NATO's European Allies

Military Capability and Political Will

J. Matlary, M. Petersson, J. Matlary, M. Petersson

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137034991
• eBook ISBN: 9781137035004
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The question of burden sharing has always been important in NATO with an acute relevance today as the US will cut its defence budget over a ten-year period and is no longer automatically willing to lead military operations. This volume considers Europe's role in political force for the future exploring eight European case studies.

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Introduction: Will Europe Lead in NATO?

J. H. Matlary and M. Petersson

The purpose and the relevance of the book

In a speech at the National Defence University in Washington, DC, in February 2010, former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates talked about the ‘demilitarization of Europe’ (Gates, 2010). When he gave his last major speech at NATO’s ministerial meeting in Brussels in June 2011, he argued that NATO had become a ‘two-tiered’ alliance,

between members who specialize in ‘soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the ‘hard’ combat missions, between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or headquarters billets – but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.

(Gates, 2011)

At a closed-door meeting with NATO Defence Ministers, Gates also named two states – Germany and Poland – that could contribute to the Libya operation but did not, and three states – the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey – that could do more (Spiegel, 2011). As a commentator put it later: ‘the real danger comes from within – from European reluctance to pay for its own defence and from growing US indifference towards what Washington sees as feckless allies’ (Stevens, 2011).

The US criticism has continued since then, and the gist of the criticism is the same: Allies do not carry their share of the burden, neither in terms of defence spending – which stands 75/25 in American’s favour today – nor in terms of military contributions to operations.

How valid is this criticism? Which of NATO’s European allies are ‘able’ militarily and ‘willing’ politically to undertake ‘sharp operations’ and to actually use force for the purpose of policy? Robert Kagan has argued that Americans are ‘from Mars’ and Europeans are ‘from Venus’ (Kagan, 2002, 2003), and that the attitude to the use of military force differs between the United States and Europe. How accurate is that picture?

The question of burden sharing has always been important in NATO – it has resulted in a ‘crisis literature’ on NATO (Thies, 2009) – but it has an acute relevance today because the United States will cut its defence budget over a ten-year period and is no longer automatically willing to lead military operations. The Libya mission ‘Unified Protector’ is a case in point. The United States did not want to lead, but was forced to ‘lead from behind’ because allies lacked some of the necessary capacities: ‘shortages in allied intelligence-gathering, aircraft, aerial refuelling tankers and precision-guidance kits for bombs proved that the US remained the backbone of NATO-offensives’ (Shanker and Schmitt, 2011, see also Hallams and Schreer, 2012). Thus, even if Europeans are politically willing, as in this case, they may not be militarily able.

In this book, we provide the first in-depth analysis of the relationship between these factors – political willingness and military ability to use force – asking whether Europe in this new situation of economic austerity and postmodern political values can play a key role in regional and global security and defence. Hitherto Europeans have been called upon to rise to the occasion of matching the United States with minor contributions, ranging from ‘showing the flag’ to militarily important contributions. But when the US signals that its lead role no longer is automatic, what about the European allies? Can they and will they undertake sharp operations on their own, assuming leading roles?

This issue is of key importance for policy as well as for scholarship on NATO. European defence today is marked by sharp cuts in budgets and a lack of integration of materiel. This happens while many national defence systems are not yet modernized or transformed towards expeditionary forces. Further, we need to ascertain whether it is true that Europe is a civilian power that refrains from using the military tool for coercion, deterrence or war-fighting in general (Sheehan, 2007).

Put differently, how important are domestic factors in security policy? There is ample research on the importance of geopolitics for the defence and security policy of the state if we look to realism in its various forms. Indeed, the main reason for military defence and for military alliances lies in the self-help fact of international anarchy. Especially for great powers, geopolitics and power-balancing matter as explanations for their willingness to maintain and use their armed forces (Nye, 2009). For smaller states, however, there is little they alone can do about their geopolitical position or about changes in threats. They are too small to matter in their domestic defence and security policies, hence their dependence on allies, especially the hegemonic power of the United States. This is often referred to as the ‘alliance dilemma’ in NATO (Snyder, 1984). For instance, Ringsmose has shown that Denmark, a small NATO member, is influenced by US pressure rather than by geopolitical changes in its security and defence policy (Ringsmose, 2010).

This is logical – small states depend on the hegemonic power for their security and are therefore prone to being influenced by its demands and wishes. Geopolitical threats and risks are second-order concerns, but matter as the ‘prime movers’ for being an alliance member. Thus, we can expect that European NATO members will be influenced by US pressure and expectations more than by geopolitical changes such as the current development of a multi-polar system (Strachan, 2009). Thus, what happens in US security and defence policy is of prime importance in Europe: On the one hand, less US engagement in NATO may lead to ‘relaxation’ due to less pressures in European states. On the other hand, the same phenomenon may lead to more European engagement because one can no longer ‘pass the buck’ to the United States. The worst outcome would be the former, but it may be the most likely, as we shall discuss below.

If we assume that alliance dependence explains most European NATO members’ security and defence policy, the question becomes how true this will be in the time ahead. Whereas political elites seem to want to prioritize alliance dependence, Krebs finds that only an elite consensus across parties allows for this: European NATO states defy public unpopularity regarding International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and continue to send troops, but this may be because there is (still) agreement across parties on this. Conversely, if this consensus is broken and parties take advantage of public opinion in order to get elected, alliance dependence no longer commands the importance it has had throughout the Cold War and beyond (Kreps, 2010).

The role of domestic politics in security and defence was secondary to alliance dependence during the Cold War. This was because the threat was clear, something which led to unity among political factions. Security and defence policy dynamics was different from domestic politics. However, when threats are less clear and look more like risks, the national interest is also unclear, and security and defence policy moves down the ladder of political priorities (Williams, 2008).

This has clearly happened in most European states after the Cold War. The academic study of such processes – policy-making in security and defence under diffuse threats and uncertain national outcomes – is still relatively scant (Matlary, 2009). As we know, even under the very clear risk of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis the policy response in Washington depended on the actors and organizations behind the policy (Allison, 1971).

Security and defence studies have traditionally either been in the realist ‘camp’, emphasizing geopolitics, or in the liberal ‘camp’, looking at alliance dependence, general foreign standing in NATO, the UN, etc., on the part of states as explanatory variables. After 1990, however, especially in Europe, the relevance of domestic factors as explananda seems to rise. In studies of Germany we find that political culture and ideology matter much (Matlary, 2009; Noetzel and Schreer, 2009). We can also expect that domestic factors will trump alliance dependence should this factor become less relevant, given US reticence to lead like before in NATO. Domestic factors therefore suggest themselves to become increasingly more important in explaining NATO policy in Europe.

Burden-sharing in NATO

In their classic study of security as a public good, Olson and Zeckhauser showed that the economic theory of public goods applies to defence spending in an asymmetric alliance such as NATO (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). This point is underlined by Jason Davidson in his recent analysis of transatlantic burden-sharing: ‘The scholarly literature on alliance burden-sharing … suggests that America’s allies contribute rarely or never to US-led uses of force’ (Davidson, 2011, p. 4).

Yet free riding is not normal in NATO, and most European allies contribute to operations where the United States is in the lead. The main explanation for this in the scholarship is the so-called ‘alliance dilemma’ in NATO (Snyder, 1984). In a study based on more than 50 elite interviews in France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, Davidson argues that national interest rather than alliance loyalty explains many contributions by these states in recent years (Davidson, 2011). He tries to weigh the following variables: national security interests, prestige, alliance loyalty, national public opinion, and human rights/values. He concludes that ‘alliance value is significantly less important than threat and prestige: strong evidence supported threat and prestige in twice as many cases as alliance value (Davidson, 2011, p. 175). Yet he also agrees that ‘interests and prestige overlap with alliance value’ in most cases: states that want to be close to the United States want this in order to be important in world politics and/or to have US protection in security terms. Thus, if Norway places most weight on geopolitics and Denmark on prestige, they will both support the United States.

However these foreign policy or external variables are weighed, what they have in common is that they are ‘external’ to the state. But in which ways do domestic variables matter in the decision to contribute?

In the Cold War, external factors clearly mattered most as the threat was existential. Europe really needed a US security guarantee. After the Cold War there is no clear-cut external variable – as seen above, the foreign policy reasons for NATO contributions are weighed differently. As the threat is no longer common and existential, there is also much greater scope for domestic variables. External factors no longer automatically trump domestic ones.

The study of the role of domestic variables is rather scant. The study of national strategic cultures is rarely done comparatively. One recent example of a comparative study is Kirchner and Sperlings’ book National Security Cultures (Kirchner and Sperling, 2010). In the book, their aim is to study the impact of domestic cultures on various security policy issues, one of them being compellence, which we term coercive diplomacy in this book. The other factors studied in that volume do not involve military force.

With the exception of the few studies on national strategic cultures in Europe there is little systematic scholarly work on how domestic factors influence the political and military ability of NATO’s European allies. The few studies of public opinion concur that it plays little role unless it is used by the political opposition in election campaigns. Davidson finds that public opinion is only relevant as an explanatory factor when it is coupled with opposition parties that may capitalize on this in (re)election efforts (Davidson, 2011, p. 176).

This concurs with Kreps’ conclusion, which points out that ISAF contributions are not stopped by unfavourable publics. She finds that an elite consensus across parties allows for this: European NATO states defy public unpopularity regarding ISAF and continue to send troops, but this may be because there is agreement across parties on this. Conversely, if this consensus is broken and parties take advantage of public opinion in order to get elected, alliance dependence no longer commands the importance it has had throughout the Cold War and beyond (Kreps, 2010). But we can nonetheless assume that the role of domestic politics in Europe will increase in the time ahead, given budget cuts, austerity in general, and a generally negative view about the ‘success’ of ISAF.

Moreover, the great difference among European NATO allies in terms of risk-willing and relevant contributions needs explanation. ISAF illustrates how some states opt for caveats and play little role in dangerous operations, whereas others carry much more of the common burden. All NATO allies contributed to ISAF, but very few to the war-fighting in the dangerous south. NATO’s European allies, therefore, seem to fall into at least two groups today. This classification is based on the degree of risk-willing, relevant military contribution to operations like ISAF. Yet there are also divisions among states regarding strategy for NATO – the most common division is between the so-called ‘globalists’ and ‘traditionalists’ (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009).

We can discern groups of states also in other international organizations, that is in the EU, where the inner core in security policy is made up of the contributing states to any one mission, but led by France and Britain (Matlary, 2009). Multi-tier NATO is a consequence of the lack of a common strategic vision. Noetzel and Schreer describe the ‘traditionalists’ as reversal-oriented, comprising Central European countries, favouring an alliance still focused on Article 5, based on the perception of a resurgent Russian threat. After all, the functioning of collective defence was their primary reason for joining the alliance (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009, p. 216). But even for the ‘traditionalists’ contributions to international operations are needed if the motive is Article 5 guarantee.

Burden-sharing in NATO today is very difficult for governments. Allies expect just burden-sharing in terms of carrying risk, whereas domestic publics are in ‘deep peace’ and not sympathetic to national casualities or political causes in far-away lands. What can a government do about this dilemma? It has to ‘deliver’ on two arenas, at home and internationally, where the demands are conflicting. They have to make painful choices. This is why the modern burden-sharing ‘equation’ is so difficult for states: they must take risk and suffer losses of their own soldiers in wars that are not in their own national interest in a traditional sense.

The ‘alliance dilemma’ formulated by Snyder in 1984 is today characterized by ‘fear of abandonment rather than of entrapment’. Whereas there was a direct dependence between the United States and European allies in the Cold War, allies could be quite certain that they would not be abandoned. But as bipolarity has given way to more of a multipolar system today, and the threat has become diffuse and variously interpreted, ‘abandonment outweighs entrapment fears’ (Snyder, 1984, p. 484). As stated, Ringsmose has studied the behaviour of Denmark, one of the key contributors in coalition warfare, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, and found that the key determinant was Danish interest in closeness to Washington. Denmark has no geopolitical security calculus to consider, surrounded as it is by NATO states. The Danish abandonment of submarines testifies to this. Yet Denmark strongly supports US policy, to the point of being one of the most loyal supporters and contributors to US-led coalitions. Ringsmose argues that for Norway, the geopolitical relationship with Russia determines coalition contributions, whereas the main point for Denmark is general foreign and security policy (Ringsmose, 2010).

Thus, the perception of the importance of alliance dependence may not be related to national security concerns, contrary to realist theory. The Norwegian and Danish cases are paralleled in the Central-European cases, which like Norway seek US proximity because of geopolitics (‘traditionalists’); and in the British and Dutch cases, which are global partners with the United States although they do not have national geopolitical security concerns (‘globalists’). These two groups of states in NATO both seek closeness to the United States, albeit for different reasons.

In sum, both ‘globalists’ and ‘traditionalists’ among European NATO states need the US security guarantee if the alliance is to be real and deterring. Germany needs the United States as much as Denmark, and we should therefore expect both these states to contribute where the United States asks. But as noted, contributions differ very much within NATO Europe. It must be the case that some states are both willing and able, some are probably willing but unable, some the other way round, and some both unwilling and unable, at least relatively speaking.

Outline of the book

As stated, in this book we analyse European ‘political willingness and military ability’ to use force within a NATO context, both in terms of coercion as well as in actual deployments. The book consists of two distinctive parts. In Part I (Chapters 2–5) which is thematic, important generic factors – history, culture, economy and military structure, and threat and risk perceptions – are discussed. This part forms the analytical basis for the country studies in Part I (Chapters 6–14). The point of departure in this part is the analysis of US strategic thinking and its implications ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Notes on Contributors
• 1. Introduction: Will Europe Lead in NATO?
• Part I: Determinants of the Use of Force
• Part II: Application: Case Studies
• Index