Southeast Asia and the English School of International Relations

A Region-Theory Dialogue

L. Quayle

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137026842
• eBook ISBN: 9781137026859
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the interface between the theoretical framework known as the English School and the international and transnational politics of Southeast Asia. The region-theory dialogue it proposes signals productive ways forward for the theory.

Part I

The Society of States in Southeast Asia

1

Power and Community in Southeast Asia’s International Society

Two families of ideas – which might be loosely labelled ‘power’ and ‘community’ – constantly vie for centre-stage in commentary on SEA’s international relations. Rarely does one family pull off an appearance in regional narratives without the intrusion, in some shape or form, of its contrasting ‘other’. It is not surprising, then, that different theoretical discourses have assessed this mutual haunting in radically different ways and have struggled, both descriptively and prescriptively, to accommodate it.

These discursive problems impact on our assessments of SEA in several ways, polarizing accounts of its intra-regional and extra-regional relations and skewing expectations of ASEAN and of the role of small powers.

This chapter, firstly, sketches the problem that is created by two different but equally valid portrayals of SEA, and briefly reviews the strategies theorists have used to deal with them. Secondly, it shows that a pluralist ES viewpoint can embed both strands – power and community – in a single coherent narrative, bridging the awkward power-community gap, dialling down unrealistic expectations of ASEAN and highlighting the opportunities as well as the threats involved in being a small region in the midst of giants. Finally, it evaluates the usefulness of this different picture, concluding that ES approaches have much to add to our understanding of the complex dynamics at work in SEA and beyond.

The problem of conflicting narratives

The power story

This narrative focuses on rivalry, self-help and a constant awareness of power differentials. It has much to feed off.

A raft of mutual antagonisms thrives in SEA, driven by bitter historical experience, border disputes, economic disparity and significant residual nationalism at both elite and popular level. In maritime SEA, all three sides of the Singapore-Malaysia-Indonesia triangle, for example, are subject to periodic tensions across a range of issues, and Sabah still complicates relations between Malaysia and the Philippines. In mainland SEA, Thailand is at the vortex of a range of difficult relationships: violent disputes over the Preah Vihear temple draw energy from historical enmity with Cambodia; porous borders complicate relations with Myanmar; and an insurgency in the south clouds ties with Malaysia. Cambodia and Laos, meanwhile, occupy an uncomfortable position between considerably larger neighbours. Although land borders rose to bloody prominence in 2010 and 2011, maritime boundary disagreements have produced considerable intra-ASEAN tension, in which overt military posturing is not always excluded (Mak, 2008, 4–8). To Bitzinger, SEA is ‘the Westphalian system of nation-states run amok … there’s a feeling that if I lose one little piece of land, it’s a major setback’ (Interview 6).

Trust, in such circumstances, is still a serious problem within SEA. Part of the reason non-interference remains entrenched in its collective mindset is that ‘members still harbor latent distrust, if not fear, of each other despite the years of nurtured camaraderie’ (Kassim, 2007, 1). This distrust is not confined to official echelons. A survey carried out among residents of the region’s capitals found that only 37.5 per cent felt they could trust all the countries in SEA to be ‘good neighbours’. A parallel survey of the region’s elites, including academics and government officers, indicated that 59.8 per cent did not trust the good-neighbourly qualities of other countries in SEA, and only 50 per cent could not envisage conflict between two or more ASEAN states (Roberts, 2007, 1–2). The difficulty of trusting neighbours emerges from many conversations with Southeast Asians (for example, Interviews 3, 11, 12, 15, 22, 26, 37). As one academic notes, ‘Many countries talk nicely in ASEAN, but they behave a bit differently from the way they talk’ (Interview 1).

Not surprisingly, this hinders practical cooperation in sensitive areas. The Malacca Straits Patrols are therefore still ‘one of the few concrete initiatives in maritime security in SEA’ (Interview 30), and ‘defence cooperation is more probable in areas consensually deemed non-sensitive by the countries involved, namely, non-traditional challenges’ (Singh & Tan, 2011, 16).

Mutual distrust regularly surfaces in the economic realm as well. The financial crisis of 1997 notoriously increased tension among the SEA states (Rüland, 2000), but even in recovery, SEA’s states, many of whose economies are essentially competitive rather than complementary, still do not reflexively identify their national interest with regional economic integration (Severino, 2006, 249). A Thai finance minister seemed to sum up the prevailing sentiment when defending a particularly egregious act of economic unilateralism: ‘A small nation like ourselves – if we don’t protect ourselves, who else will protect us?’ (quoted by Weatherbee, 2007, 21).

A dynamic of competition is also visible in the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) negotiated with extra-regional parties. The ultimate effect of these arrangements on the overall goal of free trade is contested, but the key point here is that they tend to express national self-interest, with each state trying to forge ahead of, or at least not be left behind, its neighbours (Weatherbee, 2007, 21–4).

Accompanying the criss-crossing network of bilateral PTAs is a range of ‘10+1’ regional trade agreements, with China, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, India and Japan. These also have an unmistakable strategic dimension, again highlighting the salience of power calculations. As ‘political instruments’, argues Frost, ‘PTAs … are a surrogate of sorts for a code of conduct, implicitly guaranteeing peaceful behaviour. Security treaties and military alliances are out; PTAs are in’ (2008, 157).

The SEA region is also notably power-conscious, as is evidenced by many of the aims in ASEAN’s foundation and evolution. One was to give the region a greater global presence. A second was to check the power of potential subregional hegemons both inside and outside ASEAN. A third reflected an acute awareness of extra-regional players, and the desire to manage their influence while keeping them as much as possible at arms’ length.

After the end of the Cold War, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN+3 arrangement formed parallel answers to the problems of simultaneously retaining US interest in SEA, finding ways to deal with a rising China and involving other key extra-regional powers. The initial composition of the East Asia Summit (EAS), decided after considerable wrangling, also attests to a desire for even-handed power engagement, with fears of Chinese domination allayed by the presence of India, Australia and New Zealand. An expanded EAS has likewise admitted not only the US but also Russia.

Despite these arrangements, a constant flow of commentary analysing SEA’s relations with China certainly testifies to a preoccupation with the rise of a near and historically dominant power. Uncertainty centres particularly on China’s economic impact, its claims in the South China Sea and its use of the Mekong. Bearing heavily on all these issues is the relationship between China and the US, and the nature and relative strength of their power and influence in SEA. But SEA’s potential as an arena of great-power rivalry also involves the future calculations of India, Japan and Russia. Not surprisingly, then, East Asia in general is not a region that underestimates the danger of conflict. Most of the experts surveyed in a study on attitudes to maritime risk, for example, ‘felt that the outbreak of interstate conflicts was possible and thinkable’ (RSIS, 2010, 20).

Against this backdrop, a continued enthusiasm for arms purchases in SEA seems eminently understandable. This need not constitute an arms race, and is not unambiguously aimed against any specific quarter (Bitzinger, 2010, 60, 63–6; Loo, 2010; Mahadzir, 2010), but it is a noticeable facet of regional life.

Any interpretative framework that wants to make sense of SEA must certainly come to terms with this ‘Mars’ element of its discourse, which is much too prevalent and deep-seated to ignore. Yet purely realist viewpoints – the obvious choice for narrating power – fall far short of adequately interpreting this theme.

Part of the reason for this, as Goh observes, is that the realist framework struggles to deal with the behaviour of small or secondary states (2007/08, 116), and SEA’s comparatively weak states are playing a much more influential role in the wider region than realists would anticipate. While the military might of the US offshore balancer is important in promoting regional peace and stability, realists tend to overstate it (Acharya & Tan, 2006, 38), failing to wholly account for ASEAN’s having managed to establish itself as ‘an object of competitive courtship’ by great-power ‘bumptious suitors’ (Frost, 2008, 127). ASEAN’s continued capacity to lead the broader Asian regional process is always open to question, and it must have been with some relief that the Association could again proclaim ‘ASEAN centrality on centre-stage’ (2010a), after experiencing challenges to that centrality from Australian and Japanese proposals for an ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ and an ‘East Asian Community’. But as a think-tank workshop concludes:

While competition between China and the U.S. was the dominant theme, caution was also expressed about overstating the role of outside powers. Southeast Asian states often ‘punch above their weight’ as ASEAN shapes the rules of the game in Southeast Asia, and individual Southeast Asian states are not compelled to side completely with either the U.S. or China (Percival, 2011, 4).

This would indicate that the range of options available to smaller states is also over-simplified by realist predictions. Despite SEA’s instinctive power-awareness, and despite increased pressure over the South China Sea, its states’ responses do not follow classic realist balancing or band-wagoning practices. ASEAN’s states have traditionally resisted any outside power’s acquisition of too much influence over any single country or the region, and have sought to retain maximum room for manoeuvre (Acharya, 2003/04, 153; Goh, 2007, 825). They have therefore adopted a variety of strategies to this end (see, for example, Murphy, 2010; Roy, 2005; Tow, 2004, 439). The fact that Thailand can be described in the space of two years as ‘the United States’ closest friend and ally in mainland Southeast Asia’ (Grinter, 2006, 456) and ‘the People’s Republic of China’s closest friend in Southeast Asia’ (Chambers, 2005, 599) is surely testimony to small-state flexibility in this area. Claims that ‘most countries in Asia seem to be quietly bandwagoning with the United States to balance against China’s future power potential’ (Cook et al., 2010) therefore suggest an unequivocalness that is not totally borne out by the states of SEA, none of which wants to rely on only one strategy or only one big power, and none of which feels compelled to choose between trade with China and security ties with the US (Percival, 2011, 5).

While the urge to both cultivate and offset power seems undeniable in SEA, the expression of this objective appears to belong in a much more complicated category than that described by most realist literature. Included in the package are unmistakable characteristics of community, the second key SEA dynamic.

The community story

The sheer volume of ASEAN-related statements, commentary and political traffic – ASEAN was projecting more than 1000 meetings in 2012 (Interview 33) – makes it hard to ignore the second key regional narrative, that of community. Its themes are peace, norms and cooperation.

It is not to be passed over lightly that none of the bickering outlined above – even at the most lethal moments of the temples dispute – has (yet) resulted in all-out war or significant regional instability. Admittedly, the SEA nations hardly form a security community (Collins, 2007), as an unspoken threat of force still constitutes the backdrop to their relations at some level (in a way it does not, for example, in North America or Europe). But avoiding war is hardly a minor achievement, given the diversity of the region, the post-colonial backdrop and the comparative track record of West Asia, South Asia and Africa (Khong, 2005, 32–6). As Bitzinger comments, SEA’s states are hardly ‘in love with each other’, but they also do not routinely and openly display high levels of animosity (Interview 6). Likewise, defence diplomacy is gathering pace (Abad Jr, 2011, 67–72; Singh & Tan, 2011).

A qualitative difference in relations between states inside and outside the Association – an indicator that ASEAN actually affects behaviour – is also visible. Malaysian fears of Indonesia did not immediately evaporate with the end of konfrontasi, and tensions later took on the form of a ‘prestige dilemma’ (Liow, 2008b, 109–12, 132–56), but there was no further war. Nor can this be explained by the elevation of self-restraint and self-denial to a general norm. East Timor’s independent existence was temporarily snuffed out by Indonesia, while Malaysia pursued a ‘menacing’ foreign policy toward Brunei during the mid-1970s; with independence, the latter sought sanctuary in ASEAN membership, because the Association ‘offered some form of political guarantee that neither Malaysia nor Indonesia would in the future threaten or seek to annex the tiny state’, and it was encouraged to take this course by Singapore – itself ‘well aware by the early 1980s that ASEAN was an asset for protecting its own national sovereignty’ (Emmers, 2003, 69–81). Eventual accommodation between the Philippines and Malaysia was likewise facilitated by a desire ‘to keep the Sabah dispute from destroying ASEAN’ (Severino, 2006, 166). As this issue had effectively scuppered two previous attempts at regionalism, this was a notable step forward (Haacke, 2003, 32–51). The referral of disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), although decried by some as evidence of lack of trust in ASEAN, can also be interpreted as progress, an indication that expectations among the states involved have shifted (Ba, 2005, 263). There is evidence of an ‘ASEAN factor’ that can facilitate improved relations and new identities (Nguyen, 2010, 78–9). To date, ASEAN has managed to avoid ‘another konfrontasi … another Vietnam … and another Corregidor’ (Khong, 2005, 34).

This achievement clearly has an ‘associative dimension’ (Emmers, 2003, 59). The power-oriented objective of restraining Indonesia would not have worked without a community-oriented means, allowing President Suharto to espouse ‘an approach to regionalism characterized by self-restraint’ (Emmers, 2005, 650). The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) likewise seek to meet external power not with countervailing power but with a practical attempt to reconfigure the normative environment (Haacke, 2003, 53–61).

Constructivists see a number of different strands in this associative element: the redefinition of actors’ interests and identities through social interaction and the practice of cooperation; the constitutive role of norms; and the impact of intersubjective factors such as ideas and culture. In ASEAN’s case, this package has shaped a set of practices that derive from both global and local political culture, and involve behavioural norms (including non-interference and non-use of force) and procedural norms (including informality, organizational minimalism, consultation, consensus, inclusiveness and non-confrontational negotiation styles) (Acharya, 2000, 1; 2001, 3–4, 63–70; Batabyal, 2004, 356–7).

If cooperation is ‘a social process involving interactive and cumulative social negotiations’, Ba suggests, then ASEAN’s much-derided ‘talk shop’ has proved able to produce ‘new social norms, a new culture of regional dialogue, as well as new social and institutional practices’; the result is a deepening of cooperation in areas that once were taboo, and a SEA that is unquestionably ‘more stable, cooperative, and coherent’ than it was four decades ago (2009, 4–5, 17–19, 94).

While constructivist accounts of SEA are more positive than realist narratives, their optimism is still largely guarded. The quest for regional unity has been driven by a sense of vulnerability that produces incompatible normative pressures – both the pressure to cooperate, and the pressure to refrain from pushing cooperation too far in case the fragile unity that exists is blown apart (Ba, 2009, 5–7, 31–2, 35–40). The processes of ‘constitutive localization’ suggest that normative progress will be slow (Acharya, 2009b, 146). Change will always be accompanied by ongoing ‘processes of contestation and accommodation’ (Caballero-Anthony, 2005, 273). Nevertheless, this is clearly a narrative that sees something genuine in SEA’s ‘community’ impulse.

This dynamic has also not been missing from its relations with the wider region. Relation...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Other Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations and Acronyms
• List of Interviews
• Introduction
• Part I The Society of States in Southeast Asia
• Part II International Society and Others
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index