God, Mind and Logical Space

A Revisionary Approach to Divinity

I. Aranyosi

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137280312
• eBook ISBN: 9781137280329
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Logic in Philosophy

The book offers a novel approach to the idea of divinity in guise of a philosophical doctrine called 'Logical Pantheism', according to which the only way to establish the existence of God undeniably is by equating God with Logical Space.

1

Introduction

The phrase “logical space” is one of the most frequently occurring phrases in contemporary philosophy. Countless times in the context of a philosophical debate or discussion we say something to the effect that a certain position on a certain issue is possible or makes sense for someone to hold – it is in logical space, we say. We need not agree with that position, but we consider it to make sense, or to be consistent logically. In such contexts we care about the particular position itself and we might explain it, make it more explicit, analyze it in terms of its consequences, agree with it, reject it, improve it, work it out in more detail, and so on.

Sometimes it is a different context in which we tend to use the phrase, namely, when what we care about is not a particular position on a particular issue, but logical space itself. This interest is at a meta-level as compared to the previous case, and it usually involves debates over how to characterize the very space of possibilities. The standard approach in this case has been the postulation of possible worlds as a way to regiment our modal language and order logical space. Questions related to the space of possible worlds can range from ontological ones, like “what are possible worlds?” and “are they real?”, to epistemological ones, like “how do we know whether there is a possible world containing such and such states of affairs?” and “are there unknowable possible worlds?”.

In yet another context, we do not explicitly refer to logical space, but work within a region of it, assuming implicitly that that region exists, namely that what we are talking about makes sense or is consistent. This is the case when we talk about not what is merely possible, but about what is actually the case. Since Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the birthplace of the phrase “logical space” as far as philosophy is concerned,¹ we equate the region of logical space occupied by the actual world with the totality of facts: “Facts in logical space are the world” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, section 1.13).

The idea of a logical space, therefore, deeply pervades all philosophical discussion, at some level or other, and this pervasiveness of it makes philosophy what it is, or gives its identity as a type of discourse and knowledge. If we compare it with science, for instance, we can observe that the level we have articulated in the third paragraph above, that of talking about the facts, is the most frequent in scientific endeavor, then the level we have mentioned in the first paragraph, that of possibilities, is important in theory construction, but the meta-level of talking about the nature of the space of possibilities itself is virtually absent from scientific discourse.²

Yet, in spite of this pervasiveness, or maybe precisely because of it, one hardly finds any monograph explicitly dedicated to the notion of logical space. Of course, there is a lot of literature on possible worlds and modal semantics, but, as it will turn out later, there is a lot more to logical space than possible worlds. Using an actuarial-agricultural metaphor, the framework of possible worlds offers the picture of a well-ordered infinite space of well-demarcated lots of plough land, each with its well-known kind and quantity and quality of crop. Logical space, however, will turn out to contain regions of bumpy, rough, and unstable terrain, foggy views, vague boundaries, uncertain harvest, barren fields, lush jungles, and chimeras. Moreover, it will turn out that logical space has not only a horizontal dimension, as the “possible worlds” framework suggests, but a vertical, hierarchical one as well, where some regions of space contain representations of regions of a lower order of the same space. We will get to these issues in due time, but first I will say a few words about how the mind fits into the picture as well as about the structure, the style, and the intended audience of the book.

There are two levels at which the mind comes to be relevant to logical space. One is a foundational level at which mind uncovers more and more of logical space. One could say, as Wittgenstein does, that that logical space is already there,³ and add that the mind is to discover or uncover it, rather than create it. Hence, logical space is a partly mind-dependent entity in the sense that how much and what of it is represented, and therefore relevant for philosophical discussion and disagreement, depends on what some minds have been up to in terms of uncovering and explaining or investing some intellectual work in some regions of that space. However, logical space being represented in thought is itself part of logical space, as it will turn out in the early chapters of the book, hence the mind’s very activity of uncovering logical space is no less part of logical space, and so logical space is in this sense mind independent, or “brutely there”. In effect mind and logical space are interdependent, or to apply a slogan championed by Hilary Putnam: Mind and Logical Space jointly make up Mind and Logical Space.⁴

A second level at which the mind enters the picture is via some philosophical puzzles, problems, and particularities of mental phenomena as such. Part of the motivation for this book is that we can understand these issues related to mental phenomena by a global and novel understanding of logical space. Two main topics have traditionally been considered in the literature on mental phenomena, that of intentionality and that of phenomenal consciousness, both these peculiarities of the mind being discussed in the context of how they can fit into a more general physicalist or naturalist approach to understanding the world. I will too, therefore, focus on these ones, but will also add some new sub-problems or puzzles to what has been discussed, which will motivate some of the ideas regarding logical space, which in turn will put mental phenomena in a new light. Some of the ideas I put forward in the book, especially in connection with intentionality, will no doubt be considered exotic by authors involved in the naturalization movement in the philosophy of mind; others, especially the argument I put forward for the mental-physical identity thesis, will probably find sympathetic reactions. In any case, what is important is what unites these approaches, namely, the idea that global properties of logical space are to explain local phenomena, like mental phenomena in the actual world.

Some words about the structure of the book. In Chapter 2 and 3, I offer a view about what logical space is, the extent of logical space, its basic structure, and a comparison between the present view and the standard, traditional, possible worlds based understanding. I also discuss here the question of existence or not, concreteness or not of non-actualities.

In Chapter 4, I take up the task of discussing various problems related to intentionality. Here I put forward the view that logical space is folded, that is, that there is causal interaction between distinct regions of logical space, for example between distinct possible worlds, and that happens in the neighborhood of minds, when minds “fold” a possible state of affairs onto their actual environment, as in false beliefs, illusions, hallucinations, and perhaps in some cases dreams. This property of logical space, the property of being folded, will account for various problems in the philosophy of mind and language. I consider the Thomas Theorem from sociology, and give it an ontological interpretation, based on the sketch of an ontology that I will have constructed in the previous chapters. The main point is to introduce the notion of “transistence”, that is, the causal effects of things that do not exist but are (falsely) believed to exist. The Thomas Theorem states that if people represent something as real, it is real in its consequences. This is a very important and deep idea, and it will play a role in discussion in Chapter 8, when I address problems related to religious conflict and tolerance. I also offer an attack here on the dogma that a relation holds only if its relata exist. I distinguish between a relation holding from a relation existing (relative to a logical region), and advance the point that a relation can hold between anything and anything, but a relation R between x and y exist-at-S only if both x and y exist-at-S. Next, I move to the discussion of intensionality and hyperintensionality, and offer a view of these that differs from the universally held view today that lack of substitutability of coreferential terms in such contexts salva veritate is equivalent to the lack of knowledge of identities.

In Chapter 5, I discuss the problem of phenomenal consciousness in the context of conceivability arguments against physicalism. I offer an argument for physicalism in the form of mental-physical type identity, based on a structural feature of logical space, which I call “spillover”. Spillover happens when belief that some state of affairs is an actual empirical fact forces us, through a priori reasoning, to rethink and redescribe the global logical space related to the issue at hand, and, as a result of the newly discovered global features of logical space, to gain further revisionary knowledge about the actual world. The discussion here is based on my paper “A New Argument for Mind-Brain Identity” (Aranyosi 2011).

Chapter 6 is dedicated to the issue of whether and how the a priori, or ontological argument for the existence of God, due to Anselm of Canterbury, can prove anything. I will argue that the argument is sound, but what it proves is that God is identical to logical space itself. The view, which I call “Logical Pantheism” is admittedly quite exotic, and, to my knowledge, it hasn’t been put forward, in print and in the way I put it, as a hypothesis.⁵ I argue, however, that it is the only way to have an effective ontological argument.

In Chapter 7, I consider some potential historical precedents to Logical Pantheism, and I offer some speculations on various quotes from Pseudo-Dionysius The Areopagite, Meister Eckhart, some of the Traditionalist or Perennialist philosophers, Paul Tillich, and John Hick, and argue that something like Logical Pantheism can be identified in them, although, of course, they are lacking the contemporary jargon of possible worlds or logical space.

In Chapter 8, I discuss several other problems in the philosophy of religion, which are solved by Logical Pantheism. The problem of evil is that actual evil acts or events with evil consequences are incompatible, either logically or evidentially/probabilistically, with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being. I will argue that the principle of plenitude (Logical Totalitarianism) of Logical Pantheism makes it logically necessary that actual evil occur. The modal problem of evil is in my opinion a much stronger one. It is due to Theodore Guleserian (1983), and it asserts that possible evil is incompatible with the necessary existence of God. That is, even if you have a coherent theodicy, a justification of the idea that the actual world is the best of all, you still have a problem with non-actual worlds where extreme forms of evil occur, given that God must be present in/at those worlds as well. I will argue that there are serious problems with both Guleserian’s and his critics’ proposals, and that the only solution is a non-personal notion of God, the one implied by Logical Pantheism. Further, I argue that the problems of standard, traditional Pantheism, for example, the views condemned by Pope Pius IX in 1862, do not affect Logical Pantheism. Finally, the notion of folded logical space, or transistence, which I proposed in Chapter 4, can be used as a metaphysical interpretation of religious conflict, disagreement, tolerance, and pluralism. This is the only place in the book where I consider some political issues as well, related to current debates about religious fanaticism.

The last chapter before the concluding remarks is dedicated to answering some potential problems related to Logical Pantheism, like whether it is compatible with what people refer to when they use the term “God”, whether it renders certain types of religious behavior nonsensical (prayer, worship), and whether it implies that morality is empty and life meaningless.

As for the style of the book, in general I will keep to more or less informal and only minimally technical language. Many of the ideas are new, they have not been considered yet in the literature, and what is important for me at this point is to formulate them, at least roughly, and indicate the way they help solve various philosophical problems. The parts about modality could, of course, be deepened and given a formal treatment, but at this moment such an endeavor would only divert attention from the “meaty” implications of the more novel points I will try to put forward. Many issues related to modality won’t be discussed except maybe tangentially. Similarly, there are many topics in the philosophy of mind that have not made it into the discussion except if related to the main problems I have mentioned earlier. As a consequence, I believe the book could equally be enjoyed (supposing it is enjoyable to begin with) by both philosophers specializing in the problems I discuss and by those who are merely curious about a radical view in ontology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of religion.

Part I

Logical Space

2

What Is Logical Space?

As pointed out in the introduction, the phrase “logical space” is extremely frequent in philosophical discussions, yet one hardly finds any article or monograph dedicated to the notion of logical space itself, except when it is taken as synonymous with the space of possible worlds. Wittgenstein, who introduced the phrase to philosophy in the Tractatus, never defines logical space, yet we get a clear and intuitive idea of what it is supposed to be, namely, the space of all possibilities. If that is true, then we are immediately pushed to explain what possibilities are and what it means to say that logical space is the space of all possibilities. Traditionally, it is propositions that are taken as bearers of the modal properties of possibility, necessity, impossibility and contingency, and these modal notions are in turn explained by appeal to truth at a possible world. Logical space, then, is, according to current orthodoxy, a space of possible worlds, and possibilities are propositions true at some possible world, hence, belonging to logical space. Impossibilities will be propositions that are not true at any possible world; hence, they are not in logical space. Contingencies will be propositions that are possible but false at some worlds. Necessities will be propositions that are true at all possible worlds.

In this chapter I want to argue for a somewhat different picture of logical space, according to which logical space is to be taken as containing possible worlds, but not reducible to a space of possible worlds. It is rather to be taken holistically, as a space of possible regions obtained constructively by way of logical operations on propositions. I will first argue that logical space is larger than what the “possible worlds” picture offers and that it is the absolutely largest space, or the space of the Absolute Everything. Then I will compare my picture with the possible worlds based picture. The discussion will continue in the next chapter with the issue of realism about logical space, the problem of being and non-being, the issue of how to represent propositional attitude reports, the similarities and differences between my system and Meinongian systems (Alexius Meinong, Ernst Mally, Terence Parsons, Edward Zalta), as well as some peculiarities of the structure of logical space.

2.1 Logical totalitarianism

An analogy that comes to my mind when trying to compare the notion of logical space that I want to put forward with the standard, possible worlds based picture is the difference between geometry and topology. While geometry studies spatial properties of objects in a fixed n-dimensional space, where n can take values 1, 2, 3, ... , and the properties of that given space itself, topology is the study of spatial properties that are invariant under continuous deformations (stretching, bending, twisting, but not cutti...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1  Introduction
• Part I  Logical Space
• Part II  Mind
• Part III  God
• Afterword: A God of Garbage?
• Notes
• References
• Index