Leadership in Global Institution Building

Minerva's Rule

Yves Tiberghien

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137023728
• eBook ISBN: 9781137023735
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Between 1995 and the present day, the world has undergone significant advances in international law, norms, and institutions. Progress was particularly intense in the fields of global environment, human security, cultural diversity, and human rights. This book reveals the key role played by the European Union, Japan, and Canada in this process.

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Introduction: Minervian Actors and the Paradox of Post-1995 Global Institution Building

Yves Tiberghien

Since the early 1990s, humanity has faced unprecedented challenges of coordination and governance. In addition to traditional security dilemmas and the increasingly complex management of the global economy, we are challenged by a growing list of pressing global issues that cannot be addressed by market mechanisms alone. These issues include climate change, environmental and biodiversity preservation, global food safety, population health and pandemics, cultural preservation, human rights, and human security. The functional need for cooperation among key states, as well as the rising plethora of non-state actors, may be higher than ever in human history. In a nutshell, humanity is at a crossroads. It enjoys historically high levels of prosperity, peace, and interdependence. Yet, it will be able to preserve these levels only if it is able to provide for indispensable global public goods and minimize pressing global public risks (Attali 2011; Flahault 2011; Malloch-Brown 2011; Ruby 2010).

This book focuses on global institutions, defined broadly as a set of global rules, norms, treaties, or organizational frameworks that allow states (and other actors) to coordinate their actions in the context of fragmented sovereignty and the absence of a global government. The book develops an understanding of institutions that builds on the tradition that sees them as functional rules of the game, and as solutions to transaction costs and collective action dilemmas (North 1990; Williamson 1985). At the global level, transaction costs and levels of uncertainty are higher due to greater cultural differences and divergence in interests; the endeavor of global institution building is thus, paradoxically, both more essential and more difficult to achieve (Keohane 1984; Siebert 2009). The builders of institutions not only face the classic collective problem among as many as 195-odd states and numerous other significant actors; they also have to deal with the potential unevenness in the distribution of costs and benefits generated by new institutions and its security implications.

In the post-Cold War era, the challenge has been simplified by the removal of a lethal competition between East and West, and yet also complicated by the rapid diffusion power. Initially, during the period from 1990 to 2005, analysts and policy makers heralded a period of US unipolarity, marked by a renewed leadership in technology (the internet revolution) and the acceleration of globalization, as well as overwhelming military power and global dominance (Haas 2005; Ikenberry 2002; Walt 2005). Yet, this US hegemony quickly peaked with the challenges of Iraq, the global financial crisis of 2008, and the rise of large emerging nations, primarily China. The decade of the 2000s has seen the largest diffusion of economic power since 1945: together, the economies of advanced democracies of the OECD still represented 62% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 1990 and 60% in 2000. But that share collapsed in the 2000s, reaching just 50% in 2011 (in PPP terms).¹ In nominal $, according to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the US share of total world GDP shrank from a high of 31.4% in 2000 to 21.6% in 2011 (nominal $).

Ironically, however, the period of US renaissance in the 1990s did not correlate with a new leadership in global institution building. As Congress shifted inward after 1994 and the US presidency moved to unilateralism in 2001 under President G.W. Bush, the US chose not to convert its power into global institutions. After the mid-2000s, on the other hand, diffusion of power became more visible and, despite a new interest for global institutions by the time of the Barack Obama administration in 2009, global coordination clearly became more difficult. Today, global stability and the provision of global public goods call for a new strategy to enlarge the willing coalition (Brzezinski 2012), while the US hegemon must act under increasing budget constraints (Friedman and Mandelbaum 2011; Mandelbaum 2010).

This book is not about the United Nations as a whole, itself an ongoing and partially institutionalized effort at global governance with a much longer trajectory going back to 1945 and indeed to 1919 and the League of Nations (Weiss and Gordenker 1996; Weiss and Thakur 2010). Likewise, the book does not focus on global economic summits, such as the G8 or the new post-2008 G20 process (Alexandroff and Cooper 2010; Tiberghien 2012), or on the debate about an overhaul of global trade and financial system (WTO, IMF, BIS (Bank of International Settlements), FSB (Financial Stability Board) (Eichengreen 2011; Rodrik 2011).

This book focuses on one important episode of global institution building that took place against US opposition at the height of US unilateral dominance during the period from 1995 to roughly 2005 (but with some continuation until today): the advancement of global treaties, rules, and norms primarily in the areas of global environment, global rule of law, human security, and cultural diversity by a coalition of non-hegemonic actors.

The puzzle of non-hegemonic global institution building in 1990s and 2000s

In early 2001, international relations took an unusual turn. The US, the lone global superpower and seemingly indispensable leader in international institution building since the 1940s, had announced its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol on climate change a few months earlier. With this announcement, it was expected that Kyoto would die and that new negotiations would usher in a set of US-friendly institutions. Yet, by the end of July, all other economically advanced countries, except for Australia, had decided to ignore the US withdrawal and to press ahead with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The European Union took the first step at its Gothenburg Summit in June, taking the decision to assume the role of climate hegemon and to lobby other countries in the process. Despite its tight economic integration with the US, Canada followed suit. Japan hesitated, torn between its close alliance with the US and clear economic interests on the one hand, and EU and civil society pressures on the other. By the end of July, however, Japan crossed the Rubicon and decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and thus participate in the creation of a new international institution in the absence of the US (Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007, 2010). Russia later joined the trio, enabling Kyoto to take force as international law in February 2005 (Harrison and Sundstrom 2010). A new major international institution was born, despite opposition by the global hegemon. Of course, subsequent meetings of the parties in Copenhagen (2009), Cancun (2010), and Durban (2011) have revealed the limits of this institution; the combined weight of the US and of emerging powers of the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) axis proved too much for its initial setup. Nonetheless, the Kyoto process was significant both as an unusual advance in international relations and as a key building block for future institution building in the climate arena. As of 2012, it is important to note that nearly all countries have come to accept Kyoto norms, objectives, and discourses, even though they are not yet ready to accept immediate targets and costs.

This Kyoto pattern was not an isolated one. The same process occurred with the ratification of the 1998 Statutes of Rome and the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. While the US was initially involved in the drafting of the statutes and had been a signatory, it later decided to withdraw its signature and launch an active campaign against the ICC. Yet, despite the undisputed status of the US as the sole superpower and the unprecedented asymmetry of power in the world today, other participants (eventually including Japan in 2007) merely shrugged off the US opposition and pushed ahead (Bassiouni 1999; Broomhall 2003; Malone and Khong 2003; Sands 2003). Under the Obama administration, the US has dropped its anti-ICC campaign and now supports its use for selected cases (Ivory Coast, Libya), in essence acquiescing to its existence.

Meanwhile, Canada, Japan, Norway, and the EU have been advancing the concept of “human security” and lobbying for such notions to be integrated into policy deliberations at the UN level (Malone and Khong, 2003; Remacle 2005). The Ottawa treaty to ban personal landmines (1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and on their Destruction) was signed, ratified, and implemented, despite opposition from the US. Again, the coalition driving the ban included Canada, key European countries, and Japan (Byers 2007; Cameron et al. 1998). In 2005, the process culminated in the adoption of the norm of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) during the UN general meetings.

In a different field, on October 20, 2005, 148 countries adopted a new cultural diversity treaty negotiated within the framework of UNESCO. The treaty, led by Canada and France, aims at helping nations protect their domestic cultures from homogenizing global economic forces and represents a major milestone in the achievement of this goal (Byers 2007; International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 2005). Only two countries opposed the treaty: the US and Israel. The treaty affirms the sovereign right of countries to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions, and insists its recognition by the WTO and other treaties. The US has argued that the treaty is vague and can be used to block trade in cultural goods and services. Other examples of attempts at international institution building include emerging norms of development assistance, assistance policies, humanitarian interventions, refugee rights, and human rights (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Finnemore 2003; Weiss and Thakur 2010).

These cases exemplify two important trends in international affairs that took place during the key window of 1995 to 2005. The first trend is an expansion of multilateral institution building into new arenas. While the immediate post-Second World War period saw the creation of effective global institutions mainly in the field of economic cooperation and development (IMF, World Bank, WTO), security (disarmament treaties), and human rights (beginning with the International Declaration of Human Rights contained in the UN Charter), the 1990s and early 2000s saw the expansion of this trend into the arenas of environment, human security, and third-generation human rights (Reus-Smit 2004; Thakur 2006; Weiss and Thakur 2010). The development of these international institutions includes formal legal treaties, codes of conduct, and norms and practices that shape behavior. In this project, institutions are taken in their broadest sense and encompass the full spectrum of possibilities, ranging from norms and new agendas that frame international action to formal rules of the game, new international law, and rigid frameworks. Each chapter in this book addresses one kind of international institution as the object to be explained, but the array of institutions explored here covers the whole range from informal to formal.

The second trend is a new political pattern in the creation of these institutions. To the surprise of many, as the US decided that institution building beyond the realms of economy (trade, finance) and hard security (anti-terrorism, non-proliferation) was not in its interest and should be halted, other national and supranational actors joined forces to construct new institutions. This construction continued unabated despite, not only US opposition, but also the reluctance of other powers such as Russia and especially China. In the cockpit driving the continued trend, one can find what we call Minervian actors: in particular, an emergent European Union aiming to project a new common identity, a transforming Japan, and a Canada forcefully dedicated to multilateralism.

Minerva’s rule

In the Roman (and Greek) pantheon, Minerva was the goddess of creativity, law and justice, and inventiveness. She was combative and effective, relying on craftiness rather than brute force like her father, the fearful Mars. In the Greek version, Athena accompanies many heroes such as Odysseus, Heracles, and Jason to victory through wisdom and guile. Because she encourages the cultivation of knowledge, art, craft, and law, she is a good symbol for the advancement of rules and institutions. She represents a pragmatic, yet powerful, effort at advancing human prosperity, civilization, and overall balance through tools and cumulated knowledge, rather than through a mere exercise of power. In international relations parlance, we take Minerva/Athena to represent the advance of institutions and governance.

Thus, under the label of Minervian actors, we refer to states or organizations such as the European Union that choose to commit significant resources and power (that is, not just discourse) to the advancement of global institutions and global governance. This approach presumes a specific intention and purpose behind this action, thus delineating a novel type of actor on the international scene. In the reality of the post-1995 world, we characterize the actions of Minervian actors as a non-hegemonic contribution to global governance, one that relies more on global and decentralized institutional incentives than on a unipolar power structure.² The Minervian pole represents a group of states and non-state actors that support the creation of credible institutions, possibly backed by limited but effective use of economic resources or force.

De facto, the set of countries analyzed in the book is limited to industrialized democracies, particularly Canada, Japan, and the EU, taken as a whole or in its parts. But “Minervian” universe is not limited to these jurisdictions. It is a broader term than, and analytically distinct from, “middle powers,” which has been used since the late 1980s to describe nations such as Canada, Australia, Norway, South Africa, Mexico, or Brazil and has more recently been applied to Japan (Chapnick 2005; Cooper 1997; Finlayson 1988; Cooper et al. 1993; Pratt 1990; Soeya 2005; Wood 1988). Although Canada, Japan, and the EU have formed the backbone of the Minervian contribution to institution building, authors in this book draw attention to cases where participation by Norway, Switzerland, South Korea, and also South Africa and Mexico, is noteworthy. The Obama administration of the US has sometimes acted as a Minervian actor on a case-by-case basis since 2009, although the true nature of this behavior lends itself to debate (Laïdi 2010).

The Minervian moment in historical context

Historically, the United States has inspired and led the trend of global institution building in a classic hegemonic pattern (Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1984; Ikenberry 2010). President Wilson was the key thinker and political force behind the ill-fated League of Nations in 1919. Rooseveltian America established the foundations of post-war global institutions: the Bretton Woods monetary system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Likewise, the United Nations bore a strong American birthmark. Eleanor Roosevelt, the former US First Lady, was the key actor behind the drafting of the UN Charter of Human Rights in 1947 (together with a French diplomat and a Canadian law professor). International law in trade and human rights developed thanks to US leadership.

The first rift between the US and its progeny dates back to the unilateral decision by President Nixon in 1971 to close the gold window, a resolution that ended the Bretton Woods monetary system and led to severe financial and trade tensions. While the Nixon era marked a shift in US attitudes toward global institution building, the US continued to exert leadership in the advancement of international human rights and international environmental treaties well into the 1990s. Initially, the US was well ahead of Europe in what is today seen as a key preserve of European leadership: global environment and climate change (Vogel 2003).

In the 1990s, the Clinton administration carried the Rooseveltian torch further and displayed significant leadership during the Kyoto negotiations in 1997 and the process that led to the creation of the International Criminal Court. But the then Republican-controlled Congress did not give a chance to the Clinton agenda. UN-bashing, already on the rise under the Reagan administration, had become central in the discursive landscape of Capitol Hill and achieved predominance under the Bush administration in 2001. The international agenda seemed in jeopardy across the board.

Around that time, leadership in new in...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1  Introduction: Minervian Actors and the Paradox of Post-1995 Global Institution Building
• Part I  Minervian Settings
• Part II  The Competitive Mode
• Part III  The Normative Mode
• Part IV  The Political Leadership Mode
• Part V  Conclusion
• Works Cited
• Index