Fathers and Sons

The Rise and Fall of Political Dynasty in the Middle East

M. McMillan

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137308115
• eBook ISBN: 9781137297891
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Geschichte des Nahen Ostens

This book traces the rise of the political dynasty in the Middle East and, in the process, provides the context for the current Arab uprising. The author shows that a father-to-son transfer of power has no basis in Islam, and yet the idea of dynastic power became entrenched in the Middle East.

Chapter 1

Companions to Caliphs

The Prophet’s First Successors

After the Prophet: The Rightly Guided Caliphs

The first of the Prophet’s successors was one of his closest confidantes: Abu Bakr (r. 632–34).1 An early convert to Islam, Abu Bakr was the father of Muhammad’s favorite wife, ‘A’isha, and a loyal companion to the Prophet from the beginning of his mission to the end of his life. It was Abu Bakr who accompanied Muhammad on his night flight from Mecca in 622, and during the Prophet’s dying days, it was Abu Bakr who led the community in prayer.

His leadership of the community was not, however, a foregone conclusion. In the confusion after Muhammad’s death, the Ansar—the “Helpers” from Medina who converted to Islam when the Prophet came to live in the city—met at the portico (saqifa) of one of the local tribes to discuss if they should stay within the Muslim community and if not, who should lead them.2 When news of this reached Abu Bakr and another early convert, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, they were so concerned the Muslim community was about to split, they raced off to the meeting, all but gate crashed it, and put forward the case for Muslim unity—but only under the leadership of an early convert.

A man named Abu ‘Ubayda al-Jarrah was also at the meeting. He, like Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, was an early convert and very influential in the community. He backed their proposal.3 Abu Bakr then suggested ‘Umar or Abu ‘Ubayda al-Jarrah as a suitable leader, and they, in turn, suggested him.4

Faced with what was effectively a coup, the Ansar succumbed to tribal differences. The Aws tribe broke ranks and pledged their support to Abu Bakr rather than have a member of their traditional tribal rivals, the Khazraj, lead them.5

Not everyone was pleased with this outcome. Many of the Ansar remained unconvinced, and there was also dissent among some of the early converts, especially those who thought Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali, was best qualified to succeed him.6 But their opposition did not prevail. The majority of the key groups in the community—the early converts from Mecca, the Ansar in Medina, and the later converts from Mecca—gave their allegiance to Abu Bakr as caliph (from the Arabic khalifa, meaning “successor”). That support enabled him to exercise power effectively and lead the community through the trials of the Ridda wars, when a number of tribes who pledged their loyalty (and paid their taxes) during Muhammad’s lifetime saw no reason to continue doing so after his death.7

When Abu Bakr fell ill in July 634, he appointed his ally at the saqifa, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, to succeed him as caliph. In many ways, ‘Umar was the most obvious candidate. Like Abu Bakr, he was an early convert, a Companion of the Prophet, and his authority within the community was immense.

A devout, austere man, strong in his personal beliefs, ‘Umar led the Muslim community for ten years, from 634 to 644, and it was during his caliphate that the Islamic world as we know it today took shape: from Persia to Palestine, Egypt to Iraq, Africa to Armenia, historic and holy cities fell one after another to the advancing Arab armies.8 The Arabian caliphate was now the Islamic empire.

In 644, after going on pilgrimage to Mecca, ‘Umar was attacked by a young slave belonging to the governor of the Iraqi city of Kufa.9 As ‘Umar lay dying, he called for a shura, a consultative council, to be convened to decide his successor.

The council was made up of six men: ‘Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law; Sa‘d ibn Abi Waqqas, leader of the conquest of Iraq; al-Zubayr, one of the conquerors of Egypt; ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf, a Companion of the Prophet who led the pilgrimage during the caliphates of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar; ‘Uthman, a well-respected early convert; and Talha, another well-respected early convert. All six were Companions of the Prophet, men of merit, and belonged to Muhammad’s tribe Quraysh.10

Their choice soon narrowed to ‘Ali and ‘Uthman. ‘Uthman, at first glance, was an unlikely candidate to be caliph since he was the only member of the shura never to have led an army. ‘Ali, by contrast, had an impressive record of fighting for the faith.11 In spite of ‘Uthman’s lack of martial ability, the Prophet was known to have thought highly of him because of the sacrifices he made in Islam’s early days. ‘Uthman was a wealthy member of the Meccan aristocracy until he embraced Islam, and he was ostracized by his family. Muhammad showed his respect for ‘Uthman by marrying one of ‘Uthman’s daughters and by arranging for ‘Uthman to marry one of his—a privilege he did not grant to many early converts.12

In the end, the shura chose ‘Uthman because he promised to govern in accordance with the Qur’an, the Sunna of the Prophet, and the policies of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. ‘Ali agreed to the first two conditions but was reluctant to limit his options by committing to the third.13 His unwillingness to concede this point was only part of the story. His candidacy faced a more difficult problem: some of the shura were uneasy about giving power to a relative of the Prophet in case it led to the creation of a political dynasty. ‘Uthman presented no such problems, and when he became caliph in 644, he appeared only too willing to fulfill his promise to the shura and adopt the policies of his predecessors.

What no one had anticipated, however, was the extent of the privileges ‘Uthman would bestow on his family. Many charges would be laid against ‘Uthman during his caliphate, but none was more damaging to his moral authority than his favoring of his Umayyad clan members.14 What motivated him to behave this way is open to debate. He was a deeply pious man so his motives were not rooted in self-interest. Whether the favoritism he showed his family sprang from a desire to rehabilitate them (many were last-minute converts who had opposed the Prophet as long as possible) or whether he wished to show them he had made the right decision in accepting Islam as early as he did is not clear.

‘Uthman’s nepotism was a consistent theme during the 12 years of his caliphate, and it took many forms: most notably his decision to place his relatives in positions of power. He made his cousin, al-Harith, inspector of the market in Medina, a position that might not seem particularly glamorous or glorious, but the office holder could, if he so chose, manipulate food prices to his commercial advantage, so it was a job that provided the means for considerable self-enrichment.15

Other members of the caliph’s family were equally fortunate. The caliph appointed his half brother, al-Walid ibn ‘Uqba, to govern Kufa;16 his cousin, Abdullah ibn ‘Amir to govern Basra;17 and his foster brother, Abdullah ibn Sa‘d, to govern Egypt.18 This last appointment was particularly shocking because Abdullah had been exiled from the community by none other than the Prophet.19 The first two caliphs had endorsed this decision and refused repeated requests from Abdullah’s family, including ‘Uthman, to allow him to return.

Within five years of assuming power, ‘Uthman had given almost all the key governorships in the caliphate to his Umayyad relatives.20 The Islamic polity was in danger of turning into a premodern version of a one-party monarchical state where access to power and privilege was denied to anyone not related to the caliph.

In many ways, the governor of Syria, the caliph’s cousin Mu‘awiya, was typical of the new elite. He was originally appointed by the caliph ‘Umar to govern the province. Now under ‘Uthman’s patronage, the territory under his control was expanded to include areas previously held separate from the governorate of Damascus to prevent the creation of a superprovince: a province so rich in resources it held the potential to become a state within a state. With more garrisons at his command, Mu‘awiya became one of the most powerful men in the caliphate.21

Mu‘awiya’s success surprised many. He hailed from the pre-Islamic aristocracy and was a last-minute convert who became a Muslim only when the Prophet conquered Mecca in 630. This late conversion left him open to the charge that his acceptance of Islam was motivated more by political opportunism than personal piety. Early converts, who embraced Muhammad’s message when the Meccan aristocracy opposed Muhammad and who also fought alongside him when the Meccans fought against him, found it hard to accept that the men who risked nothing for the faith were now reaping all the rewards.22

‘Uthman’s reliance on his family was politically unwise, but it became politically dangerous when he began treating the public finances as if they were his own. When, for example, he arranged for one of his daughters to marry an Umayyad relative, the dowry was paid from the treasury of the Iraqi city of Basra.23 The caliph was equally generous to another son-in-law: he gave Marwan ibn al-Hakam the war booty proceeds from the entire province of Ifriqiyya in North Africa, half a million dirhams in total.24

This blurring of the boundaries between public and private finances became an increasing problem for the caliph. The money he was seen to dole out to his relatives from the public treasury, the bayt al-mal, along with his parceling out state-owned lands to them for development projects was more than many in the community were prepared to tolerate.25 Dissent grew, and it came to a head at the hajj in 656, when rebels from Basra, Kufa, and Egypt—all areas the caliph had placed under the control of his Umayyad relatives—came to Medina to present their grievances to the caliph in person.26

The rebels may have intended to resolve their differences with the caliph through dialogue, but events took a dramatic turn when members of the Egyptian party stoned ‘Uthman as he preached in the mosque. The caliph was left unconscious and needed to be carried home.27 But he was no safer there than he had been in the mosque and was soon under siege.28 For the first time in years, ‘Uthman was unable to go to Mecca to lead the pilgrimage. In his absence, he asked Abdullah ibn al-‘Abbas to lead it for him.

As the siege continued, the shuttle diplomacy taking place between the caliph’s camp and the rebels failed to make any progress. Eventually ‘Ali, who had been interceding on the caliph’s behalf, gave up, claiming ‘Uthman would not listen to anyone but his Umayyad relatives.29 ‘Uthman would soon discover that the relatives to whom he had shown such generosity were not as reliable as he might have hoped. The person arguably best equipped to provide material assistance to the besieged caliph was the governor of Syria, Mu‘awiya. In the past, he had assured ‘Uthman he would deploy his considerable military assets in his defense if ever the need arose. But when the need did arise and ‘Uthman requested them, they were nowhere to be seen.30

Some of the pilgrims proved more reliable and tried to help their caliph. When the Egyptian rebels heard of this development, they decided to move against him, and by the time Abdullah ibn al-‘Abbas returned from Mecca after the hajj, the siege had reached its violent conclusion. The caliph was dead, the caliphate was in crisis, and the community dangerously divided. ‘Uthman met his end, defended by his loyal wife Na’ila, as he read the Qur’an. The atmosphere in the Holy City was so volatile that his body lay unburied for several days—it was not even ritually washed31—and had to be buried at night with only a handful of people in attendance.32

Given the turbulent circumstances of his last days, ‘Uthman did not appoint a successor. Nor did he appoint a shura to decide one. It was left to the community to find their own way. Abdullah ibn al-‘Abbas summed up the mood of many when he saw people gathering around his cousin ‘Ali, urging him to put himself forward as the next caliph. He told ‘Ali that whoever received the oath of allegiance in the wake of ‘Uthman’s death would end up being implicated in his murder.33 But ‘Ali, sidelined at the saqifa and cast aside by the shura, accepted the allegiance that was given to him. His supporters were jubilant. He had at last achieved what they believed he deserved: the succession to the Prophet.

From Consultation to Civil War: The End of the Rightly Guided Caliphate

‘Ali became caliph in 656 and his five-year caliphate saw him face very differen...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Note on Conventions
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Chapter 2
• Chapter 3
• Chapter 4
• Chapter 5
• Chapter 6
• Epilogue
• Notes
• Selected Bibliography