Nationalism and Multiple Modernities

Europe and Beyond

Atsuko Ichijo

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781349435791, 9781137008749
• eBook ISBN: 9781137008756
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Social Sciences

This book is the first to apply the theory of multiple modernities to the study of nationalism, examining the modernity of nationalism through three major case-studies: Anglo-British, Finnish and Japanese.

1

The Modernity of Nationalism

In proposing the idea of multiple modernities, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (2000) declared that modernisation theories that were prevalent at the end of the twentieth century and, indeed, classical theories of modernisation proposed by Marx, Durkheim and ‘even’ Weber had not been successful in explaining the phenomenon of modernisation. Eisenstadt further articulated the focus of his opposition to these received theories as their implicit or explicit assumption of convergence of various societies to the standard set by European experiences. In order to examine the modernity of nationalism from an unconventional stance – the theory of multiple modernities – the first necessary step is to examine the modernity of nationalism according to ‘conventional’ modernisation theories. In order to take on this task, in turn, it is logical to outline these ‘conventional’ and classical theories first.

The outline of ‘conventional’ modernisation theories

Specialised literature on multiple modernities does not usually give a detailed account of what the ‘conventional’ modernisation theories are; it seems it is taken for granted that the readers share the background knowledge. Not all students of nationalism are well versed in social theory, however, and a brief outline of these conventional theories should be helpful in grasping the modernity of nationalism as articulated by a number of scholars.

Theories of modernisation which are problematised in the theory of multiple modernities do not constitute a systematic collection of thought; rather, they are an assembly of various attempts made since the nineteenth century to explain what is deemed to be the single most important social change, the arrival of modern society. It is fair to say that they all intellectually draw from the legacy of the Enlightenment in that these are attempts to explain social changes without attributing them to divine forces but relating them instead to human endeavours. In this regard, ‘conventional’ modernisation theories also entail an idea of progress in that society does not have to be perceived as an unchangeable given but as a site where changes can be induced by human activities. This affirmation of possibilities of human agency is claimed to have emerged first in Europe, which has provided the context in which these theories are often seen as uncritically Eurocentric.

Given this genealogy, one of the major contingents in the group of ‘conventional’ modernisation theories is classical sociology, which emerged as a scientific study of human relations and behaviour in the nineteenth century (Swingewood 1984). Many early sociologists – notwithstanding their self-awareness of being a sociologist – adopted evolutionary views of social change, perhaps reflecting the far-reaching impact of Charles Darwin’s work. In these views, society progresses to higher and higher stages and the Western European society that emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution was often placed at the top of the hierarchy. For instance, Auguste Comte (1798–1857), one of the widely acknowledged founding fathers of sociology, proposed a general law of three stages through which human thought would evolve: theological, metaphysical and positive. In the first, the theological stage, the human mind would be satisfied with supranatural explanations; in the second stage, human beings would seek to justify universal rights by referencing them to something higher than human authorities but not to the divine; in the third stage, science would become the dominant mode of thought. For Comte, it was the society in the third stage with the scientific outlook that was the highest, most developed type of human organisation. Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), long fallen out of fashion, likened society to a living organism, and proposed that it would evolve just like a living creature by adapting to the changes around it in order to survive. In his view, society would naturally evolve from military society, which is undifferentiated and homogeneous, to industrial (= modern) society, which is marked by a high degree of differentiation and heterogeneity. Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), implicated in Eisenstadt’s remark, proposed that society evolves from one based on mechanical solidarity – society held together by the likeness of its members – to one on organic solidarity – society held together by enhanced interdependence because of a high degree of differentiation. The drivers of the shift from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity are thought to be population growth, development of more complex social interactions and increased division of labour. Following this line of thought, in the twentieth century, Talcott Parsons (1966) predicted that societies would have little choice but to follow a unilinear path from the primitive to the modern. One of the major implications of these social evolutionary theories is their claim to universality; each scheme is supposed to be applicable to any society around the world. Combined with the placement of Western European society at the pinnacle of the evolutionary process, classical sociology has therefore helped shape theories of modernisation which predict global convergence to the West European experience.

It is customary in sociology to label social evolutionary theorists such as Comte, Spencer and Durkheim as consensus theorists because in their views society changes in order to attain equilibrium, and contrast them to conflict theorists such as Karl Marx. While the driver of social change in Marx’s historical materialism – contradiction and conflict – is radically different from those in social evolutionary theories, it nonetheless draws from the same intellectual sources and shares many characteristics as a theory of modernisation with theories put forward by Spencer and others. Since historical materialism is based on the fundamental fact that in order to survive human beings have to engage with production and reproduction, one of this theory’s distinguishing features is its scientific nature, and being scientific implies universal applicability. Shlomo Avineri (1969) argued that Marx’s theory of non-European societies more often than not had been overlooked or ignored in favour of highlighting the universality of his theory of history and that Marx was in fact more sensitive to the context. However, as Stiputa Kaviraj (2005) has pointed out, in the case of Indian historians the hold of Marxist orthodoxy on intellectuals was overwhelming, so much so that Indian historians writing in the 1950s were compelled to produce a historical narrative of India that conformed to Marx’s general scheme by putting forward claims that are now discarded including insistence on the existence of ‘feudal’ society before the arrival of British colonialism in India.

Both evolutionary theories and Marxist theories of modernisation claimed to be universally applicable and presented modernisation as a homogenising process by which various societies in the world would converge to the European model. These ideas were further developed by social scientists in the postwar West. Based on bird’s-eye observations of newly independent states in the postwar period, Edward Shils (1960) argued that aspiration towards modernity was a common feature seen in many new states, and surmised that to be modern was to be Western, which would then mean being dynamic, democratic, scientific, economically advanced and sovereign, among other things. Shils drew attention to tension between the ‘modern’ and the ‘traditional’ as the major feature of the modernisation processes the newly independent states were embarking on. The interest in the newly independent states stimulated deliberation on the relationship between modernisation and development, and from this the now taken for granted formula that the more economically developed a society is the more democratic it is. One of the most well-known contributors to this idea is Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) who investigated the link between the level of development and the stability of democracy in a number of countries. Lipset pointed out a number of factors working together – capitalist industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth, the level of education plus ethos that emphasises individual responsibility, the establishment of secular political culture – in the process of modernisation and confirmed the link between the growth of the middle class and stable democracy.

Kaviraj (2005) describes these received modernisation theories as the theory of symmetry. The symmetrical view of modernity is a functional one in which various processes such as capitalist industrialisation, the growth of importance of the state in social order, urbanisation, enhanced individualist tendency, secularisation in politics, restructuring of family life and intimacy, the rise of science and so on are functionally interdependent on one another, thus inducing symmetrical development. This perspective lends itself well to proposing a ‘totalising’ view of social change, a tendency that is shared by functionalists and Marxists. Another feature of the symmetrical theory of modernisation is its claim of universality with which it predicts that all human societies will follow the same route to modernity.

This brief review of the vast body of literature on modernity and modernisation does not claim to do justice to many of the theories included here. As mentioned earlier, theories grouped together as ‘conventional’ theories of modernisation do not constitute a monolithic and homogeneous group. Closer examination would surely identify subtle and not-too-subtle variations in interpretations and predictions. However, the purpose here is to outline what the theorists of multiple modernities take issue with in the ‘conventional’ or ‘established’ theories of modernity and modernisation. They are critiqued by multiple modernities theorists for assuming that there is a single modernity, that is, the Western one which occupies the highest level of evolution of human society, and to which the rest of the world should converge. Multiple modernities theorists find implicit Eurocentrism in the conventional theories, which they fear will lead to misinterpretation of different societies’ experiences.

The modernity of nationalism

Having outlined the basic features of ‘conventional’ or ‘established’ theories of modernisation, we are now ready to examine the modernity of nationalism as articulated in existing theories of nationalism to ascertain to what degree nationalism’s modernity is defined by ‘conventional’ theories of modernisation.

Industrialisation and the evolutionalist view of modernisation

Many scholars attest that Ernest Gellner’s contribution to theories of nationalism is second to none (see, for instance, Hall 1998 and Malešević and Haugaard 2007). Among a large number of Gellner’s insights on nationalism, what is most relevant to this volume is his evaluation that both nationalism and the nation are modern. In a complete refutation of the primordialist position that holds nations and nationalism as being ‘natural’, part of human nature and as something ‘out there’, Gellner considers that nations are contingent and engendered by nationalism and ‘not the other way round’ (Gellner 1983: 55). Nationalism, in turn, is ‘a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (ibid.: 1) and is essentially society’s response to the shift to industrial society.

Gellner’s view of society is materialist in the sense that it is the mode of production that ultimately conditions the nature of society; modern society is like this because of industrialisation and premodern society was like that because of its agrarian-focused production (Gellner 1983). In his view, it is the shift from agrarian to industrial production that necessitates nationalism. Industrial society is premised on perpetual growth, and perpetual growth requires complex and ever-changing division of labour. This in turn requires a new kind of mobility of the labour force, which brings a kind of egalitarianism that did not exist in premodern, agrarian society. Because of this mobility, ‘For the first time in human history, explicit and reasonably precise communication becomes generally, pervasively used and important’ (ibid.: 33). This requires universal literacy and homogenisation of language and culture which can only be achieved by state-sponsored education. Because of this, ‘the eternal manifestation of a deep adjustment in the relationship between polity and culture’ (ibid.: 35), that is, the rise of nationalism as a principle that says ‘the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (ibid.: 1) becomes unavoidable.

The modernity of nationalism in Gellner’s theory has been discussed widely and among many attempts, Charles Taylor’s and Nikos Mouzelis’s examinations are most relevant to this chapter because both examine the type of modernity Gellner bases his theory of nationalism on (Taylor 1998; Mouzelis 2007). Taylor’s is categorical in assessing Geller’s theory as a functional one that focuses on the relationship between modern societies as economies and the modern state. Mouzelis suggests that substituting Gellner’s concept of industria for modernity, as conceived in ‘received’ theories of modernisation, would better clarify the link between modernity and nationalism. Both therefore point to the fact that Gellner’s theory is developed within the framework of what Kaviraj (2005) describes as symmetrical theories of modernity.

The modernity of nationalism according to Gellner is, first and foremost, found in his general evolutionary framework which reflects classical sociology and functionalism of the postwar period, and also in the fundamental importance placed on industrialisation and the focus on the role of the state in facilitating modern economy.

The Marxist tradition

As pointed out earlier, Marxism is an established part of the modernisation paradigm which remains influential in thinking about modernity. On the other hand, Marxist scholars have been criticised for not taking nationalism seriously, most famously by Tom Nairn, who maintains that the ‘theory of nationalism represents Marxism’s great historical failure’ (Nairn 1977: 329). Nonetheless, as Wade Matthews (2008) suggests in relation to Eric Hobsbawm, there have been various contributions to theorisation of nationalism by scholars with Marxist backgrounds, endeavours which are nonetheless pursued in the received framework of modernisation.

The Communist Manifesto famously predicted that the global spread of capitalism would strip any national particularities from workers. Marxism’s analysis of capitalism as a total, globalising and therefore homogenising force has probably distracted its students from addressing nationalism, but when they do, Marxism’s insistence on scientific truthfulness together with the genesis of historical materialism renders their analysis of nationalism vulnerable to the charge of Eurocentricity, as pointed out by Kaviraj (2005).

Matthews (2008) argues that the modernity of nationalism articulated in Eric Hobsbawm’s work is clearly shaped by the Marxist understanding of history. As per Gellner, Hobsbawm takes the view that nations are engendered by nationalism. He emphasises that nations are functions of a modern territorial state and places nationalism ‘in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 10) that corresponds to the transition to capitalist society. Nationalism, which is fundamentally irrational according to Hobsbawm, is a by-product of the emergence of bourgeois society as envisaged in historical materialism and therefore will run its course, if it has not done so yet, as an explanatory framework of what is happening around us.

Hobsbawm’s assessment of nationalism shares much with Gellner’s: both regard nationalism as contingent; both take a functional view of nationalism in that nationalism has emerged to fulfil certain societal needs because of industrialisation or transition capitalist society. The modernity of nationalism is therefore identified in a similar manner by both Gellner and Hobsbawm. One notable difference between Gellner and Hobsbawm is that while Gellner appears to take an agnostic position in relation to the normative question of nationalism, Hobsbawm has a clear normative stance. Hobsbawm contends that historians cannot be committed to nationalism because nationalism is fundamentally irrational, which goes against the scientific and rationalist spirit with which historians should pursue their profession (ibid.: 12–13).

Other scholars of the Marxist tradition have proposed a less rigid stance towards the role of nationalism in the global fight against capitalism while sharing the basic understanding that nationalism is ‘a crucial, fairly central feature of the modern capitalist development of world history’ (Nairn 1977: 331). Tom Nairn, for instance, in his The Break-Up of Britain (1977), suggested that what he termed neo-nationalisms of the British Isles in the 1970s should be seen as a step towards the realisation of the socialist revolution, not as the reversal of the progress of world history. In Nairn’s view, nationalism is not an unexpected and inexplicable outburst of suppressed emotions of the Volk, but something that is dictated by the logic of world historical development, in particular, uneven development. By definition, according to Nairn, development is uneven creating unequal relationships between the hegemonic ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’. Nationalism is a response of the periphery to defend itself by joining in the race to chase material progress. In order to carry out this mission, ‘a militant, interclass community’ is indispensable and therefore the elite ‘had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understand’ (ibid.: 340). In Nairn’s analysis therefore nationalism is fundamentally modern, although it may be irrationally inward-looking and has the propensity to evoke the primordial, because it is a necessary outcome of a universal phenomenon called uneven development.

Michael Hechter also focuses on the relationship between the rise of nationalism and development. In his analysis of nationalism of the so-called Celtic fringe (Scotland, Ireland, and Wales) of the United Kingdom, Hechter puts forward an idea of internal colonialism (Hechter 1975). Hechter’s analysis is built on an examination of the development of the British Isles from the Tudors until the 1960s and inspired by contemporary Marxist scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank. The spread of the capitalist mode of production has created the core and the periphery, and each of them is now locked in entrenched interdependency. Hechter considers that economic inequalities between the core and the periphery, which largely overlap cultural differences, are the prime drivers of nationalism of the periphery, assisted by adequate communication among the peripheral population who consider themselves as the oppressed. While, as Anthony Smith (1998: 57–63) has pointed out, Hechter’s account accommodates more ‘primordial’ elements than Nairn’s, ultimately Hechter considers that nationalism in the peripheries of the United Kingdom in the twentieth century has arisen as a result of regional development, a type of development that was pursued by the postwar welfare state firmly entrenched in a capitalist mode of production. In other words: ‘The most recent crystallisation of Celtic nationalism may ultimately be understood as a trenchant critique of the principle of bureaucratic centralism (ibid.: 310).

It is not just the logic of historical materialism that defines the modernity of nationalism in Hechter’s account; it is also the role of the modern state and the development of communication technology, additional features of modernity, that make nationalism modern.

The rise of the modern state

Notwithstanding Gellner’s enormous impact on the theorisation of nationalism in reference to industrialisation and the enduring influence of historical materialism by far the most common way of arguing for the modernity of nationalism is through its association with the ris...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  The Modernity of Nationalism
• 2  Multiple Modernities and Nationalism: Theoretical Exploration
• 3  The Anglo-British Case: The Archetype?
• 4  The Finnish Case: Late Modernity at the Edge of Europe
• 5  The Japanese Case: Non-European Modernity and Nationalism
• 6  Multiple Modernities and Nationalism Revisited
• Notes
• References
• Index