The UK as a Medium Maritime Power in the 21st Century

Logistics for Influence

Christopher Martin

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781349668502, 9781137012364
• eBook ISBN: 9781137012371
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book argues that the UK, as a post-modern globalised state, will require means to have influence over events and opponents that threaten the UK's interests in the 21st century, and that its means is the Royal Navy. However, unlike other studies, this research emphasizes the role of logistics, especially afloat support logistics and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. In doing so, the author rejects the current theory underpinning military operations at distance, that distance degrades capability, and posits an alternative theory, that time is the key factor, for maritime-based forces. The UK must reengage with its maritime status and maintain a maritime-based capability to protect its interests in the new maritime century as a leader within the international community. The book will be of use to scholars and researchers interested in naval history and defence policy. 

© The Author(s) 2016

Christopher MartinThe UK as a Medium Maritime Power in the 21st Century10.1057/978-1-137-01237-1_1

Begin Abstract

1. The United Kingdom: A Post-modern Maritime and Globalised Nation

Christopher Martin¹

(1)

School of Law and Politics, University of Hull Law and Politics, Hull, UK

End Abstract

Before giving any consideration to what kind of navy the UK requires it is important to first consider just what kind of country the UK actually is. This is a complex question and there are various factors open to consideration: these can include, aspirational, political, military and economic factors as well as others.

A Post-modern State?

“Our vision is for a secure and prosperous United Kingdom, with global reach and influence.” ¹ Such ambition has not materialised from thin air; it has been a constant theme of the UK’s foreign and defence policy. The SDSR10 stated the UK, “has always had global responsibilities and global ambitions. We have a proud history of standing up for the values we believe in and we should have no less ambition for our country in the decades to come.” ² The UK Foreign Secretary stated at a speech at the Mansion House in March 2012: “Britain is a transatlantic nation and a European nation. But our role and interests go beyond that to be global.” ³ On 15 September 2015 in the House of Lords, Earl Howe, Minister of State for Defence stated: “The fact that we are one of four countries in the world building aircraft carriers underscores our commitment to remain engaged in the world. Taken alongside our upgraded capabilities across all domains, it gives us a full-spectrum capability to be proud of.” ⁴ On the face of it this all seems very well, but how can the UK maintain influence in a complex and rapidly changing world where the relative simplicity of the Cold War has given way to multipolarity, regionalism and the growth of new centres of power? In this new world order, according to the UK government: “The maintenance and expansion of geopolitical influence will be an important consideration for all powers, especially those with global or regional leadership aspirations.” ⁵ And the UK has such aspirations as the Foreign Secretary stated: “The National Security Council has reached a clear conclusion that Britain’s national interest requires us to reject any notion of the shrinkage of our influence.” ⁶ This is a claim and ambition reaffirmed by Earl Howe in 2015: “We [the government] are clear that there will be no reduction in Britain’s influence overseas.” ⁷

Influence in global politics comes from a variety of factors, most of which are fixed notwithstanding shifts in notions of power caused by trends in globalisation. Power is important because “in international politics, having power is having the ability to influence another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise.” ⁸ This definition provides the widest understanding of power as it reflects the reality that power encompasses a number of factors. In general it is sufficient to note that in regard to concepts of power, Realist conceptions dominate but there is certainly no proposal to enter into the long-standing debate as to what constitutes power here. ⁹ As regards economy, the World Bank regards the UK as a “High Income OECD country”. ¹⁰ UK’s GDP amounted to $2.678 trillion dollars in 2013 and this placed the UK in sixth place globally. The UK is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a leading member of the EU, at least for the present, and other vitally important international organisations such as the Commonwealth. Militarily the UK is a major player by normal (i.e. non-US) standards. The UK is a leading member of NATO, the world’s most powerful and long-standing military alliance, and is one of only seven declared nuclear-armed states. In 2014 it spent $61.8 billion on defence, which placed it fifth in the world in terms of largest defence spending. ¹¹ Although it is almost certain that from 2016 the proportion of UK GDP dedicated to defence will fall below the 2 % NATO minimum, whatever sleight-of-hand perpetrated by government statisticians, the UK is one of a handful of European members of NATO to have met this standard consistently to date. There is no doubt that comparatively the UK retains many of the ‘hard’ (Realist) determinants of power but it also has considerable ‘soft power’ features. ¹² According to the Institute for Government, the UK ranks very highly in the soft power index (6.78) second only to the USA (7.41). ¹³ All these attributes of the UK have important implications for the way the UK goes about its business in international politics. As a prominent member of so many vital political, economic and military organisations the UK has responsibilities to those organisations and their member-states. It is also the case that other states look to the UK for leadership in that the UK is expected to act in a particular way: power and the ability to exercise power demands responsibility. ¹⁴ Similarly, great wealth brings with it responsibility and self-interest in maintaining the global system; if the UK wants to sit at the top of the table it has to pay for the privilege, financially and morally.

Since 2001 (Afghanistan) and especially 2003 (Iraq) UK governments have been particularly wary of overseas commitments. There has been an assumption, or a hope in some circles, that the UK public have had enough of overseas adventures and that becoming a ‘normal’ European country such as Ireland or Norway is the way for the UK to act. However, if the UK government thinks it lacks the moral legitimacy that public support endows for playing a major role in world affairs it could not be more wrong. A report published by Chatham House in 2015 on UK public opinion stated that 63 % think the UK should aspire to be a ‘great power’; 42 % think the UK should pursue its interest at all times even if this is done unethically; 69 % think the UK has a responsibility to maintain international security and 58 % think the UK should provide the UN with peacekeeping troops (at which the UK has a poor record). ¹⁵ In conclusion the report stated: “Among the public and opinion-formers, a higher number than ever say they want an ambitious UK that seeks to remain a great power. Acceptance of what has been called the ‘Thesis of Decline’ is at its lowest level since the survey began. Such a view may not result in a sober reflection on Britain’s dwindling resources and reduced capabilities, but it remains a testament to national ambition.” ¹⁶ If there is a mismatch between the UK’s capabilities and resources and public ambition for the UK, then it is a result of successive governments’ parsimony, usually on the basis that ‘there are no votes in defence’. The present spend on UK defence expressed as a proportion of GDP is lower now than at any time since the Second World War and should it fall below the NATO 2 % target would send friends and enemies costly political signals. This has attracted considerable criticism not the least from the USA. As Vice-Admiral Jeremy Blackham explains, “there isn’t a natural law that says that the defence budget has got to be at a certain level…but whatever it is it’s the smallest proportion it has been for many, many, many decades…we have chosen deliberately to spend a much smaller proportion of our national wealth than we ever have in the past; much less than we can afford.” ¹⁷ And it is the fact that it is ‘much less than we can afford’ that is the critical issue. The defence assumptions that underpin the ambition of the UK as espoused by the government must be matched by financial commitment. Unfortunately, in recent years defence has increasingly become a discretionary spend to the extent that many of the defence assumptions under plans under SDSR10 were potentially compromised. In that regard it is worth quoting Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, former Chief of the Defence Staff, who stated: “Ideas that do not have the adequate resource put into them are not a strategy; they are a fantasy.” ¹⁸

When the ‘thesis of decline’ is reconsidered and the basis of the UK’s current power base is assessed, then, “compared to all other members of today’s international society it is remarkable just how powerful the country remains.” ¹⁹ If there is one aspect that must change however, it is the persistent conceptualisation of the UK as a post-imperial power as this perpetuates the notion of ‘decline’. Many labels are applied to describe the UK today: ‘post-imperial’, ‘great power’, ‘major power’, ‘medium power’ and ‘declining power’. Often, these labels are applied within the context of what the UK was 70 years ago. The UK today is a very different country from the one that began unravelling its imperial grandeur in 1947. In the first place, the UK shares a space in international politics with other Western states under the umbrella of what we can call ‘post-modern’. ²⁰ Essentially there are three types of states in the modern world: post-modern, modern and agrarian. Agrarian states are mainly, though not exclusively, located in sub-Saha...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontmatter
• 1. The United Kingdom: A Post-modern Maritime and Globalised Nation
• 2. The Attributes and Roles of Naval Forces
• 3. The Fleet
• 4. Strategy: The Ability to Control Events
• 5. Logistics: The Arbiter of Opportunity
• 6. The Myth of the Loss of Strength Gradient
• 7. Naval Comparisons
• 8. Conclusion
• Backmatter