The Discourse Trap and the US Military

From the War on Terror to the Surge

J. Michaels

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781349350858, 9780230372047
• eBook ISBN: 9780230372054
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book proposes the idea of a 'discourse trap' in which the discourses and associated terminology devised for political or military reasons can entrap policymakers by motivating or constraining their actions.

Chapter 1

Introduction

In Makers of Modern Strategy, John Shy and Thomas W. Collier make a brief mention of the importance of language in “revolutionary war,” claiming that words are weapons. They state, “Language is used to isolate and confuse enemies, rally and motivate friends, and enlist the support of wavering bystanders.” Rather than being merely a tool of war, they also argue that language can shape a war: “But the same language directs—or misdirects—military effort; the rhetoric of political conflict becomes the reality of strategic theory.”1 This observation is one of the primary ideas informing this study. It is my contention that the importance political and military systems attach to the creation, dissemination, and control of language in war extends beyond “revolutionary war” and instead is a key feature of conflict more generally. Once introduced into the political-military discourse, words can shape a battlefield and be battled over themselves. This terminological phenomenon has so far received scant academic attention and represents a gap in the existing war studies literature.

This book aims to bridge this gap by examining how the discourses devised for political or military reasons can have a much greater, and in many ways, different impact than was intended when the discourse was first introduced. It will argue that discourse plays an integral role in conflict, direct as well as indirect. Discourse can take on a life of its own, forcing political and military leaders and their associated institutions to fall victim to a “discourse trap.” This phenomenon is defined as the action that is motivated or constrained primarily by the discursive constructs ostensibly created to serve the needs of policy makers. In some instances, political and military leaders may feel compelled to adopt policies and practices in order to justify or abide by their discourse. In other instances, the discourse, perhaps out of sheer repetition, creates a “self-fulfilling prophecy”—defined as “a false definition of the situation which makes the originally false conception come true”—and can seriously impair strategic and operational performance.2 Nevertheless, it should be noted that, similar to Robert K. Merton’s observation that “unforeseen consequences should not be identified with consequences which are necessarily undesirable,” the effects of the “discourse trap” might be undesired but not always undesirable.3

This study will attempt to establish the existence of the discourse trap by providing a framework for identifying the phenomenon and its associated effects and demonstrating the ways in which it impacts the conduct and study of warfare and strategy. Specifically, the discourse trap will be examined through the prism of contemporary US military operations. The cases to be studied are “Global War on Terrorism,” “Shock and Awe,” “Characterizing the Irregular Adversary in Iraq,” and the “Surge.” This introduction chapter will begin by establishing a framework to clarify how the discourse trap functions, which will then allow subsequent investigation into how it impacted the US military. The relevance of discourse to war must also be firmly established, particularly as the literature on this subject is limited as a result of scholars’ reliance on a traditionally narrow approach to the function of language.

Discourse and War

Why is the study of discourse relevant to the study of war? After all, in the rich war studies literature, very little attention has been devoted to this subject. In comparison to the study of the nature and character of war, military history, military capabilities, military sociology, and so forth, the study of discourse remains marginalized. At best, the study of discourse in war has been subordinated to other areas of enquiry, such as those aforementioned, rather than existing independently. One of the main reasons for this is that scholars tend to view the function of language in war in very limited terms. For most scholars, language is relevant mainly for the study of propaganda and public affairs. Thus, in order to mobilize and sustain support for a war, or to undermine an adversary, political and military systems employ certain types of language. However, as will be highlighted, such a conception of the function of language in war is too limited. Instead, by expanding this conception, numerous avenues of enquiry can emerge.

The term discourse is one that has acquired many different meanings and is often used by a single author in multiple ways.4 To avoid confusion, for the purpose of this book, discourse simply refers to the language actors use to discuss certain issues and assign meanings to them. For instance, when referring to “counterterrorism discourse” in the context of the US Department of Defense (DoD), I am merely referring to the way defense officials talk and think about “counterterrorism” and what they mean by it. However, the very fact that defense officials are talking and thinking about an issue in terms of counterterrorism, as compared to “counterinsurgency,” also necessitates viewing discourse from the perspective of the terminology employed by the actors being studied. This then raises the problem of the relationship between discourse and terminology. My argument is that the two are mutually constitutive. Discourse gives terminology its meaning, or to put it slightly differently, terminology only acquires meaning within discourse. Simultaneously, terminology provides the essential building block for discourse, since it is impossible to discuss an issue without employing a term to describe it. By way of illustration, to take the example of counterterrorism again, the term itself can have many different definitions assigned to it and also be used and understood in both positive and negative ways depending on who uses it and when. In this specific case, and as will be shown in Chapter 2, the way defense officials employed the term counterterrorism in the 1980s was very different from the way it was used after 9/11.

Yet the way in which a term is employed in discourse is one thing; that the term is used in the first place is quite another. The simple fact that officials are employing the term counterterrorism, as opposed to counterinsurgency or some other term, can have the effect of guiding the discourse in a particular direction. It is here that the possibility of a “trap” emerges, in which a discourse is perceived to be misguided yet is difficult to escape from. In the context of defense policy, officials may perceive that the term counterterrorism is inappropriate to employ, preferring instead counterinsurgency, which they feel more accurately reflects reality and the use of which would lead to a different set of actions potentially resulting in more favorable outcomes. However, for either intended (e.g., political objections) or unintended (e.g., the effect of socialization or indoctrination) reasons, officials may find themselves constrained by the discourse of counterterrorism and find it difficult if not impossible for a discourse of counterinsurgency to emerge. Attempting to change a discourse is made particularly difficult when it is competing against a “dominant” discourse, or a discourse that can be considered “mainstream” or “acceptable,” especially if it has become institutionalized.

When considering how the discourse trap functions, it is important to note that any number of discourses could be the subject of investigation, and the field should not be limited to national security actors. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present study, the discourses under examination, and specifically the terminology that contributes to these discourses, will be limited to the field of contemporary US defense policy. The terminology employed in this field derives in large part from both political actors (these include civilian defense policy makers such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith) and bureaucratic actors (in this case, the uniformed military and career civil servants).

Whether intended or unintended, these actors are often the audience for the terminology they spawn, and the way in which they employ this language sets the terms of discourse in the defense policy-making process. This is particularly the case when the terminology is disseminated throughout the system and becomes institutionalized or becomes institutionalized and is then further disseminated. In the context of the Department of Defense (DoD), evidence of the institutionalization of terminology can be found in any number of areas, including official statements (congressional testimony, press statements), official documents (military plans, policy papers, doctrine, defense journals and magazines, military dictionaries, operational orders, intelligence reports), as part of the military education curriculum, and the titles or mission statements of bureaucratic offices. While the salience of a discourse can be observed when it becomes institutionalized, the consequence of its institutionalization confers legitimacy, which then results in the further entrenchment of the discourse. Over a period of time, a cumulative effect of discourse salience emerges. In other words, as officials repeat a discourse, it becomes legitimate, and potentially a dominant discourse. Once it attains dominance, criticism often becomes confined to operating within the discourse, rather than a critique of the discourse itself, since the legitimacy of the discourse has become internalized.5

Related to this is the problem of a marginalized discourse, in which certain topics are not seen to be of relevance and therefore are considered unworthy of significant attention. In bureaucratic terms, this often means a particular topic is not placed on policy makers’ agendas because it does not seem important or urgent. To take one example, Peter Neumann and M. L. R. Smith demonstrate how “discourse failure,” defined as “the constriction of the language and vocabulary used to identify, analyze, and accept that a significant threat existed,” inhibited the United States in the 1990s from countering al-Qaeda. The practical effects of “discourse failure” on the intelligence process were severalfold: intelligence collectors devoted resources to irrelevant areas, analysts emphasized issues that seemed to be of higher priority, and policy makers dismissed reports concerning the evolving threat.6

It can be extremely difficult for political and military systems to make a paradigm shift due in large part to the discourse traps they have created for themselves. Yet it can be reasonably argued that the discourse is merely the product of a political or bureaucratic interest, and therefore when the interest changes, the discourse will change as well. Unfortunately, this argument presumes such a shift in discourse is automatic and painless, excluding the possibility that it may be difficult and have unintended consequences. In many cases, the specific circumstances that allowed a discourse to become dominant, and possibly institutionalized, may no longer be valid. However, escaping from the old discursive constructs in order to deal with new circumstances can be very difficult. In some cases, this requires adopting new terminology or giving new meanings to old terms. In other cases, it may mean delegitimizing an old discourse to legitimize a new one. Whether the motivations for doing so are structural or not, this process occurs and can have unintended consequences that can impede the transition between discourses and constrain action.

Of the terms examined in this study, the majority derive from politicians and not only permeate the political discourse but also filter into the bureaucratic discourse. Conversely, in a minority of cases, the terminology used within the bureaucracy percolates into the political discourse. Rather than being a unified entity, in which there is a consensus on the terminology employed, the government includes countless factional interests, whether political or bureaucratic, that employ certain terminology or give it a particular meaning, which runs counter to the terminology used or meanings applied by other factional interests. In each of these instances, the government, rather than the population, is the audience. It is important to recognize that this occurs whether intended or not. For instance, a political discourse intended for popular consumption can unwittingly enter the bureaucratic discourse and have unintended consequences.

Political actors are aware that the terminology used inside the bureaucracy can have negative political consequences if it enters the mainstream discourse, including the discourse of politicians from an opposition party. Recognizing this danger, political actors may seek to impose controls on the terminology employed within the bureaucracy. Bureaucratic actors may also recognize the danger of employing political language and choose to impose their own discursive constraints. Regardless of whether the actor is political or bureaucratic, there is a general recognition that employing terminology that is deemed inappropriate, for one reason or another, can have negative consequences and that to avoid these necessitates placing controls on the terminology used.

The negative consequences that can arise from policy makers’ inappropriate use of terminology, specifically analogies and metaphors, have long been recognized in the literature on political psychology and decision making. A key finding of this literature that is of direct relevance here is that the language used by policy makers often constitutes their actions by providing a prism with which they view a particular situation as well as the means of dealing with it. As Ole Holsti notes, “even experts may well use … shortcuts to organize their attitudes. ‘Domino theory,’ ‘lessons of Munich,’ ‘lessons of Vietnam’ … are among the shortcuts that have served … to guide the thinking of more than a few policymakers and their expert advisers.”7 Yuen Foong Khong, who analyzed the analogies American policy makers brought to bear on the decision to intervene in Vietnam, provides one important illustration of cognitive psychology in wartime decision making. While recognizing the public advocacy aims of the analogies US policy makers used in order to justify their decisions to the citizenry, Khong’s analysis clearly shows that the same analogies were used to frame the private debate among senior policy makers and had a causal impact on the information processing that preceded decisions and the choice of policy options. Within the bureaucracy, analogies were more than rhetoric or convenient figures of speech; they were devices for consensus building and facilitating decisions, though in many instances they were the subjects of intense and heated debate.8 Similar to historical analogies, policy makers also rely on metaphors as a mental shortcut.9 Metaphors with which a security problem is understood can shape the perceived nature of the problem and its solutions, focusing on the aspects that are highlighted and marginalizing or ignoring those that are downplayed or hidden in the metaphors’ entailments.10

Assuming that bureaucratic politics is the underlying rationale for promoting one discourse at the expense of another, it is reasonable to expect policy makers to rely on mental shortcuts, such as employing an analogy, image, or metaphor that supports the policy they are trying to promote, and use others to denigrate policies they disagree with. In such cases there is a risk that the discourse being employed can constrain or misdirect action, especially as many of the terms employed are used in a subjective way for the purpose of marketing a policy. But even if cases exist where policy makers’ motives are purely altruistic and there is no apparent bias in the selection of analogy, metaphor, and so on, there will still be unintended consequences. For example, the analogy itself may be inappropriate to the situation for one reason or other. Moreover, one policy maker’s use of an analogy is likely to be very different from that of another policy maker, and so once introduced into the mainstream discourse, its original meaning is almost certain to be lost. In its relation to decision making, the discourse trap doesn’t discriminate with regards to policy makers’ motives. Whether altruistic in intention or not, policy makers will have to deal with the consequences of the discourses they employ.

The role of discourse in politics, especially the constraints discourse places on political systems broadly and politicians in particular, bears a remarkable similarity to the role played by “ideology.” In fact, the two concepts overlap in many respects, regardless of the definition of ideology that is chosen. Among the mainstream definitions of ideology, two stand out. The first relates to ideology in the formal political sense (conservative, liberal, Marxist-Leninist, etc.). The second relates to false consciousness, or as Slavoj Žižek has referred to it, the “unknown knowns”; “the things we don’t know that we know.”11 Similar to ideology, discourse can function at both the conscious and unconscious levels. Moreover, the language we employ can be impacted by our worldview, but it can also constitute our worldview. Attempting to discern the fine line between where ideology ends and discourse begins, or vice versa, is an impossible task and will not be attempted here. Suffice it to say, it is observable that the link between ideology and discourse exists, and therefore, when examining the constraints that discourse places on political action, one can draw from the literature on the role of ideological constraints.

This being the case, what are ideological constraints, and how do they influence behavior? In many political systems, to take a cynical view, the role of ideology may be limited to providing justification for policies that would otherwise be deemed unpopular or to being a tool for obtaining power, quietly discarded once power is obtained. However, political ideologies can often constrain policy makers, especially as they are usually a source of legitimacy. Politicians that come to power touting a political ideology probably do not want to be seen by their supporters as deviating from core principles. Consequently, politicians must expend great effort to ensure that the actions they take can be presented as being consistent with their officially stated principles. Likewise, politicians may feel they have no choice but to refrain from actions that might be pragmatically advantageous but are indefensible from an ideological perspective and therefore cannot be explained to their constituencies without a loss of credibility.

However, a problem arises here. As is well known, during the Cold War, for instance, the United States maintained relationships with “friendly” dictatorships and referred to these “allies” as “freedom-loving.” Were US policy makers who made these positive references liars, or were they genuinely stating convictions? Put another way, if policy makers think and talk in certain ways, does this influence their actions, or can they keep separate the public justification from the power politics? It would probably be somewhat naïve to suggest that policy makers can remain completely unaffected by their habits of thought and speech and therefore indulge in unrestrained Machiavellian politics. There may be exceptions to this rule, but on the whole it is fair to assume policy makers are indeed affected by the ideological prisms and language they are socialized in. As such, the effect of political ideology, similar to the effect of political discourse, is to impose a general framework for the perception of reality. This framework can have the effect of setting limits on policy options, as well as defining goals, priorities, and the methods for achieving them.

William Isaac Thomas’s theorem “If men define situations as real they are real i...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Chapter 1
• Chapter 2
• Chapter 3
• Chapter 4
• Chapter 5
• Chapter 6
• Notes
• Bibliography