Participation, Citizenship and Trust in Children's Lives

H. Warming

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781349337668, 9780230302648
• eBook ISBN: 9781137295781
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Social Sciences

This book critically analyzes and theorizes trust dynamics in children's lives and how they impact upon children's participation, citizenship and well-being, drawing on a wealth of empirical evidence that examines trust in various institutional and cultural contexts.

1

Theorising Trust – Citizenship Dynamics Conceptualisation of the Relationship Between Trust and Children’s Participation and Citizenship in Globalised Societies

Hanne Warming

This chapter explores how sociological theories of trust can contribute to a dynamic and critical understanding of children’s participation and citizenship within the new sociology of childhood paradigm. Critical is understood here as a dialectical approach which is attentive to power relations and that illuminates dynamics of discrimination, disciplining and exclusion. Using the concept of trust for this purpose might seem a bit peculiar, as many sociological approaches to trust are functionalist rather than critical, including Luhmann’s perspective which informs this chapter. However, in line with Harré (1999), I will argue that a functionalist concept of trust can underpin a critical agenda and that this can be further reinforced using Bourdieu’s relational sociology and Delanty’s theory of cultural citizenship.

The chapter opens with a brief discussion of classical trust theorising, which was characterised by universalism and a clear distinction between psychological and sociological conceptualisation of trust. I then turn to the work done on trust by Giddens and Luhmann, who conversely contextualise their theorising of (the conditions, need for and function of) trust in globalised high complex societies and move towards a more dialectical approach through including psychological as well as sociological perspectives. I argue that Luhmann’s concept of trust in trust and trustworthiness, compared to Giddens’ concept of basic trust, is more successful regarding overcoming the theoretical heritage of universalism and thus more in accordance with the new sociology of childhood. Further, I find his distinction between trust and confidence fruitful for approaching (conditions for) children’s active citizenship in globalised complex societies. Next, I present Bourdieu’s theory of practice showing how this framework can contribute to a power-attentive development of Luhmann’s trust theorising and Harré’s re-reading of Luhmann’s trust theorising, which connect dynamics of trust with democracy and active participation. I link this framework with Delanty’s quadripartite conceptualisation of citizenship and Moosa-Mitha’s argumentation for a difference-centred approach to children’s citizenship and go on to explore the relationship between trust, citizenship and the social construction of childhood. I illustrate my argument using an empirical example from an ongoing research project about trust in social work with children. The chapter concludes by pointing to the risk that prevailing societal tendencies, such as the search for evidence-based practice in social work, pedagogic etc. and the neoliberal responsibilisation of the individual, might cause negative spirals of distrust – lacking citizenship.

Trust: The theoretical heritage

Although I agree broadly with Luhmann’s point about the absence of trust in the sociological literature until he put it on the agenda (see the introduction of this book), trust has in fact been theorised in sociology since the days of Tönnies, Simmel, Durkheim and Parsons, all of whom acknowledged its role in social life and cohesion. In keeping with this heritage, Lewis and Weigert propose that from a sociological perspective trust ‘must be conceived as a property of collective units (ongoing dyads, groups, and collectivities), not of isolated individuals’ (Lewis & Weigert, 1985: 986). They thus draw a sharp distinction between the sociological concept of trust and psychological concepts, such as the concept of ‘basic trust’ developed by Erikson (1950) in development psychology. Whereas the latter addresses individuals’ inner psychological capacities and feelings, the former address a characteristic of – or, as the above mentioned classical sociologists would argue, a precondition for – sociality.

However in later theorising, this distinction is neither simple and clear cut nor regarded as appropriate. Thus, in accordance with broader tendencies in social theory, most contemporary sociological and social psychological trust theorising strives to include both the dimension of personality and the social dimension, moving towards a more dialectical conceptualisation of trust. Hence, beyond the sociological heritage, Erikson’s developmental psychological concept of basic trust (Erikson, 1950) has proven a significant source of inspiration for later sociological trust theorising. This includes the work of Giddens (1990, 1991), in which the concept of basic trust is more or less adopted, the work of Harré, who emphasises that trust ‘constitutes both a pattern of psychological dispositions and beliefs’ and ‘a pattern of moral obligations’ (Harré, 1999: 271), and Luhmann’s theorising of system internal conditions for trust formation (Luhmann, 2005: 135–46). Despite these theorists’ shared assumption of a dialectic relationship between a personality dimension and a social dimension of trust, the three authors approach this dialectic relationship quite differently as I explain below, starting with Giddens.

Adoption of the concept of basic trust

One of Giddens’ important books, in which he also contributes to our understanding of trust, is The Consequences of Modernity (Giddens, 1990). Here, he analyses how the late modern life conditions threatens our ontological security, by which he addresses a stable mental state, and changes the social relations such that personal trust must be replaced by abstract (system) trust. According to Giddens (1991), basic trust, understood as a psychological structure developed in early childhood, is the essential and universal condition for trusting one self, other people and systems. Thus in Giddens’ analyses of how the life conditions in late modernity threatens our ‘ontological security’ and changes the social relations, the individual’s psychological structure of basic trust (or distrust) developed though early childhood is regarded as decisive for the resilience towards these threats and changes. In this, Giddens’ work is typical of much sociological and social psychological trust theorising, which is directly based on Erikson’s concept of basic trust. Below I will argue that this concept runs counter to the insights which have emerged from the new sociology of childhood.

The concept of basic trust relies on a model of personality development based on temporally ordered stages, in which passing successfully through earlier stages is a precondition for non-pathological development in subsequent stages. According to this model, the capacity for trust develops through the parents’ care for the child during the first years of a child’s life. This model has been criticised for being deterministic, universalistic and incompatible with empirical findings and theories about children’s development from the new childhood studies (Sommer, 1996). Further, the concept of basic trust relies on a traditional understanding of child socialisation in which the adult care persons are regarded as the agents and the children as passive objects of this agency. This approach is not in accordance with important insights from the new childhood research (Sommer, 1996; James et al., 1998) which emphasise that: 1) the child plays an active role in interaction from the very beginning; 2) other people apart from the mother might be important in the young child’s life, depending on the societal organisation and social construction of childhood; and 3) societal, historical and cultural specific features shape the context for interaction and therefore also influence the child’s socialisation. While Giddens would probably not disagree on the latter point, as this is in accordance with his structuration theory about human action, it is not reflected in his use of the concept of basic trust.

Trust as a communicative act and system internal condition for trust

Luhmann (2005) conceptualises trust as a situated communicative act rather than as an inner feeling or an essential psychological structure. However he does acknowledge the existence of ‘system internal conditions for trust’. These are conceptualised as trust in trust. Further, besides trust in trust, Luhmann also addresses the other side of the coin, namely ‘system internal conditions for trustworthiness’ (being trusted).

The notion of trust in trust is closely connected to the concept of basic trust. But while the latter is a personal competence learned through a successful passage through an early development stage during the first year of a child’s life, trust in trust is a relational concept. Hence, trust in trust develops over time throughout life and vary according to the object of trust within a psychic system (a personality). Along similar lines, Luhmann’s notion of trustworthiness, which is mainly inspired by Goffman’s concepts of self-presentation and impression management, emphasises mutuality and the roles of social norms in the trust building process (Frederiksen, 2009: 9). This dual conceptualisation acknowledges the personality dimension as an important factor, but not as a determining factor in processes of trust building and reproduction. It also suggests that the personality dimensions of trust, that is trust in trust and trustworthiness, are not essential individual abilities, but are built up or damaged in cultural structured communication. Thus, it represents a step towards a dialectical understanding of trust that is in keeping with the new sociology of childhood approach.

Yet this framework is still quite weak when it comes to the genesis of the psychic system including the system internal conditions for trust. Indeed, the psychic system remains something of a black box in Luhmann’s theorising, which was not the case regarding Giddens’ theorising. Here however, we found the framework too essentialistic and deterministic. Thus there is a need for the development of a theoretical framework that enables a closer analysis of the role played by the social in the genesis of the personality dimension of trust as well as an account of how it changes over time. For this purpose, I suggest combining Luhmann’s work on the system internal conditions for trust with Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the relationship between individual dispositions (habitus) and the social. I introduce this framework in the next section and then develop it further in the subsequent discussion of trust and citizenship.

Combining Bourdieu’s concept of habitus with Luhmann’s work on system internal conditions for trust

Despite considerable differences between Bourdieu’s and Luhmann’s theories, at a very basic level they share a dialectic approach to the relationship between the individual and the social, as well as an autopoietic approach to society,¹ addressed through the concept of fields (Bourdieu) and systems (Luhmann) respectively. These shared ontological positions make it feasible to combine the two theories (Almlund, 2008: 9–10), however we also need to acknowledge the disagreements. These include a functionalistic (Luhmann) versus a conflictual (Bourdieu) approach to the dynamics of development and the disagreement concerning the relation between a system/field and the surrounding systems/fields. Whereas Bourdieu emphasises a hierarchy between fields, in which the field of power has an impact on the internal dynamic of all other fields, Luhmann only talks about how the surroundings can irritate a given system (Ibid.; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 90; Bourdieu, 1987: 6). This chapter is fundamentally based on the Bourdieusian approach, and the Luhmannian conceptualisation of trust is reconstructed through a Bourdieusian re-reading. Within the autopoietic approach, Bourdieu has dedicated his main efforts to illuminating domination and power dynamics such as discipline, discrimination, exclusion and not least reproduction of inequality. Thus, a Bourdieusian re-reading of Luhmann’s concept of trust enables a critical analysis of trust dynamics that is attentive to power relations.

Following Bourdieu’s thinking, habitus is generated as an internalisation of the social, including societal power structures. Habitus includes dispositions for trusting, which in Luhmann’s vocabulary correspond to trust in trust, and the personal attitude that in relation to social norms leads others to see one as trustworthy or not. The societal power structures are theorised through the conceptions of social, cultural, economic and symbolic capital, field, positions and doxa by which we can understand the mechanisms of trustworthiness as a game of symbolic capital. Within this framework, parent’s (abilities for) caring for their child is shaped through internalised and external power relations and doxas. Further, the personal capacities for trusting others do not only develop through the early child-parent relation, as it was the case within the developmental psychological approach and the concept of basic trust, but also throughout life through participation in, and incorporation of, the power structures of different fields, experiencing and learning whether others are worthy of your trust or not.

Bourdieu has been criticised for being overly structuralistic and attributing too much importance to habitus as a fixed structure (Jenkins, 1982). Seen in this light, his theory falls into the same trap as the developmental psychological concept of basic trust of assigning too great a role to early childhood in the genesis of capacities for trusting and the genesis of attitudes that promote trustworthiness. I will, however, argue that a more constructivist reading is appropriate, in keeping with Bourdieu’s own description of himself as a structuralistic-constructivist and a constructivistic-structuralist (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Though Bourdieu regards early socialisation as more important than later socialisation, he emphasises that habitus, rather than a fixed determining structure, is a set of dispositions – or more figuratively speaking a vocabulary – that will play out in different ways depending on the field in which it acts and is not a fixed determining structure like in the development stage model. He underlines the creativity of habitus, which is necessary since any given situation is never the same as a previously experienced one, and he points out that habitus develops throughout life (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 133; Delica, 2011). In response to the critique of determinism, he further points to the sociology of the social determinants, that socioanalysis, ‘can help us unearth the social unconscious embedded into institutions as well as lodged deep inside us’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 49).

It has now been indicated how Bourdieu’s concept of habitus can contribute to development of Luhmann’s theorising of system internal conditions. In the remainder section of the chapter, which addresses the relation between trust and citizenship and how this relation is shaped in globalised societies, the analytical potentials of combining Luhmann and Bourdieu will be developed based on an elaboration of Luhmann’s concept of trust.

Trust, citizenship and societal tendencies

While Giddens, in accordance with the classical sociologist, regards trust as a universal significant condition for social life and social cohesion, Luhmann, conversely, argues that its significance is conditioned by the growing freedom of individuals. In this view, trust becomes increasingly important as the degree of complexity and risk in society increases due to the role played by trust in reducing complexity. Thus, Luhmann argues that trust is far more important – but also a much more prominent phenomenon – in our highly complex societies than it was in the past. Rather than a disagreement in society diagnose, this difference between Giddens and Luhmann is due to Luhmann’s stringent distinction between trust and confidence:

If you do not consider alternatives (every morning you leave the house without a weapon!), you are in a situation of confidence. If you choose one action in preference to others in spite of the possibility of being disappointed by the action of others, you define the situation as one of trust. In the case of confidence you will react to disappointment by external attribution. In the case of trust you will have to consider an internal attribution and eventually regret your trusting choice. Moreover, trust is only possible in a situation where the possible damage may be greater than the advantage you seek (Deutsch, 1958, 1962: 302ff.). Otherwise, it would simply be a question of rational calculation and you would choose your ac...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 Theorising Trust – Citizenship Dynamics Conceptualisation of the Relationship Between Trust and Children’s Participation and Citizenship in Globalised Societies
• Chapter 2 Adult Trust and Children’s Democratic Participation
• Chapter 3 Trust Building and Violation During Childhood Consequences for Children’s Wellbeing and Dispositions for Trust in Later Life
• Chapter 4 Betrayal of Trust: Victims of Maternal Incest
• Chapter 5 Trust Relationships Between Children, Social Welfare Professionals and the Organisations of Welfare
• Chapter 6 Trust, Social Work and Care Ethics An Exploration of the Luhmannian Concept of Trust and Social Work with Children at Risk: Relating Luhmann’s Concept of Trust to the Ethics of Care
• Chapter 7 Trust and Facilitation in Educational Interactions
• Chapter 8 Negotiating ‘Children’s Best Interests’ in the Context of Parental Migration
• Chapter 9 ‘I trust my mom the most’: Trust Patterns of Contemporary Youth
• Conclusion: Potentials, Challenges and Limitations of the Trust Approach
• Index