Drugs on the Dark Net

How Cryptomarkets are Transforming the Global Trade in Illicit Drugs

J. Martin

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781137399045
• eBook ISBN: 9781137399052
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

This study explores the rapidly expanding world of online illicit drug trading. Since the fall of the infamous Silk Road, a new generation of cryptomarkets can be found thriving on the dark net. Martin explores how these websites defy powerful law enforcement agencies and represent the new digital front in the 'war on drugs'.

1

Conceptualising Cryptomarkets

Abstract: The first chapter is intended to ground the concept of the cryptomarket in broader scholarly knowledge and aims to present these illicit sites as complex and multifaceted entities. Online drug dealing is discussed in relation to various definitions of cybercrime. Cryptomarkets are also analysed as sites of informal nodal governance, and various nodal resources, mentalities, technologies and institutions are identified. Finally, users of cryptomarkets are analysed as interdependent and resilient online communities with complex notions of collective and political identity.

Martin, James. Drugs On the Dark Net: How Cryptomarkets Are Transforming the Global Trade in Illicit Drugs. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. DOI: 10.1057/9781137399052.0004.

Cryptomarkets are complex computer-based phenomena. In cyberspace they represent virtual meeting places for a motley assortment of deviants, drug users, entrepreneurs and political activists who come together online to share information and to trade. Whilst logged on to a cryptomarket, the physical location and identity of users are masked by free yet highly sophisticated encryption technology. This enables anonymous communications and commerce, the nature of which is often subversive or illegal, particularly with regard to the use, sale and distribution of illicit drugs (Barratt, Lenton et al. 2013, Christin 2013, Hout and Bingham 2013, Martin 2013, Van Hout and Bingham 2013). The diverse range of illicit products which are traded via cryptomarkets, together with their clandestine nature, contributes to a popular misunderstanding that these virtual spaces are entirely lawless where ‘anything goes’. This perception is fuelled by sensationalist media reporting, with one news article recently likening cryptomarkets to the infamous Star Wars cantina at Mos Eisley Spaceport (Lumby 2013), a ‘wretched hive of scum and villainy’ where, for the right price, one can buy virtually anything.

Whilst colourful and evocative, the Star Wars analogy is also misleading. As is demonstrated later in the chapter, the majority of cryptomarkets strictly prohibit the sale of the most overtly and unambiguously harmful goods and services (such as child pornography and contract killing, to mention two examples which are frequently, and often erroneously, cited by the news media) (Falconer 2012, Palmer 2012, Lumby 2013). That commentators draw on inaccurate and misleading language and imagery of science fiction in describing cryptomarkets is revealing, as it points to a deficit in both popular and academic terminology that is capable of adequately explaining these new forms of association developing on the internet. This is not a problem particular to criminology or any other academic discipline. The recent mass proliferation of advanced communication technologies poses an ongoing challenge to scholars across the breadth of the academy to develop new concepts and theories which are relevant to an increasingly interconnected age. The rapid pace of technological change is also problematic as it contrasts significantly with the traditionally more ponderous cycles of academic observation, analysis, peer-review and debate. This mismatch often leaves scholarly discourse lagging significantly behind online events and places an additional emphasis on the timely development of conceptual tools with which one may interrogate and analyse novel online phenomena.

This chapter further develops the concept of the cryptomarket by drawing on other, more established scholarly concepts and theories. A central aim is to explore these illicit sites as complex and multifaceted entities that fulfil a variety of functions. As a starting point, the criminal dimensions of cryptomarkets are discussed with reference to the emergent and loosely defined field of cybercrime. The focus of the analysis is then broadened to incorporate non-criminal perspectives, identifying cryptomarkets as spontaneously forming and self-regulating sites of nodal governance. Finally, cryptomarkets are analysed as idiosyncratic online communities which share a range of values and attitudes with regard to illicit drug use and exchange.

Cryptomarkets and cybercrime

To date, much of the public and scholarly discourse regarding cryptomarkets refers to cybercrime (Hodson 2013, Ablon, Libicki et al. 2014, Trautman 2014). This ubiquitous and overly inclusive term refers to practically any offence committed with the help of a computer, ranging from simple harassment carried out via email, to global ‘botnet’ attacks which are capable of paralysing critical national infrastructure (Provos, Rajab et al. 2009). To provide much-needed clarity and depth to the concept of cybercrime, scholars have created a range of cyber-taxonomies. These include simple binary classifications, such as the dichotomy between ‘computer-assisted’ and ‘computer-oriented’ or ‘computer-focused’ crimes. This well-known system differentiates traditional sorts of offences that are committed with computer assistance (e.g. fraud, blackmail, breaking and entering) from entirely new, virtual offences such as hacking and malware creation (Jewkes, Yar et al. 2010). Similar to this are taxonomies which categorise computer-related crimes according to their perceived association with various types of conventional offences. For example, the unauthorised access of private, virtual space may be conceived as ‘cyber-trespassing’, while injurious online offences such as bullying and harassment represent forms of ‘cyber-violence’ (Wall 2001, Holt 2013). More recently developed cybercrime taxonomies include those that cluster offences according to whether offenders use computers as either targets or tools (or both) (Brenner 2010), or alternatively refer to different stages in the chronological development of computer-related offences and the increasing risks/costs posed to private enterprises (Sjouwerman 2011).

Among the more sophisticated of cyber-taxonomies are the ‘3 generations’ of cybercrime identified by Wall (2007). Wall’s (2007) system distinguishes between computer-related offences according to the degrees to which they utilise and exploit global computer networks. Determining the generation to which a computer-related offence is associated is achieved by performing a hypothetical ‘transformation test’. This involves hypothesising how the offence would be affected if computer networks were no longer available. According to Wall (2007), first-generation cybercrimes are those which are able to continue essentially unchanged in the absence of computer networks. These are traditional sorts of offences that use computers for communications or other practical purposes, but may also employ substitute means to perform these tasks if computer networks are unavailable. An example of a first-generation cybercrime is a burglar who uses a computer to disable the alarm on a bank vault. In this case, the exploitation of a computer network may be useful, or perhaps even critical to the commission of the offence. However, in the hypothetical absence of computer networks, burglars will almost certainly continue to steal from banks through the use of alternate means. The computer network is therefore simply another tool used in the commission of what is otherwise a conventional offence. While perhaps more technologically sophisticated than other instances of burglary, it does not qualitatively differ from similar offences that do not rely upon the use of computer networks.

By contrast, second-generation cybercrimes are those which exploit some of the vast new criminal opportunities afforded by global computer networks (Wall 2007). These too may resemble conventional types of offences, but are also significantly transformed by the availability of networked systems. The dissemination of child pornography is perhaps the most troubling example of a second-generation cybercrime. This offence pre-dates the mass proliferation of networked computer systems so it is clear, both historically and hypothetically, that it is able to persist in their absence. However, the scope and magnitude of the offence is significantly transformed by computer networks and associated communications technologies. These allow offenders to meet online and to communicate with one another with ease and relative anonymity, as well as facilitating the instantaneous transfer of much greater volumes of illegal data than would otherwise be possible through conventional, interpersonal networks of offenders. If one transforms the offence by removing computer networks, then the dissemination of child pornography would undoubtedly continue, but only in much smaller volumes and at a significantly reduced rate.

Third generation cybercrimes also exploit global computer networks, but they do so through the use of automated software (Wall 2007). Computer automation dramatically increases the scale of third generation cybercrimes relative to other cyber-offences because, once created by a skilled programmer, automated programs are able to self-replicate without further active participation on the part of offenders. The dissemination of malware which infects and ‘enslaves’ computers via spam email is one of the most common and costly examples of a third generation cybercrime (Wall 2007). Upon opening malware concealed in a spam email, cyber-victims unwittingly forfeit some degree of control over their computer, which is then incorporated into a global network of similarly compromised ‘botnets’. This network expands automatically by accessing personal information that is stored on comprised hard drives or email accounts and generating subsequent spam attacks. These in turn compromise more computers and perpetuate the cycle of infection and expansion. The power of this ‘viral’ method of transmission depends upon both computer automation and networked systems and, importantly, if one hypothesises their removal, then the offence would effectively cease to exist.

Of the three generations of cybercrime identified by Wall (2007), only the first two are currently relevant to cryptomarkets. However, identifying whether offences committed via cryptomarkets constitute either first or second-generation cybercrimes is more complicated than it may initially appear. At first glance, the primary offence facilitated by cryptomarkets (i.e. the sale of illicit drugs) appears to correspond to the criteria associated with first-generation cybercrimes. This is because the vast bulk of the global illicit drugs trade is carried out not through the use of computer networks, but rather through interpersonal networks of drug manufacturers/cultivators, wholesales, traffickers and local distributors (see Chapter 3 for more detailed discussion of conventional drug distribution networks). These conventional drug distribution groups may use computer networks to communicate and help coordinate their activities. However, if one performs the Wall (2007) transformation test and hypothesises their removal, then it is clear that both the sale and distribution of illicit drugs would persist by other means. For this reason, Wall (2007) specifically identifies drug dealers who use computer networks as committing first-generation cybercrimes.

Complicating this perspective, however, is the fact that the sale of illicit drugs carried out via cryptomarkets is dependent upon global computer networks. Cryptomarkets transform conventional drug sales by facilitating the creation of global networks of offenders. These networks comprise both vendors and purchasers of illicit drugs who, once online, are able to conduct a range of illicit activities not only on an unprecedented scale, but also with a degree of freedom that significantly exceeds what is possible through conventional, interpersonal criminal networks. Particularly, cryptomarket users may readily compare and purchase tens of thousands of different illicit products from vendors located all over the world (Christin 2013). They may communicate freely, instantaneously and anonymously with one another, as well as access and contribute feedback about the huge variety of products that are listed for sale. Information provided in this manner is then automatically processed by cryptomarkets in order to rank the multitude of registered illicit vendors according to perceived reliability and customer satisfaction (see Chapter 2 for more detailed discussion of cryptomarket operations and consumer feedback systems).

The vast scale of cryptomarket-facilitated computer networks, combined with the speed, flexibility and reciprocal nature of online communications, significantly transforms the sale of illicit drugs when compared to similar offences committed via conventional illicit markets. Critically, if one hypothesises the removal of computer networks, then cryptomarkets, and the highly sophisticated and extraordinarily user-friendly drug exchange services that they provide effectively cease to exist. This suggests that cryptomarkets facilitate a form of illicit drug sales that is qualitatively different from the conventional, offline variety. Unlike conventional, offline drug sales, cryptomarket-facilitated drug offences are dependent upon, and significantly transformed by, global computer networks and therefore represent second-generation, rather than first-generation, cybercrimes.

Nodal governance

While cryptomarkets may be analysed as sites for the commission of cybercrime, by focusing exclusively on their criminal dimensions scholars risk ignoring or underemphasising other important aspects about the roles and functions in cyberspace. An alternative to a criminal-centric perspective is to consider cryptomarkets as sites of informal nodal governance on the internet. The concept of nodal governance was originally developed by Shearing and Wood (2003) as a way of mapping the plurality of public and private authority structures operating within neo-liberal states. According to Shear...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  Conceptualising Cryptomarkets
• 2  Cryptomarket Operations
• 3  Conventional vs. Online Drug Distribution Networks
• 4  Cryptomarkets and Law Enforcement
• Conclusion and Future Directions
• Bibliography
• Index