EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations

More than the Sum of its Parts?

Kenneth A. Loparo, Louise Van Schaik

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781137012548
• eBook ISBN: 9781137012555
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Analysing the relationship between EU unity and effectiveness in multilateral negotiations on food standards, climate change and health, this book develops a new model that simplifies earlier work on 'actorness' as well as combining insights from institutionalist, intergovernmentalist and constructivist theories.

1

Introduction

Can the European Union (EU) be more than the sum of its parts in international negotiations? The EU Member States are often criticised for being unable to reach common positions on important foreign policy issues, such as the war in Iraq in 2003 or the independence declaration of Kosovo in 2008. However, for many external policies, particularly those that are not security related, operating on the basis of a common EU approach has become a standard feature.

Many have questioned the effectiveness of the EU in international negotiations, complaining about the ‘cacophony’ of EU voices and the segmented and navel-gazing character of EU coordination. The criticism of the fragmented way in which the EU conducts its external relations and foreign policy was a key issue in the debate on EU reform that culminated in the Lisbon Treaty. This Treaty reorganised procedures for EU decision-making and external representation and created new foreign policy actors: the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also serves as Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), and the European External Action Service (EEAS). However, they do not play a leading role in all issues of external relations (e.g. trade), and as regards many of them their role is still evolving.

The way the EU formulates and decides upon common positions and organises its external representation is indeed likely to influence how successfully it operates in international negotiations. In this respect, it is interesting to realise that there is (still) no such thing as a single method of European foreign policy-making. There is not only a difference between Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Union’s external policies – that is, those that can be found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (e.g. trade, environment) – but also within the latter category, diversity persists with regard to decision-making on the EU’s negotiating mandate and its external representation. This diversity is first and foremost related to the degree of legislative competence which the EU Member States have transferred to the EU. The higher the degree of EU competence, the more the EU is legally obliged to act on the basis of a common position, which is represented by a supranational European representative.

A number of cases before the European Court of Justice illustrate that it has often been disputed whether the thrust of the competence lies with the EU or with the Member States (cf. Eeckhout, 2004; Hoffmeister, 2007). This reflects the sensitivity of transferring competence in external representation in international affairs to the EU. Moreover, it hints at reasons why EU Member States may be unwilling to operate as a unified bloc in international negotiations, such as (expected) difficulties in aligning preferences of EU Member States and the European Commission or a lack of trust in the negotiating abilities and/or intentions of the EU’s lead negotiator.

This book assesses how the extent to which the EU is united in conducting its external affairs affects its effectiveness in terms of reaching its stated goals in international negotiations. It investigates various dimensions of EU unity, looking not only at EU competence but also at preference homogeneity of EU Member States and the extent to which their representatives in the negotiations are socialised into operating through the EU. These dimensions are assumed to influence the degree of EU unity, but it is not clear in which direction they influence it, how they are related among each other or to EU effectiveness. A key contribution of this book is that it establishes a model of how these variables are related on the basis of empirical research in three case studies and a review of other literature on the EU’s influence or performance in international affairs.

The relationship between the key concepts is analysed in the following three cases: the international negotiations on hormonegrowth promoters as conducted in the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC or Codex), the negotiations on emission reductions in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the negotiations on intellectual property rights and access to health in the World Health Organization (WHO). These cases stretch across different issue areas for which the degree of EU competence varies as well.

1.1 EU unity and effectiveness: why would EU Member States join forces internationally?

When reviewing the literature, there is no straightforward answer to how EU unity relates to the EU’s effectiveness in international negotiations, and what factors contribute to EU unity (see also Niemann and Bretherton, forthcoming; Smith, 2006; Thomas, 2012). There is a large body of literature available, focusing on the international actorness of the EU (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998; Ginsberg, 1999, 2001; Peterson and Smith, 2003; Young, 2003; Smith, 2004; Bretheron and Vogler, 2006; Groenleer and Van Schaik, 2007), its international bargaining power (Meunier, 2000; Rhinard and Kaeding, 2006; Gstöhl, 2009), its structural power (Keukeleire and MacNaughton, 2008), international outcomes (Jupille, 1999) and, more generally, the relationship between the EU’s institutional set-up and its international performance (e.g. Elgström and Strömvik, 2005; Smith, 2008; Jørgensen, 2009; Jørgensen et al., 2011; Jørgensen and Laatikainen, 2012).

Although the focus of the majority of the literature is not on effectiveness as such, it usually somehow assesses implicitly the effectiveness or at least the performance of the EU in international negotiations. The risk of not focusing on effectiveness as such is that features of EU unity may already be portrayed as equalling the EU to being effective in reaching its goals in negotiations, whereas in reality those features may only make it more likely for the EU to negotiate effectively, and even this may not always be the case.

In these studies, a variety of reasons are mentioned to explain EU effectiveness in international affairs. A majority of authors argue that a coherent approach in which EU actors firmly back a single position would be a precondition for maximising influence in negotiations (e.g. Ginsberg, 1999; Gauttier, 2004; Nuttall, 2005; Laatikainen and Smith, 2006; Santopinto, 2007; Jørgensen, 2009; Thomas, 2012). According to Cameron (2007: 207), ‘When the Union speaks with one voice in bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations it is a powerful voice representing in excess of 450 million citizens with a combined GDP roughly similar to that of the US. The Union could be as effective in other areas if it wanted to, simply by providing for a single representation.’

However, negative aspects of the EU operating on the basis of a coordinated position are referred to as well (e.g. Smith, 2006; Smith, 2010). Strongly centralised models of EU coordination, in which the EU mandate can be decided upon by qualified majority voting and the Commission is the lead negotiator, have at times not been effective (Gstöhl, 2009). Other studies indicate that less compelling models of EU coordination, in which EU Member States decide upon common positions by consensus and are represented by the EU Presidency, have not impeded the EU from operating in a united and coherent way (Vogler, 2005; Rhinard and Kaeding, 2006; Groenleer and Van Schaik, 2007). According to Thomas (2012), coherence may be necessary for the EU to exert influence abroad, but is not sufficient. He seeks the reason for this in the negotiating environment where many others do not share the EU’s collective policy preferences and are ready to deploy vast resources in pursuit of their goals. In other words, the relationship between how the EU organises itself and how effective it is in negotiations is ambiguous and still underexplored.

In Chapter 3, I discuss why I have chosen to focus on analysing effectiveness and its relationship to EU unity, and how this is different from other approaches. I consider it sufficient to mention here that the literature tends to focus on how the degree of formal EU competence is related to the EU’s performance in international negotiations. According to this view, having exclusive competence would be beneficial for the EU’s effectiveness in international affairs. This ‘institutionalist’ viewpoint is shared by many politicians and opinion shapers who discuss EU foreign policy and argue in favour of more unity in EU external relations. They clearly favour competence expansion and urge the EU Member States to speak with a single voice more often (see below).

I contest the validity of this thesis, since it does not explain research on cases where shared competence did not impede the EU from operating successfully in international negotiations and it assumes that exclusive competence automatically leads to more effectiveness in international negotiations. Studies illustrate that it is unclear whether EU competence, or other factors, influences EU unity in external representation. Two factors that can be derived from the dominant theories of intergovernmentalism and constructivism can be distilled from it. From an ‘intergovernmentalist’ perspective, preference homogeneity between EU actors would be the key factor explaining whether EU unity can emerge and result in the EU being more than the sum of its Member States. A ‘constructivist’ perspective adds processes of EU socialisation among representatives of EU Member States as an explanatory factor for EU unity.

Consider, for instance, what may happen if Member States only cooperate because it is obligatory in legal terms but do not truly support the common position. An example is an open letter from former French President Sarkozy to Commission President Barroso in which he asks the Commission to take a cautious stance in the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations.¹ In these negotiations, EU Member States are no longer allowed to defend their own cause but have to decide upon a common European mandate. If needed, qualified majority voting can be used to adopt this mandate. The Commission is in charge of the actual negotiations, which allegedly gives it some room to stretch the mandate. By writing an open letter, the French president clearly demonstrated that he was not convinced that the Commission would look after the French interests. This undermined the EU’s credibility and, for sure, was not a demonstration of EU unity to the outside world.

Hence, more systematic and empirical research on the relationship between EU unity (and its constituting factors) and effectiveness could extend, deepen and verify current insights in the literature. It could provide more conclusive empirical information to underpin the political debate on (institutional) reform of external relations. It could shed more light on whether and how institutionalist, intergovernmentalist and constructivist perspectives can be used to explain the EU’s external conduct and its unity and effectiveness in particular.

The objective of this book is therefore twofold. First of all, it aims to contribute to the debate on EU institutional reform, in which strengthening the EU’s position in the world has been a key topic. It does so by systematically collecting and comparing empirical findings on whether more EU unity in external policy-making, as portrayed in the case studies, leads to more negotiating effectiveness. Second, and related, it aims to contribute to the academic debate on how EU unity in external representation influences the EU’s effectiveness in the negotiations studied, and what factors contribute to EU unity. The theoretical question is whether an institutionalist, intergovernmental or constructivist perspective provides most explanatory power for understanding the EU’s ability to unite internationally, and whether this in turn is transformed into international impact. Here the operational question is in what way EU competence, preferences and socialisation influence EU unity and effectiveness, and how they relate to each other. Are formal institutions (i.e. competence) or informal norms (socialisation) dominant in shaping preferences of EU Member States, or are initial preferences the starting point and influencing how the competence division is seen and whether socialisation processes can emerge. Are there any unexpected relationships? In this respect, this study is exploratory and is based on the case study findings. In these cases the negotiating context is taken into account to see how this influences the key concepts analysed and their relationships.

1.2 Research question and concepts

The main research question of this study is:

How does the degree of unity in the external representation of the Union’s external policies relate to the effectiveness of the EU in terms of reaching stated goals in international negotiations?

Sub-questions are:

– Does more unity in external representation lead to more effectiveness?

– To what extent is the degree of unity in external representation related to the legal assignment of competences?

– To what extent is the degree of unity in external representation related to preference homogeneity among EU actors?

– To what extent is the degree of unity in external representation related to Member States’ representatives involved in negotiations considering themselves first and foremost as European, instead of national, actors?

EU unity in external representation refers to the ability of the EU to represent itself as a unitary actor, acting upon a collectively decided position which is formally and informally supported by the EU Member States and the European Commission.² In the literature and policy documents this phenomenon is also referred to as EU international actorness (e.g. Jupille and Caporaso, 1998; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Groenleer and Van Schaik, 2007) or coherence (e.g. Cameron, 2007: 35; Thomas, 2012). The concept of EU actorness is somewhat broader than EU unity in external representation as it also includes external recognition and other factors which – from within – the EU cannot directly influence. It is somewhat similar to the EU displaying ‘statehood’. The concept of coherence or cohesion is not only used to analyse preference homogeneity, but is also used to describe consistency between EU policies and between CFSP and other external policies (Nuttall, 2005) and can therefore be confusing in comparison to ‘EU unity in external representation’.

The degree of EU unity can be considered a proxy for the degree of European integration that has emerged in a specific area of EU external relations. It illustrates the extent to which the EU acts in a supranational fashion, EU Member States truly stick together, or the EU even displays characteristics of statehood within the international system. This makes the issue so sensitive, since it is related to a transfer of power from the national to the European level raising important questions regarding the efficiency and legitimacy of EU governance in these fields. It also prompts the question of what explains the emergence of European integration, or an ever-closer cooperation of states.

In this book the degree of unity in external representation is assumed to be influenced by the degree of EU competence, the preference homogeneity among EU Member States and the EU socialisation of their representatives. These factors are expected to be complementary and interrelated. The aim is to increase understanding of how they relate to and constitute EU unity. Direct relationships between these factors and EU effectiveness are explored as well. The factors are based on leading theories used to explain European integration and international relations: institutionalism, intergovernmentalism and constructivism. Another dominant theory, neofunctionalism, is not used explicitly, but insights of it are taken into account in the EU competence factor, since external competence to act on a matter is related to internal competence, and hence the likelihood of policies being in place in the relevant policy area.

The degree of EU competence (exclusive, shared, complementary) thus defines the legal competence of the EU to conduct policies in any given policy area. It provides an institutionalist explanation for EU unity, since it strongly influences the rules of the game that have to be adhered to, such as, for instance, regarding the position of the European Commission in external representation. Depending on the extent of competence, the European Commission, as representative of the EU, is the sole EU negotiator or has to share its role with the EU Member States – in which case the external representation is usually conducted by the chair of the relevant Council body that is involved. The degree of Union competence also affects other issues such as whether qualified majority voting is allowed for deciding upon international negotiating positions (see Chapter 4). The most centralised exclusive competence model is sometimes also referred to as the ‘Community method for EU external relations’ (e.g. Eeckhout, 2004). Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the term ‘European Community’ no longer exists and has been replaced by ‘European Union’, but it is not yet clear whether the term ‘Community method’ will also be replaced by ‘Union method’. Because of the term ‘Community’ bein...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• List of Acronyms
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Comparing Three Sets of Multilateral Negotiations
• 3. The EU’s Effectiveness in International Negotiations
• 4. EU Competence: A Precondition for EU Unity?
• 5. EU Preferences and Socialisation: The Willingness of EU Member States to Unite in International Negotiations
• 6. The EU Negotiating Food Safety Standards
• 7. The EU Negotiating Climate Change
• 8. The EU: A Healthy Negotiator?
• 9. A Comparative Analysis
• 10. Conclusions and Relevance for Institutional Reform Debate
• Annex – Questionnaire That Was Used for the (Semi-Structured) Interviews
• Notes
• References
• Index