The First Northern Ireland Peace Process

Power-Sharing, Sunningdale and the IRA Ceasefires 1972-76

Thomas Hennessey

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781349575497, 9781137277169
• eBook ISBN: 9781137277176
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The First Northern Ireland Peace Process covers the various attempts to end the 'Troubles' from 1972-76. These attempts included secret talks with the Provisional IRA and a parallel process to build a political consensus between the British and Irish Governments and the main constitutional parties in Northern Ireland.

1

‘Talking to Terrorists’: British Government Contacts with the IRA 1972–74

On 24 March 1972, Prime Minister Edward Heath announced the suspension of the Northern Ireland Parliament, ending 50 years of Unionist rule. For many the demise of Stormont was a victory for the Provisional IRA (PIRA) insurgency to drive the British out of the North of Ireland. Among the senior leadership of the Provos were Sean MacStiofain (the Chief of Staff), Ruairi O Bradaigh (also referred to as Rory O’Brady) and Daithi O Conaill (also referred to as David O’Connell), who had seemingly brought the British Government to this point. Victory appeared close. To accommodate the Northern Protestant majority in the united Ireland the Provisionals hoped would eventually emerge from the termination of British rule, Republicans developed their Dáil Uladh policy, which would see the establishment of a nine-county Ulster Parliament in a federal Ireland. Dáil Uladh, it was argued, was the solution to the partition problem and an answer to the Unionist fear of being swamped in a Catholic dominated Republic. In the PIRA analysis, ‘Unionist intransigence lies in the fear of the loss of power … and without the power to administer their own destiny, the Northern Unionists would never be content within a United Ireland’. Therefore the answer seemed to be to allow the Protestant people to control a provincial parliament in a nine county Ulster, where Protestants would still have a majority, and: ‘With the bogey of the border removed the old issues would become irrelevant, and we would see for the first time in our tragic history, a normalisation of politics along “left”, “right”, “centre”, rather than religious divides.’ The fear of any future Protestant misrule for Catholics would be diminished by the size of the minority in the new Ulster, by the constitution, and by the central Irish parliament. With the old fears removed, ‘Catholic and Protestant culture could flourish side by side and the nation would draw strength from … diversity, rather than allow hatred to breed from it’. In the new Republic, ‘Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter could retain their identity and still find common identity as Irishmen.’¹ Ruairi O Bradaigh believed that ‘If Britain disengages that door would be closed’ for Northern Protestants. He regarded the much vaunted Protestant backlash as ‘overrated’, and based on the understanding that Britain stood at their back.²

What made these Republican statements relevant was that, by early 1972, the British Government began to receive approaches from the Provisionals, through intermediaries. Dr John O’Connell TD, a front bench spokesman in the Irish Labour Party, approached a Conservative MP and junior minister, Michael Heseltine, to the effect that if the former were granted an interview with the Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, the SDLP could be brought into discussions with the British Government – whom it was boycotting because of internment. Heseltine passed this on to the Tory peer Lord Windlesham.³ Instead, it was arranged for O’Connell to meet David Blatherwick of the British Embassy in Dublin. Here O’Connell revealed that alongside his personal contacts with the SDLP he had links with ‘another group’, to which the British Ambassador, Sir John Peck, remarked: ‘he clearly meant the IRA’. O’Connell wanted to put these points to Maudling. When told it was unlikely the Home Secretary would want to meet him without knowing more, O’Connell ‘quite affably’ said that in that case he would reluctantly let the matter drop.⁴ After ‘a good deal of thought’ Maudling decided that, ‘while it would be quite wrong’ for a Minister to see an emissary from the IRA; Graham Angel, the Home Secretary’s Private Secretary, should. Angel saw O’Connell twice but the events of Bloody Sunday appeared to scupper the contacts.⁵

Shortly after Bloody Sunday ‘indirect contact’ was made with the Provisionals, in the person of Frank Morris, the IRA Adjutant in Derry/Donegal. Morris was speaking with the approval of MacStiofain in the knowledge that his comments would probably reach Her Majesty’s Government. An intermediary informed the British that, in the Provisionals’ view, the SDLP was ‘a party in no more than name’ consisting of six Stormont MPs with no real cohesion, who had ceased to represent their constituents. Of these Austin Currie was considered ‘closest’ to the IRA; Gerry Fitt was held to be ‘too wrapped up’ in Westminster; and John Hume was losing his hold in Derry. No SDLP member would make a move towards the conference table save on terms agreed with the Provisionals, and the latter were confident that they could ‘control’ the SDLP if negotiations started. The minimum concessions the Provisionals would expect before the SDLP could be ‘permitted’ to go on to the conference table were:

a. an assumption by Westminster of responsibility for law, order and security in Northern Ireland;

b. guarantee that internment would be phased out by submitting some cases to the courts and the gradual release of the remainder.

The Provisionals would not expect, or insist, that reunification should be on the agenda initially, but they would, nevertheless, keep the issue to the forefront and propose its early introduction into any negotiations. They saw no likely prospect of an outcome satisfactory to them on this issue but recognised that it could be used as a bargaining counter to extract greater concessions on other points. Meanwhile they would agree to the SDLP discussing a constitutional agenda that included:

a. proportional representation, weighted in favour of the Catholics, in Northern Ireland;

b. reformed Senate with an alternating sectarian majority over two/three years;

c. Bill of Rights.

The contact’s final comment was that the Provisionals could continue the struggle for a long time and while they accepted that they could not defeat the British Army they were confident the British Army could not defeat them. A summary of the meeting with the intermediary was despatched to the Foreign Office where the scribbled comment was: ‘Told Provos No question of direct contact. This is the result.’⁶

It is unclear whether this contact with an intermediary refers to a meeting held the day before, on 8 February, with the same go-between (as is likely) and the Commander of 8 Brigade, Brigadier Pat MacLellan, the senior British Army officer in Derry. The intermediary contacted MacLellan at approximately 10:30 a.m. on 8 February and stated he wished to see the Brigadier. MacLellan received permission for the meeting from his superior, Major General Robert Ford, Commander Land Forces (CLF) in Northern Ireland (the second most senior military officer in the Province). The meeting took place between 12.25 and 13.00 in Victoria RUC Station. The contact opened the meeting by revealing he had had a meeting with the Derry IRA leadership and would be meeting Provisionals in Dublin. He wanted to test the Brigadier’s reactions, and those of the General Officer Commanding (GOC NI), to the following proposition. The British Army could not defeat the IRA (the more they ‘lifted’, the more it recruited support from the Republic, etc.). In the event of a Protestant backlash Catholics could not defeat the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The Prime Minister’s ‘line was no talks until the gunmen and bombers were defeated’. The contact, therefore, proposed a truce between the IRA and British, the basic terms being that the Provisionals would ‘lay down their arms’ until 1 January 1973 and the British should make no arrests during the truce. This would appeal to the IRA as it would give them the initiative politically and they would gain all the credit for having forced Heath’s hand; it would appeal to the British Army, ‘who were the political jam in the sandwich’. The contact seemed most anxious that his proposition should be ‘fed into the machine as soon as possible’. MacLelland’s comments were:

A. This approach must be viewed in the context of increasing security force pressure on the IRA in Belfast where I expect their activities to be reduced to minimum in six to eight weeks’ time. Any breathing space will undoubtedly be sued to build up resources.

B. The IRA will still have capacity to continue operations particularly cross border and in Londonderry and will require large scale security force and intelligence effort to counter.

C. Our objective is to get the IRA to desist from violence.

D. If the proposition is to be pursued I think it will be for Whitehall to consider how to overcome the propaganda advantage that the IRA see in it …⁷

The following month, John O’Connell returned to centre stage and revived his approach to the British. At a supper he hosted, on 8 March, O’Connell became embroiled in a long conversation with Peter Evans, of the British Embassy staff. O’Connell reiterated the remarks he had made to Angel to the effect that he could give categorical assurances that, if the security forces in the North would agree, the IRA would consent to a truce on certain conditions. Evans replied that irrespective of the merits of a truce – which itself seemed highly dubious – it was ‘inconceivable’ that the leaders of either faction of the IRA (the Official and Provisional wings):

a. could be trusted to keep their word;

b. could themselves guarantee control over those who claimed membership of their organisations; and

c. would be willing to combine to give a Labour member of the Dáil a mandate to act as a spokesman on their joint behalf.

Moreover, continued Evans, no one could have the slightest confidence in the good faith of illegal organisations who were currently carrying on a mindless and murderous campaign of assassination bombing involving innocent civilians. O’Connell retorted that violence in the North would inevitably continue under present conditions and that the sole means of stopping it was to meet the IRA conditions for a truce; sooner or later, he insisted, the British would be forced to negotiate with the ‘terrorists’ just as they had in Palestine, Cyprus and Aden. Evans told him that ‘apart from getting his history sadly wrong, he was making a fool of himself by trying to barter the non-existent good faith’ of the terrorists to concessions that not even the Irish Government would dare suggest. Although the two men ‘parted on good terms’, Evans reported to the Foreign Office: ‘I am more than ever convinced that Dr O’Connell’s activities are inspired primarily by a desire for cheap publicity in Dublin. He is a political lightweight with a great opinion of himself. I am inclined to doubt that either IRA faction has inspired his approach to Mr Maudling’s staff … I think he has cooked this up himself.’⁸

But Evans was wrong on the substance of O’Connell’s links with the Provisionals. On 9 March, the day after the supper, O’Connell travelled to London to meet with Harold Wilson, the Leader of the Opposition, at the House of Commons. The Labour leader agreed to see him after confirmation from the Irish Embassy that O’Connell was a man to be ‘taken seriously’. O’Connell brought a document purporting to come from the Provisional IRA setting out three conditions for ‘peace in the present conflict between the British and Irish forces’, and he indicated that the IRA would start a truce, for three days, the following night. Wilson brought the document to the Prime Minister, telling Heath he had told O’Connell that he believed none of the conditions would be acceptable to the Government and that he himself could not advocate them. Heath replied that he would inform Maudling immediately to see if the Home Secretary should meet O’Connell.⁹ The IRA peace proposals demanded the British announce their intention to withdraw from Ireland, the abolition of Stormont and an amnesty for political prisoners.¹⁰ Maudling, as it turned out, remained of the opinion that it would be ‘inappropriate’ to meet O’Connell although he was happy for the Teachta Dála (TD) to pass any information on to Wilson; the Home Secretary would then see the Labour leader.¹¹ As a result of this O’Connell sent a telegram to Angel declaring: ‘CANNOT REMAIN SILENT ANY LONGER IN FACE OF CONTINUED BRITISH INTRANSIGENCE’. Angel noted: ‘This means he is going to give the press his version of his meetings with me’,¹² which O’Connell duly did.

This was the background to what the British knew of PIRA intentions as London imposed Direct Rule. In his statement to the House of Commons, on 24 March, Heath had made clear that HMG aimed at a process of reconciliation, and he foreshadowed the release of those interned without trial, since the introduction of internment in August 1971, who were no longer thought likely to involve a risk to security. To the British it appeared that, although the Provisionals publicly rejected HMG’s policies, ‘it seems clear that the PIRA was confused by the speed of events and that there was a general drift in the leadership away from advocacy of violence towards a more political approach, leaving only MacStiofain in favour of armed militancy’. Throughout April and May 1972 leading figures in the Roman Catholic community, including Cardinal Conway and John Hume, of the SDLP, appealed for an end to violence. This call was echoed by grass root organisations including women in Belfast and Derry.¹³ And Dr O’Connell again contacted Peter Evans, at the British Embassy, to ask for an early interview with William Whitelaw who, as the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (SSNI), had assumed responsibility for governing the Province. In guarded language, O’Connell indicated that he had been in touch with the Provisionals in Dublin and that the purpose of his interview was to discuss the terms of a ceasefire. Although O’Connell undertook to be bound to secrecy, Sir John Peck was reminded of the TD’s divulgence to the press of his contacts with the Home Office.¹⁴

In the event it was June before events leading to ceasefire crystallised. On Friday 9 June, MacStiofain and David O’Connell issued a statement saying that the PIRA had been in discussion for the previous six months with, inter alia, leading Protestant churchmen, and at a press conference in Derry, on 13 June, MacStiofain invited the Secretary of State to meet the PIRA to discuss:

a. the withdrawal of British troops from Nationalist areas;

b. the acknowledgement of the right of the Irish people North and South to decide the future of the country;

c. an amnesty for internees, political prisoners and those on the run.

If the invitation was accepted within 48 hours, MacStiofain said the PIRA would call a ceasefire for seven days, providing the British Army ended arrests, raids and searches and harassment of the civilian population. William Whitelaw rejected the proposal and said he could not respond to an ultimatum from terrorists. After the Secretary of State’s statement to the House of Commons, on 15 June, concerning his proposals for PR local government elections and talks on political institutions, he met the SDLP’s John Hume and Paddy Devlin at the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), Great George Street, London – apparently the first meeting members of the SDLP had had with a British Government minister since July 1971. The SDLP representatives thought a real opportunity for a lasting peace had emerged. The Provisionals were the key to the situation. Hume and Devlin canvassed the advantages of a complete end to internment. The pressure on the Provisionals to end violence would be irresistible and there would be the possibility of ending civil disobedience and having positive talks on the ending of the ‘no-go’ areas to the security forces. A major move towards progress would be to make special arrangements for prisoners claiming political status.¹⁵

In Dublin, rumours of a ceasefire unsettled the Irish Government. Erskine Childers, the deputy premier in the Fianna Fail Government, telephoned the British Ambassador, who reported it was ‘to remind me of his earlier entreaties that any negotiation between HMG and the Provisional IRA would have disastrous consequences for the Irish Government for the general Irish situation. I called his attention to Mr Whitelaw’s emphatic rejection of the Provisionals’ latest offer, and Mr Childers repeated that any weakening on this issue would be calamitous.’ Peck then told the Tánaiste that he had recently heard the idea mooted in political circles in Dublin that ‘if we adhered to the position that we would treat only with properly elected representatives, perhaps we would not mind if they were accompanied by representatives of the Provisional viewpoint’. Childers replied that this would not matter so long as the Provisional leadership...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 ‘Talking to Terrorists’: British Government Contacts with the IRA 1972–74
• 2 Power-Sharing and the Council of Ireland: The Evolution of Irish and British Policy Strategies 1972–73
• 3 Power-Sharing
• 4 Sunningdale
• 5 A New Ceasefire: British and Republican Dialogue 1974–75
• 6 British–IRA Talks 1975–76
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index