Equality in International Society

A Reappraisal

R. Hjorth

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9780230393158
• eBook ISBN: 9780230393165
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Business
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The author re-examines the concept of equality in international society, past and present. The view that equality necessarily flows from sovereignty is considered a contingent rather than a necessary contention. A new framework for equality in international society is sketched out emphasising the normative strength of the principle of equality.

1

Introduction

This book is about the concept of equality in international society. The starting point for this inquiry is the contention that while equality is an essential concept in modern political theory it is not so in international theory. In the political theory literature there are several accounts of equality, such as formal equality, moral equality, equality before the law, equal liberty, material equality, equal access, equality of opportunity, equality of outcome (Hoffman & Graham, 2006, 61–62); and in the history of political philosophy equality is often regarded not only as a central political idea but also as a vantage point for philosophical reflection. Accordingly, social contract theorists from Thomas Hobbes to John Rawls treat equality as a starting point for normative political theory. The challenge is to formulate a psychologically realistic and formally structured concept of equality among moral and rational persons from which to theorise principles of political organisation. Hobbes’s understanding of the equality of fear is the point of departure for the journey from a state of war to orderly political relations (Hobbes, 1909, 94 [60]). For Rawls, the much more complex equality of the ‘original position’ is conditional for ‘justice as fairness’, which is the foundation for the theory of justice (Rawls, 1972, 11). In addition to social contract theory there is the classical political ideal of equality expressed by Aristotle as the ‘government of men free and equal’ and formulated in opposition to the patriarchal notion of the household (Aristotle, 1944, 29 [1255b]). Accordingly, Michael Oakeshott claims that a civil association is a ‘practice’ of which equality among the participants is an essential element (Oakeshott, 1975a, 121). Hannah Arendt has commented about the relationship between freedom and equality in Aristotle, that ‘to be free meant to be free from the inequality present in rulership and to move in a sphere where neither rule nor being ruled existed’ (Arendt, 1958, 32). Thus, concepts of equality are central to the work of political theorists of different denominations.

However, in the international relations literature equality among states is generally understood in an entirely different way, and it is not given the same priority among political concepts. While it is true that equality of states is widely regarded to be one of the core principles of international law, it has not been given much attention by international relations theorists. Generally, equality of states is understood in terms of ‘sovereign equality’ as expressed in the UN Charter (Klein, 1974; Suganami, 1990; Watson, 1998; Kingsbury, 1999). In this sense equality is viewed as a legal principle (legal equality) and derived from sovereignty (sovereign equality). It is a formal principle stipulating a fictitious equality of states. Moreover, legal equality of states is often regarded as an element of sovereignty along with the principles of non-intervention and immunity. On this point Benedict Kingsbury claims that ‘the concept of sovereignty underpins a principle of sovereign equality that has attained almost an ontological position in the structure of the international legal system’ (Kingsbury, 1999, 66). Accordingly, Hedley Bull claims that equality of states is best understood as a ‘corollary principle’ to sovereignty whereas sovereignty is viewed as the ‘basic rule of coexistence’ (Bull, 1977, 36–37). Similarly, Robert Jackson views sovereignty as a ‘precondition of international society’ and that sovereignty is a ‘normative foundation’ for a society of states in which ‘equal sovereignty’ is ‘necessarily basic’ (Jackson, 2005, 75); and Hans Morgenthau argues that equality of states is ‘nothing but a synonym for sovereignty, pointing to a particular aspect of sovereignty’ (Morgenthau, 1967, 302). But the intimate connection between sovereignty and equality has also been questioned, for instance by Hans Kelsen. Kelsen argues that the rules governing equality of states are valid not because of sovereignty but because they are norms of positive international law (Kelsen, 1944, 207). Nevertheless, the general verdict seems to be that it is better to maintain a fictitious formal equality sustained by sovereignty than to rethink equality according to substantial criteria or moral ideas.

The closed pair of concepts, equality and sovereignty, contributes to the containment of a politico-legal sphere that is stable, functional and practical, and that is serviceable as a framework for addressing issues of world politics, even demands for greater material equality or recognition, without risking a breakdown of the entire order. It is simply a way to cope with the real inequalities of the world without disturbing the consensus around a formal legal conception. Accordingly, it is argued by Kingsbury ‘that a radical change in the international law concept of sovereignty will be hazardous without concomitant development of adequate alternative means to manage inequality’ (Kingsbury, 1999, 68). Judging from this it seems even more challenging to rethink equality in international society. Because while the discourse about the concept of equality and its place in international society is largely absent from the literature, the notion of sovereign equality is a conception on which a lot seems to hinge.

This book shows that there is much to learn about how equality has been understood in the past, and it explores ways to theorise equality for the present.

First, it is shown that the concept of equality is historically contingent to an extent that is seldom realised. The common view of equality as a corollary principle to sovereignty, the latter being the central principle, is not only contingent mainly in relation to the post-1946 consensus but also, it is argued, insufficient for the understanding of the ways in which equality and sovereignty possibly relate. Second, it is shown that equality is a normative foundation for international society inasmuch as sovereignty is, and the two concepts must not be connected the way they are usually conceived to be. Third, it is argued that equality has to be understood as a normative principle in its own right, reflecting what in different historical contexts has been viewed as important characteristics of a political community. Fourth, it is shown that equality has had a constitutive function for the understanding of what international society is. Whereas sovereignty is an expression of autonomy on the side of the bounded community, equality is the central principle for the design of an international society and a necessary condition for achieving international legitimacy. Fifth, it is suggested that shared notions of equality and the reasons for equality are vital to the understanding and force of the rules and values central for the legitimacy of an international society and its practices. All in all, the book presents a normative account of equality in international society, past and present, which challenges the widespread idea that sovereignty is necessarily the foundational principle for international society.

The aim of this inquiry is to review the history of equality in international society focusing on the justification for equal treatment, and to offer a new normative framework for rethinking equality in contemporary international society. The book looks for answers to the following questions:

(i)  What in the history of modern international society has justified principles of equal treatment among the members of international society?

(ii)  To what extent has reasoning about equality contributed to the demarcation between members and non-members of modern international society?

(iii)  In what sense is equality related to different concepts of international pluralism and justice?

(iv)  How can the concept of equality in international society take into account humanitarian concerns and the fostering of decent conditions within states?

Embarking upon this task involves dealing with some major issues in the literature on international theory. Reasoning about equality sets the limits for normative pluralism simply by determining the range of properties that political communities should be in possession of in order to be accepted and approved of as equals. An international society may be inclusive in the sense that a variety of different communities are accepted and granted the right of equal treatment, but can also be more restricted and exclusive. In the history of international society a restricted view has prevailed, and one or another reason has motivated the exclusion of communities and associations in relation to international society (Linklater, 1998; Mapel & Nardin, 1998; Jackson, 2000). This book focuses on the reasons for such inclusion and exclusion, past and present, in the sense that it focuses on the reasons for equality as a guiding principle. Furthermore, this inquiry is at least indirectly concerned with international justice. Entrusting states with sovereign equality, equal treatment, equality before the law, equal consideration of interests and equal rights, for example, is a matter that clearly involves considerations about justice (Rawls, 1999a; Tan, 2004; Altman & Wellman, 2009). Finally, the viewpoint that individual human rights should be treated alongside and on an equal footing with the rights of states in international society has gained wide recognition, and has had implications for humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect, protection of civilians in armed conflict and humanitarian action in war (Vincent, 1986; Beitz, 1999; Wheeler, 2000; Welsh, 2004).

Consequently, this is a book about equality in international society. It is not about equality without or outside international society. Hence, it is not about equality within the modern state and it is not a theory of cosmopolitan equality without the state. It is not about equality in world society or about the equal or unequal distribution of power and capabilities in the international system. The book is a response to the contention that equality in international society is under-theorised. It seems that equality is either viewed as a matter of concern for the bounded community and hence for political theory, or it is treated as a speculative principle on a higher level of abstraction and maybe therefore a concern for moral cosmopolitanism. This book shows that equality is not only those two things but that it is also an element of international society, both in theory and in practice. In addition, equality and inequality at different levels of political association is at least partly a consequence of international society and also something to be handled by international society. Ian Clark has captured a great deal of this in his book The Vulnerable in International Society (Clark, 2013). He shows that a focus on international society enlightens and is complementary to the political theory of the bounded community as well as to cosmopolitanism. This book advances the claim that international society is important as a level of analysis, not only for explaining or understanding international relations, but also for the formulation of normative international theory. It follows up on Clark’s term ‘the vulnerable’ by sketching out what is labelled a ‘realm of consideration’ outside the boundaries of the state as well as an international ‘sphere of deliberation’ that is more inclusive than the state system. In these ways the book touches on issues of global governance beyond the narrow confines of the traditional account of a society of states, as well as opening the door to a more inclusive concept of global ethics or world ethics.

Outline of the book

Chapter 2 reviews the main concepts, approaches and analytical devices that are utilised throughout the book and specifies more in detail the tasks to be pursued. The rest of the book is divided into two parts. Part I deals with various attempts to understand and justify equality in the past, particularly the justification of equal treatment among the members of international society. Chapter 3 reviews two naturalist theories of equality. It is shown that the concept of equality among political communities was developed by Thomas Aquinas and early modern scholastic lawyers such as Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez, and later developed by Hugo Grotius. This, it is argued, was the first consensus on equality in international society. The chapter also reviews notions of equality of states related to early modern natural right theory presenting a concept of the equal rights of states, as described by Eméric de Vattel and Samuel von Pufendorf. That particular conception is shown to have had lasting influence on the discourse of equality in international society. Moreover, it is shown that the two distinctly different notions of equality in international society that have emerged out of naturalist tradition are still important and have contributed to the formulation of a range of critical normative issues that remain central. Chapter 4 outlines a constructivist theory of equality originating from the work of Hobbes. A fairly close reading of Hobbes leads to the specification of three different concepts of equality. The central idea advanced here is that of equality among political communities as not primarily natural but constructed, and that there is a normative element involved in the construction of such principles. Hobbes’s views are analysed in relation to contextual notions of state and international society at the time of the Thirty Years War. The constructivist theory outlined by Hobbes is argued to have had a profound influence on the way in which equality and international society was conceived for a long time, as developed by the positivist theorists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In fact, it is claimed to remain a central element of the contemporary consensus around sovereign equality. Among the central aspects is the relationship between sovereignty and equality and the contention that equality among states derives from recognition. Chapter 5 deals with the hierarchical element of international society that has prevailed throughout its long history and that has been challenging to the application of the concept of equality in the context of international relations. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is the starting point here, since he sought to justify a concert of equal and sovereign states in the possession of dominions. Furthermore, ideas such as nationalism, civilisation and, at times, racism led to a hierarchy of communities. The chapter covers equality in international society during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries involving colonialism and the varieties of hegemony as well as the ordering of powers. It is shown how concepts of equality contributed to the reconciliation of different political realms in the hierarchical setting and how reasoning about equality in the end possibly contributed to a change. Chapter 6 is about the debate about equality of states that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries among scholars as well as among diplomats. The dominating theoretical paradigms that clashed at this time were, on the one hand, natural right theory, and on the other, analytical jurisprudence. The 1907 Hague Conference was one major diplomatic occasion that together with the League of Nations and the UN contributed to forming a new consensus on equality of states. This involved dealing with the idea of sovereign equality as well as the distinction between equality before the law and equal rights. Moreover, this chapter sheds light on discontents of the then new concept of sovereign equality. The criticism points towards a new concept of equality in international society. Hence, the chapter is an introduction to the themes that are dealt with in Part II.

The task of Part II is to sketch out an alternative normative conception of equality in international society. Chapter 7 shows that sovereignty and equality can be separated, and why this separation is preferable. The chapter starts with a reference to Hans Kelsen’s work, theorising a separation of equality from sovereignty. The claim for an analytical separation between law and power is sustained by reference to the English School. A new beginning to theorising equality in international society is sketched out on the basis of the ‘principle of equal consideration of interests’. This minimal principle of equality developed by Rawls and Peter Singer discriminates between the capacity to have an interest and equal treatment. The chapter develops the argument that capacity to have an interest is a first step towards deciding which units should enjoy equal treatment. Chapter 8 deals with two related aspects of equality within international society that are derived from the principle of equal consideration of interests and labelled the realm of consideration and the sphere of deliberation. Based on Rawls’s concept of equality of peoples and the work of Jürgen Habermas on discourse ethics, an equal treatment principle is constructed that portrays a conception of equality which is distinctly different from previous attempts to theorise equality in international relations. Following the path taken by Rawls means that questions pertaining to issues about international justice and the foundations for international pluralism need to be addressed. Finally, Chapter 9 deals with the possibilities of reconciling this new framework for equality with contemporary theories of international society. It is concluded that the new framework for equality does indeed bring some strain to bear on theories of international society but that it is not incomprehensible to apply it onto international society. While international society theory generally suffers from the assumption that equality and sovereignty are necessarily related in a particular way, contributing to an under-theorised concept of equality, the adoption of the concept of international society as a practical rather than as a purposive association makes possible the adoption of a new concept of equality. It is argued that such a conception of international society is capable of sustaining a normative framework for equality in international society that is not implicated in the construction of sovereign equality.

2

Concepts, Approaches, Devices

The title of this book involves two central concepts, equality and international society. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce these central concepts and to discuss the methodology used to analyse them. Moreover, the chapter elucidates the central principles underlying the inquiry to be carried out.

International society

Most readers are familiar with the concepts ‘international system’ and ‘state system’, understood as either empirical concepts designed to describe systemic international relations, past and present, or alternatively used as analytical concepts invented to analyse the regularities of international intercourse among political units, mainly states (Wight, 1977; Waltz, 1979; Buzan & Little, 2000). Some readers are perhaps less comfortable with the concept of ‘international society’ as portraying international relations not only in terms of norms and principles, rules and institutions, but also invoking such ideas as legitimacy and justice to be of central importance in the affairs of sovereign states and other actors on the world political scene (Bull, 1977; Nardin, 1983; Jackson, 2000; Clark, 2005). International society is indeed one of the contested concepts of the academic discipline International Relations (Mapel & Nardin, 1998; Bellamy, 2005). Realists tend to downplay the importance of international society for both empirical and theoretical reasons, preferring instead the notion of systems. Cosmopolitan thinkers are reluctant too, giving priority to individual persons as the only appropriate moral ends and possibly to a largely imaginary world society of peoples. Thus, as a theoretical category international society is in a sense something of an anomaly, and it is often viewed as secondary and instrumental, as an instrument of power (realism) or as a possible means of achieving global moral ends (cosmopolitanism). Nevertheless, it is argued below that there are good reasons to deal with international society in its own right.

The concept of international society is of course mainly associated with the English School approach to the study of international relations (Dunne, 1998; Navari, 2009). Bull looked for the origin of the concept in A.H.L. Heeren’s work on the European state system published in 1809 (Bull, 1977, 12–13). But the idea of an international society dates ba...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Concepts, Approaches, Devices
• Part I: History: A Backward Glance
• Part II: Theory: A Fresh Beginning
• Bibliography
• Index