Why do military units commit war crimes? The impacts of these crimes are devastating, often cascading through communities and generations. The soldiers who commit war crimes hardly seem proud of their actions; often the incidents haunt them long after they return home. The accounts of unspeakable brutality committed during World War II shocked the world. While “obedience to orders” might once have been a defense for such actions, the creators of the Nuremberg Tribunals ensured that soldiers had to take moral responsibility for their individual actions. The four Geneva Conventions, drafted in the aftermath of that war, prohibit war crimes, crimes against humanity, and provide special protection for civilians threatened by conflict.
The principles underlying the Geneva Conventions, particularly protection for civilians, pre-dated the creation of the legal treaties. While actors on both sides of World War II had abandoned principles of proportionality and protection of civilians, these principles had previously been upheld by states and even used as propaganda to prove the moral cause of states engaged in conflict. Certainly, the re-affirmation of these norms in the Geneva Conventions did not bring an end to all war crimes or threats to civilians. But, the treaties did provide a standard for evaluating military actions. The creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals held individuals, rather than entire countries, accountable for violations. No longer could states, leaders, or soldiers claim a right to attack civilians.
Despite the normative power of civilian protection promised in the aftermath of World War II, attacks on civilians continue to occur. Authoritarian states can simply deny or cover up such actions, but democratic states, particularly those who created and pledged to comply with these norms, can be held accountable. These states, and their respective militaries, often cover up these crimes, minimize the significance, or blame “bad apples,” soldiers at the bottom of the chain of command. “Rogue” individuals are often singled out for judgment, but rarely are their commanders, or civilian leaders, held responsible.
This explanation for post-World War II war crimes is inconsistent with the historical record. If these crimes were committed only by “bad apples,” why did they reoccur in multiple units? Why do some units feel “above the law” while others feel a duty to exercise restraint and protect civilians? Given the dramatic impacts of war crimes on victims, perpetrators, and societies engaged in conflict, the question of why military units commit war crimes deserves further scrutiny. Conflict, whether inter-state or intra-state, will likely continue as state and state-like actors use violence to achieve their goals. Understanding how those on the ground in these conflicts, those closest to civilian populations, see their rights and responsibilities is crucial to civilian protection. Approaches that focus on state-level or individual-level explanations for these crimes often do not take into account the interaction between the state, the military as an organization, units on the battlefield, and soldiers. Failure to recognize this interaction will prevent understanding of the root causes of these actions and development of meaningful solutions.
Instead, I argue that examining militaries, particularly militaries in major power democracies, as organizations has promise for understanding why some units participate in war crimes (and why some do not). Drawing on insights from organizational theory, particularly related to organizational culture and the development of subcultures, I test whether these militaries successfully socialized units to adhere to the laws of war, particularly civilian protection. If not, units lacking the organization’s values and identity may fracture or develop countercultures that reject the organization’s norms.
The military is unique because it must create a culture that fosters loyalty and obedience while also cultivating leadership and ethical judgment. This socialization process, which includes transference of knowledge and skill alongside demonstration of organizational commitment, may explain why some units are better prepared for situations that demand restraint in the interest of civilian protection. Militaries train soldiers on strategy, tactics, and the laws of war. The organization shows its commitment to the laws through enforcement efforts, either through the military or civilian justice systems. Could it be that a failure to properly socialize some units explains their participation in war crimes?
The socialization argument presumes that the organization’s efforts to shape its culture filter down through all levels. However, militaries are large and widespread organizations, with units deployed around the world. Units may develop different kinds of subcultures depending on their knowledge and acceptance of organizational values. Enhancing subcultures bolster organizational values; these units may act as “models” in terms of compliance. Countercultural subcultures reject organizational norms in favor of their own identities and values. Unit leaders, with their experience and training, can help shape these subcultures. Is it possible that some units reject the prescribed culture and instead adhere to their own “counter culture” that rejects the principles outlined in the laws of war?
To compare these organizational-level explanations for unit commission of war crimes, I examine three conflicts that represent modern military operations: the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency, and the United Nations humanitarian mission in Somalia. In each conflict, units encountered difficult circumstances that required them to endure risks in order to protect civilians, something that should have been included in their training and emphasized by their leaders. In each conflict, some units failed to manage these circumstances and killed civilians, while others demonstrated restraint and protected civilians. I found that, in each case, socialization efforts were poor in terms of the laws of war—training was limited and organizational commitment was inconsistent at best. Units with enhancing subcultures were more likely to overcome weak socialization efforts. However, units that lacked a cohesive subculture, or that developed a countercultural subculture, were more likely to commit war crimes.
During the course of my research into these conflicts, I was surprised to learn that despite these militaries’ seeming faith and dependence on training to help shape organizational culture, training regarding the laws of war and protection of civilians was not well developed. During the Korean War, training was de-emphasized in favor of getting soldiers quickly into the battlefield, which led to the elimination of all law of war instruction. Unfortunately, the result may have caused needless deaths of Korean civilians and U.S. forces. Despite Britain’s long history of jungle warfare experience, soldiers deployed during the Malayan Emergency were not well prepared to distinguish between civilians and combatants, peasants and guerillas. It took some time for the British to recognize the importance of protecting civilians and separating peasants from the insurgents to draw away key resources and develop useful intelligence networks. Finally, even with Canada’s long tradition of leadership on human rights, their military training on the laws of war was limited to higher level officers and required only self-directed instruction. Many of the soldiers in the paratrooper units deployed to Somalia had no recent training on their legal obligations to civilians. While these findings are discouraging, they suggest that major militaries can do much more to uphold their state’s commitments to the laws of war and civilian protection. What I cannot say, however, is whether a robust training regime will lead to compliance—further research is needed to examine an intervention where the military had such training.
The overall lack of training , however, cannot explain the variation in unit behavior—why did some units harm civilians while others protected them? In all the cases I examined, subculture and unit leadership appeared to make the difference. In Korea, many units lacked any culture due to vacancies, shuffling of unit members, and their rapid deployment. Units with experienced leaders were better able to manage the difficult conditions and protect civilians. In Malaya, some of the units had counter cultures that rejected tactical innovations in fighting the guerillas; those units took greater casualties and were more likely to kill civilians. Experienced and well-trained unit leaders steered more disciplined units toward civilian protection as a means to weaken the insurgency. In Somalia , the three Commandos of the Canadian Airborne Regiment each had distinct subcultures developed long before they deployed. Unfortunately, 3 Commando , tasked with policing the urban area and civilians, had a counter cultural subculture that rejected restraint. Despite efforts to bring in new unit leaders, the counter culture was too strong, and the Commando was responsible for a disproportionate amount of violence toward civilians. The other Commandos, whose subcultures showed greater respect for norms and discipline, also had unit leaders better able to reinforce the importance of civilian protection and restraint. These findings demonstrate the importance of monitoring units’ subcultures and promoting well-socialized leaders. Developing well-socialized leaders ensures that even if organizational efforts are weakened, those leaders can channel and reinforce values and norms to their units. Understanding unit subcultures and the role of unit leaders may help the military intervene before a countercultural subculture becomes impenetrable.
Fortunately, there is a robust literature on war crimes; policymakers, international lawyers, academics, and journalists have devoted enormous attention to documenting crimes and giving recognition to survivors. However, as I demonstrate in Chap. 2, current approaches to explaining war crimes fail to address my specific question: why do some units participate in war crimes when others do not? To explore this question, I adopt an approach that utilizes organizational theory, focusing on organizational culture and the formation of subcultures. Each concept has its own intellectual background and logic that may help explain unit behavior. Following this discussion, I present chapters on my three case studies: Korea, Malaya, and Somalia . By tracing the relationships between socialization and subculture of units in each of these cases, which represent different conflict environments, I gain a more general understanding of these factors and how they influence unit behavior. In the conclusion, I discuss the findings of my case studies, what policy recommendations they might support, and identify a host of remaining questions and suggest future paths for research.
In the contemporary security environment, it is unlikely that major powers will face military adversaries on the traditional battlefield. Instead, forces will be engaged in actions to address low-level security threats like insurgents and terrorist groups. These threats are often complicated by the fluid nature of borders, particularly in weak states, and the willingness of adversaries to cross borders. As a result, civilians are often stuck in the middle of battles, if not targets themselves. Militaries will also continue to be called upon to provide aid in humanitarian emergencies. In these environments, it is important that military forces recognize that their actions will rarely ensure victory—only political solutions will bring stability and hopefully peace. However, the military may make the situation worse if they fail to honor inter...