communal identity:

Membership in a nation is a constitutive factor of personal identity. The self-image of individuals is highly affected by the status of their national community. A safe, dignified, and flourishing national existence thus significantly contributes to their well-being. (Tamir, 1993, p. 73)

It is thus argued that the national context is meaningful to the individual because it is an extension of the identity of that individual. The individual, then, is able to pursue an autonomous life in a society with a menu of choices that respects their personal identity and because of this is meaningful to them. Therefore, the self-determination of nations is aligned to the realisation of respect for the autonomous individual, and this is the fundamental basis of liberal nationalism, that ‘all nations are entitled to a public sphere in which they constitute the majority’ (Tamir, 1993, p. 150). The idea that the nation will reflect popular will is therefore centrally important to the justification of national self-determination offered by liberal nationalists. It is this specific idea that democratic nationalists emphasise, as I now detail.

Democratic nationalism

Democratic nationalists hold that democratic political legitimacy is dependent upon the existence of a strong national identity. Once again, this is driven by the liberal goal of individual autonomy, and the idea that the realisation of such autonomy is dependent on the political legitimacy that stems from shared rule in a self-determining political community. The key defining feature of this approach is therefore that ‘(a)s far as possible, each nation should have its own set of political institutions which allow it to decide collectively those matters that are the primary concern of its members’ (Miller,² 1995, p. 81).

This claim is a variant on the argument that nationalism promotes liberal individual autonomy. If individuals are to be respected as autonomous beings, then they require a form of political rule which reflects their will; that democratic rule provides this creates a conceptual linkage between liberal morality and democratic practice. However, according to Miller the realisation of this democratic practice is dependent, once again, on the meaningful context that nationalism is said to provide. This is because a shared national identity is proposed to offer the trust that is necessary for what I will term the ‘willingness to lose’.

The realisation of robust democratic practice is challenging because it asks individuals to agree to circumstances under which their own viewpoint may be rejected, on the basis that in the future their viewpoint may be on the winning side (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 225; Miller, 1995, pp. 96–7). As Miller notes,

Even the more minimal forms of democracy require individuals or parties who lose elections to stand down and hand over instruments of power, which requires sufficient faith that the victors will not use their new position to quell opposition or indeed abandon the democratic constitution entirely. (1996, p. 418)

For Miller, the participation of individuals in democratic practice rests on their confidence that other individuals will also participate fairly. This reciprocal relationship forms the ‘willingness to lose’. The existence of a willingness to lose is deemed necessary if citizens are to be able to reach agreements that are not simply an aggregation of their separate interests. Citizens must be willing to compromise their own views and beliefs in favour of reaching agreement, and must be consistent in the application of the arguments they make in political debate, even if this counts against their own interests. Citizens will only be willing to do this, it is argued, if they are confident that other citizens will act in the same way (Miller, 1995, pp. 96–7).

A willingness to lose, it is argued, stems from the existence of a common national identity. It is solidarity amongst co-nationals which provides the possibility of active participation in democratic practices (Canovan, 1996, p. 20; Moore, 2001, pp. 7–9; Spinner-Halev, 2008, pp. 608–10). According to the democratic nationalist thesis, the reason that such binding sentiment leads to a willingness to lose is due to the existence of trust. The argument is that we only trust each other to comply with the willingness to lose if we hold this common nationality. In a large context such as a state, we lack the ability to monitor each other’s behaviour. Therefore there must be some other means of guaranteeing this compliance, and for Miller, this is shared national identity:

I take it as virtually self-evident that ties of community are an important source of such trust between individuals who are not personally known to one another and who are in no position directly to monitor one another’s behaviour. A shared identity carries with it a shared loyalty, and this increases confidence that others will reciprocate one’s own cooperative behaviour. (Miller, 1995, p. 92)

To summarise, shared identity is said to promote trust within a community of individuals who are largely strangers to each other, and who are spread geographically over a large area. Trust is important because it facilitates the voluntary participation involved in nurturing a robust form of democracy, defined as the willingness to lose – whereby individuals are prepared to compromise their sincerely held views in favour of reaching agreement, in the knowledge that other individuals will also do the same.

Miller’s claim that national identity is crucial in the production of trust is relevant not just for democratic practice, but also for the provision of social justice. The development of a welfare state is said to be dependent upon the extent to which citizens are prepared to make material ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I Theoretical Concerns
• Part II Case Study Research: Migration and Identity
• Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index