Changing Indian Images of the European Union

Perception and Misperception

Rajendra K. Jain

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9789811387906
• eBook ISBN:
  9789811387913
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Diplomazia e trattati

This book explores the images and perceptions of the European Union (EU) in the eyes of one of the EU's three strategic partners in Asia in the context of its own distinct policies and identity. It fills a major gap in existing studies on how Asians perceive the EU. The book examines the perception, representation and visibility of the EU in the Indian media, among the 'elites' and in public opinion. It explores whether the Union's self-proclaimed representation as a global actor, a normative power and a leader in environmental negotiations conforms to how it is actually perceived in Third World countries.

The book asks questions such as, How have Indian images of Europe/European Union been changing from the 1940s to the present? What new narratives have emerged or are emerging about the EU in India? What does the rise of China mean for EU-India relations? Is the image of the EU changing in India or do old representations still persist even though the Union is acquiring a newpersonality in the world politics? How does India perceive Poland?

© The Author(s) 2019

R. K. Jain (ed.)Changing Indian Images of the European Unionhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8791-3_1

Begin Abstract

1. Initial Indian Perceptions of the European Union: The 1940s to the Early 1960s

Rajendra K. Jain¹

(1)

School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Delhi, India

Rajendra K. Jain

This chapter partially draws on my article entitled ‘Nehru and the European Economic Community’, published in India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, 2015, 71(1), pp. 1–15 and is used with the permission of the copyright holders (Indian Council of World Affairs [ICWA]) and the publishers, SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi.

End Abstract

India’s interest in European integration was as old as the first beginnings of the movement towards an economically and politically united Europe. The European integration movement was perceived as ‘the quickest means’ and an attempt by countries with different languages and histories to forge ‘a common programme for collective and rapid prosperity’ (Mishra 1973). European integration coincided with the ‘same experiment and experience’ which began in India in the 1950s when successive plans for socio-economic development were launched and implemented (Lall et al. 1984: ix). The Common Market was viewed as ‘a politically motivated initiative’ whose ‘ultimate objective was political conciliation and reconciliation and a cooperative political modus vivendi’ (Swaminathan 1973: 29–30).

This chapter examines the evolution of Indian perceptions towards European integration and the European Economic Community (EEC) from the 1940s till negotiations of British entry into the Community collapsed in January 1963. It examines Indian perceptions to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Defence Community and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). It examines Indian reactions to the Treaty of Rome (1957) and role when it was under consideration in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It discusses New Delhi’s first direct contacts with the European Commission in an effort to establish diplomatic relations. The chapter also looks at the keen interest of the business groups, especially the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), in the EEC. It goes on to discuss Indian strategies in dealing with the implications of Britain’s first application to join the European Community (1961) and the reactions of the business community, political parties and debates in the Indian Parliament on the EEC. It evaluates the key elements which influenced Indian thinking and evaluates Indian attempts to secure a viable trade arrangement with the Community during the Nehru era.

India, Regionalism and Regional Organizations

Since the mid-1940s, Indian elites had been expressing their views on regionalism and regional groupings in India Quarterly —the premier international affairs quarterly of the Indian Council of World Affairs—the leading think tank of the time established in 1943. As early as 1946, K.M. Panikkar—a journalist and later Ambassador to France—regarded the idea of regional organizations as ‘respectable’ and ‘attractive’ since states in the same geographical region had common problems, have similar interests and are naturally more concerned with each other’s affairs than those far away (Panikkar 1946: 120). Their role, however, tended to be limited by the United Nations Charter and the veto power of members of the Security Council. Regional organizations dealing with security, he felt, would become ‘merely another instrument for the effective assertion of the supremacy of the Great Powers’. They would not only be unable to ‘enforce sanctions against a Great Power, but may even be used to uphold and consolidate the influence and authority of Great Powers’ (Panikkar 1946: 122). He was sceptical whether an organization, which was dominated by the problems of European nations, would find time for initiating ‘a policy of sustained action’ in outlying regions (Panikkar 1946: 125).

In the early years of independence, the movement for European unification was viewed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as a natural response to problems peculiar to Europe and to its ‘legacy of conflict’ (Nehru, 8 March 1949a: 31–32), but tainted by colonialism. A year earlier, he felt that the idea of ‘a union’ in Western Europe had developed far (Nehru, 17 March 1948: 330) and that the Council of Europe was ‘slowly groping its way towards some kind of European confederation’ (Nehru, 2 September 1949b: 188).

In 1949, Girija Mookerjee traced the genesis of European integration since the days of the Roman Empire and Charlemagne. The ‘main inspiration’ for a European Union, he argued, had not come so much from ‘a desire for cultural unity or political settlement’ as from ‘a determination to ensure the pre-war position’ of West European nations (Mookerjee 1949: 239). He maintained that ‘on paper at least, a European Union has been formed although not with so much conviction that it will finally lead to the creation of a United States of Europe on the pattern of the U.S.A., which seems to have been the ideal set by most of the Europeanists’. Amongst the obstacles for a workable European Union included the reluctance of many European peoples to embrace ‘the idea of Europe as a geographical unity’. A ‘viable’ European Union, he felt, ought to be based on a Franco-German reconciliation, but such a prospect was ‘very distant indeed!’ (Mookerjee 1949: 241). Moreover, the idea of a European Union was ‘very much discounted’ in France. Another obstacle was the ‘complicated structure’ of the Commonwealth, which made it difficult for Britain ‘to identify herself completely with the countries on the Continent’. Without British participation, a European Union ‘can never have either the prestige or the reality which it needs’ (Mookerjee 1949: 242–243). In conclusion, he felt that the prospects of a European Union were ‘very remote’ and that the movement for European integration was ‘solely directed against the Soviet Union’. He was sceptical that even if a Western Union is somehow brought into being, it will have popular support (Mookerjee 1949: 243).

Even though the Asian Relations Organization, set up by the Asian Relations Conference (New Delhi, 23 March–2 April 1947), continued its unreal existence, it was subsequently quietly buried. H. Venkatasubbiah, correspondent of The Hindu and a member of the Staff of the Asian Relations Conference, wrote a two-part article in India Quarterly . The first one examined the ‘various problems’ which might arise in the formation of an Asian union as a permanent regional organization by drawing lessons from the Organization of American States (OAS) (established in 1948; Venkatasubbiah 1949a). The second article probed the various problems in the formation of an Asian Union, including the basic difficulty in defining the region itself. The idea of establishing more than one regional organization in Asia emanated from the Delhi Conference on Indonesia (January 1949).¹ He felt that the organization structure of the OAS was ‘far too elaborate a model’ for the structure of a permanent Asian organization. However, he maintained:

A permanent organisation is well suited to pool existing economic resources in the region and arrange for the supplementary foreign aid—as in the case of the European recovery program—on agreed principles. The fear that extra continent and political influence will follow economic aid could be largely a lady of development with foreign capital proceeded and organisational rather than bilateral auspices. (Venkatasubbiah 1949b: 217)

In 1951, another article in India Quarterly regarded the establishment of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) by the United Nations in 1947 as having at least achieved ‘a singularly valuable purpose’ of getting together Governments of Asia and the Far East on a common forum to discuss and consider the common problems with a view to finding solutions (Lokanathan 1951: 7).

European Coal and Steel Community

The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 was perceived by the Times of India as an ‘unprecedented waiver’ and given a release from the obligations under the GATT. In fact, it was exactly the opposite of GATT principles of non-discrimination. In effect, it had set up a special preferential trade area for the Six to trade in coal, iron ore and iron scrap completely free of duties or other import restrictions (TOI, 9 November 1952b). The decision of the ECSC members to proceed towards the establishment of a European Federal Political Committee, the Times of India editorially observed, was ‘guilty of either over-ambition or of being lip service to an ideal impossible of achievement in the foreseeable future’. The surrender of national sovereignty, it opined, could ‘well prove unpopular among the people of Western Europe’. The ‘idealistic’ Schuman Plan was termed as nothing more than ‘a French attempt to deny Germany the economic independence which would have provided France with severe competition’ (TOI, 20 September 1952a). India perceived in the ECSC ‘a real potential for the gradual replacement of confrontation with conciliation and cooperation’ (Swaminathan 1973: 30).

European Defence Community

India had been, generally speaking, critical of regional alliances primarily because they tended to enhance international tension and war. Its attitude was basically conditioned by geographical continuity. It apparently regarded the Brussels Treaty (1948)—the founding treaty of the Western European Union (WEU)—to be a legitimate measure of self-defence. It did not express any resentment or opposition to the British decision to join the Brussels Treaty.

Similarly, when asked to comment on the treaty seeking to establish the European Defence Community (EDC) (27 May 1952), Nehru remarked: ‘We do not wish to get entangled in European problems or in problems apart from those directly affecting us’ (Ministry of External Affairs 1954: 7). He was sceptical of the success of the project. The conception of ‘a European Defence Force remains a conception’ and there was ‘very little chance’ of France agreeing to it (Nehru, 23 June 1954a). After the EDC was not ratified by the French Parliament, it had suffered ‘a severe shock’ (Nehru, 3 September 1954b: 594).

European Free Trade Area

Shortly before the signing of the Treaty of Rome, Britain proposed an industrial free trade area (including the EEC as one of its members) within the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). This proposal envisaged the removal of tariff and quota restrictions on industrial goods, but excluded agriculture and left to the individual members the discretion to adopt their independent trade and commerce policies towards non-member states. An economist argued that a large group of Indian exports, except cotton textiles, were likely to remain unaffected by the formation of EFTA (Ray 1961: 34...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Initial Indian Perceptions of the European Union: The 1940s to the Early 1960s
• 2. India and Europe: Perceptions and Misperceptions
• 3. India and the European Union: Perceptions and Misperceptions
• 4. The Visibility and Perceptions of the EU in the Indian Print Media, 2009–2010
• 5. Public Attitudes and Images of the EU in India
• 6. Towards Stronger Political Ties? The EU’s Shifting Image in the Indian Media During the EU-India Summit of October 2017
• 7. Indian Perceptions of Poland
• Back Matter