The 9/11 events in 2001 caused worldwide concern about global safety and security . World commerce depends heavily on maritime transport , so its security has attracted great attention (UNCTAD 2004). Several major international organisations reacted swiftly to enhance maritime transport safety by strengthening security measures. They produced both voluntary and compulsory rules and programmes, which have been implemented internationally.
In the academic field, there has been considerable research undertaken on maritime safety and security . Roach (2004) studied security management of terrorism threats in shipping companies. HĆ„vold (2005) discussed safety climate and culture in the shipping industry and revealed 11 risk factors. Thai (2007) examined the effects of security improvements in maritime transport with an empirical study of Vietnam. Lun et al. (2008) discussed how technology could enhance container transportation security .
Most non-bulk cargoes are transported within standardised containers. The container shipping system is efficient and economical, but also vulnerable to illegal intrusion and misuse. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal goods and human trafficking can be concealed within containers by terrorists and criminals. Vessels themselves can be used as a weapon in a terrorist attack. In addition, terrorists can operate vessels to finance and support their logistics operations (OECD 2003).
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was established in 2002 by US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to cope with āthe threat to border security and global trade posed by the potential terrorist using a maritime containerā (Donner and Kruk 2009, p. 27). Participating states cooperate with the US CBP to ensure all high-risk containers are identified and inspected before loading onto vessels destined for US ports. Currently, the CSI has been operated in 58 ports worldwide. It is labelled as voluntary since the regulations are not mandated by a law or international convention.
Despite the positive implications of conducting security initiatives for global trade safety and security , arguments arise from the potential issues caused by compliance with the CSI . Additional costs and operational inefficiency are the two major issues raised by many studies (OECD 2003; Dekker and Stevens 2007; Bennett and Chin 2008; Bichou and Evans 2007; UNCTAD 2007; Kruk and Donner 2008; Bichou 2011). A major part of the cost burden comes from the container scanning required by the new security regime. In order to comply with the regime, initialisation costs occur for purchasing, installation, initial training and civil engineering works. Moreover, there are extra costs for operating the container scanning equipment. The cost estimation varies, but the results of past research conclude that the additional cost could cause problems for both low-volume and high-volume container ports (OECD 2003; Miller 2007; Bichou and Evans 2007; UNCTAD 2007; Dekker and Stevens 2007). In addition, stakeholders argued that procedural requirements act against operational and logistical efficiency . Both the direct functional redundancies and the indirect supply chain disruptions that arise out of the longer lead times could lead to less reliable demand and supply scenarios (Bichou 2011).
On the other hand, advocators of maritime security measures argue that the total cost and time of cargo inspection can be lower than conventional random physical inspections since ādetailed data recording, electronic reporting and other procedural requirementsā by the new security regulations make pre-screening and targeting suspicious containers possible (Bichou 2008, p. 30). A shipment through a CSI port will undergo zero inspections upon arrival except for an occasional random examination (Bichou 2011). Productivity of the entire supply chain can be improved because of better procedural arrangements. Moreover, security regime compliance is commercially rewarding. Much research focuses on positive impacts regarding logistical efficiency (Crutch 2006; GutiĆ©rrez et al. 2007; Thai 2007). Positive impacts include reduced transit time and improvements of lead-time predictability (Thai 2007; Bichou 2011), a reduction in stowaways (Timlen 2007), improved manpower utilisation (Thai 2007), better document processing and cargo handling (Thai 2007), and improved customer satisfaction and enhanced branding (GutiĆ©rrez et al. 2007; Thai 2007; Bichou 2011).
Nonetheless, to date, there is little data and empirical analysis to support either the positive or negative operational and financial impacts of maritime security regime compliance. There are some studies that examine the existence of these impacts, based on conceptual work, economic situation or anecdotal evidence (Babione et al. 2003; Lee and Whang 2005; Thai 2007; Rabadi et al. 2007; GutiƩrrez et al. 2007; Bennett and Chin 2008; Yang 2010; Urciuoli et al. 2010; Voss et al. 2009; Talas and Menachof 2009).
Dekker and Stevens (2007, p. 499) conducted an explorative empirical study of maritime security -related costs and financing in European Union (EU) states and in addition suggested three topics for further study on maritime security costs and financing and associated regulations: (i) āassessment of a harmonised (legal) system of b...